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Jleference, Defial)ce, and the_ U§~f.ulA.rts 
I came from an administrative law background. I thought the PTO was an 
administrative agency. But we don't teview it as if it is. There is no other 
administrative agency in the United States that I know of in which the standard 
of review over the agency's decisions .gives the appellate court as much power 
. over the agency as we have over·the¥l'O. 
-Judge S. Jay Plagerl 
The court seems inclined to let this matter slide, but I believe the decision . 
today upholding jurisdiction puts the issue squarely before us, and the 
ramifications of that decision should not go quietly unnoticed. We should not 
pretend we are reviewing judicial decisions if they are really nothing more than 
policy actions. 
-Judge H. Robert Mayefl 
One of my main messages to you is that standards of review influence 
dispositions in the Federa1 Circuit far more than many advocates realize. 
-Judge Paul R. MicheJ3 
• This Article was written when I was the Julius Silver Fellow in Law, Science, and 
Technology, at Columbia University School of Law and is in partial fulfillment· of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law in the Faculty of Law, 
Columbia University. I would like to thank Harold Edgar, Director of the Julius Silver 
Program in Law, Science, and Technology at Columbia Law School, for his helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this Article and overall support during my residence at 
Columbia Law School. I am also indebted to Richard Pierce, Jr., John Manning, and 
Rebecca Eisenberg for their valuable suggestions on an earlier version of this Article as well 
as to Walter Gellhorn and Henry Lebowitz for their infinite patience during our 
conversations. Lastly, I am grateful to the Julius Silver Program for its generous financial 
support. 
1 s. Jay Plager, An Interview with arcuit Judges. Jay Plager, 5 J. PROPRIETARYRTs. 
2, 5 (1993) (Circuit Judge, Court of Appeals for the Federal ·Circuit). 
2 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Mayer, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the standard of review applied to the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences). 
3 Paul R. Michel, Advocacy in the Federal Orcuit, C961 ALI-ABA 5, 8 (1994) 
(Circuit Judge, Court of Appeals for the Federa1 Circuit). These comments were deliver~ 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the UrJted States Supreme Cou.rt decided crrevron U.S.A. Inc. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 4 a plethora of scholarship has been 
published in the area of administrative law, most of which focuses on judicial 
review of administrative action.s However, this scholarship has never fully 
addressoo the relationship betWeen ilie CoUrt of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit6 and the Patent and Trademark Office (PT0).7 Tnis paucity of attention 
as part of a speech sponsored by the AU-ABA and the Intellectual Property law 
Association of Chicago. 
4 467 u.s. 837 (1984). 
5 See, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, 
Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, .73-CoRNELL L. REv. 
1101 (1988); Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Otizens and 
the Courts?, 7 YP.lEJ. ON REG. 1 (1990); Stephen Breyer, Judidal Review of Questions of 
Law and Policy, 35 ADMIN. L. REv. 363 (1956); Ciark Byse, hdidal Review of 
Administrative interpretation of Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron 's Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 
255 (1988); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
AdmiPJstrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989); Thomas W. Merrill, TexP.wlism and 
the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994) [hereinafter Merrill, 
Textualism]; Thomas W. Merrill, Judidal Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 
969 (1992) [hereinafter Merrill, Judidal Deference]; Abner J. Iviilcva, How Should the 
Courts Treat Administrative Agendes?, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1986); Richard J. Pierce, 
Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and 
Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 749 (1995) [hereinafter Pierce, 
New Hypertextualism]; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judidal Review of 
Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1093 (1987) [hereinafter Pierce, Chevron and Its 
.;!flennath]; Antonin Scalia, Judidal Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 
1989 DUKE L.J. 511; Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An 
Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 Dmm L.J. 984; Kenneth W. Starr, 
Judidal Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 363 (1986); Peter L. Strauss, 
One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implicatio!IS of the Supreme Cowt 's Limited 
Resources for Judidal Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1093 (1987); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 2071 (1990} 
[hereinafter Sunstein, Law and Administration]; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in an 
Administrative State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 407 (1989) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interpreting 
Statutes]. 
6 In 1982, Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act, which created the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. 
L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). The Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction 
over appeals, relating to patent law, from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences and 
federal district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1988). 
7 This Article focuses on PTO actions as they pertain to patent law. Therefore, PTO 
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may be due in part to the highly specialized character of the patent system and 
esoteric nature of its ·rules· and ··. regtftations. 8 ·Agencies such as the 
Enviromilental Protection Agency, NatioDalT.abor Relations Board, Federal 
Trade Commission, and Food and Drug Administration command a more 
substantial following among legal academics,9 possibly because the .respective 
enterprises of these agencies pertain to a larger segment of society or involve 
politically sensitive subject matter. Although the actions and internal operations 
of.theseagencies, as well as others,· ¥e unquestionably"des~ing of scholarly ·· · 
~ysis, there. are a number of compelling reasons to address how interpretive 
power1° should be allocated between the Federal Circuit and the PrO, perhaps 
the oldest agency in the American administrative state; 11 
actions relating to trademlifk law (e.g., decisions of the Trademark Trial and Appeals 
Board) will be discussed only to the extent that they are relevant to my thesis. 
8 See, e.g., Herbert C. Wamsley, The Rulemaking Power of the Commissioner of 
Patents and Trademarks (Part 1), 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 490, 491 (1982) ("Partly because 
the PrO was established before the field of general administrative Jaw became established, 
and partly because most patent and trademark lawyers are specialists, the PTO often has not 
felt the cross-currents arising from administrative law developments."); Wm. Redin 
Woodward, A Reconrideration of the Patent System as a Problem of Administrative Law, 55 
HARv. L. REv. 950, 950 (1942). 
9 For example, I reviewed four-casebooks on Administrative Law, and each one had a 
separate heading in its index for the Environmental Protection Agency, National Labor 
Relations Board, Food and Drug Administration, and Federal Trade Commission. STEPHEN 
G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATNE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY (3d 
ed. 1992); CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATNELAW (2d ed. 1994); WALTER GELLHORN ET AL., 
ADMINISTRATNE LAW (8th ed. 1987); JERRY L. MAsHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: 
THE AMERICAN PuBLIC SYSTEM (3d ed. 1992). I also read numerous Jaw review articles on 
administrative Jaw, and reviewed several more articles focusing particularly on judicial 
review. Neither the casebooks, nor the scholarly literature, with few minor exceptions, 
address the administrative law aspects of patent Jaw, specifically the relationship between 
the Patent and Trademark Office and Federal Circuit, despite the fact that the Federal 
Circuit is the busiest circuit court with respect to administrative Jaw caseload. Schuck & 
Elliott, supra note 5, at 1018 ("[T]he busiest circuit by far in the most recent period 
[1984/85] was the Federal Circuit, whose caseload was 36.4%, three times that of the D.C. 
Circuit, and two and a half times that of its closest competitor, the Ninth Circuit."). 
10 I use the terms "interpretive power" and "interpretive authority" interchangeably. 
These terms are meant to convey not only the authority to interpret regulatory statutes, but 
the overall interpretive balance of power between the Federal Circuit and PTO as it pertains 
to both legal and factual issues. 
11 The first patent statute was enacted in 1790. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 
109 (1790). The 1790 Act established a group of executive officers (the Secretary of State, 
Secretary of War, and Attorney General) who were authorized to issue patents if the officers 
determined that the inventor was the "first and true inventor" and that the invention was 
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First, technological innovation and its relationship with the law is asserting 
itself within our legal culture, and, as a result, the practical importance of 
intellectual property law, particularly patent law, is rapidly being recognized 
and embraced by society, legislatures, lawyers, and law schoolsP 
"sufficiently useful and important." Thomas Jefferson, the first Secretary of State, was 
primarily responsible for administering this patent statute. However, it was the 1836 Patent 
Act that created tile Phlenf Offic'lnmd vested it with the authority to administer the patent 
s-ys>.em. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). Thus, nearly 100 yearn before the 
New Deal and the birth of the modern administrative state, the Patent Office was examining 
and issuing patents. For a general history of the Patent Office, see P.J. Frederico ed., 
Outline of the History of the United States Patent Office, 18 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 1 (1936). 
12 See, e.g., D. CmsUM & M. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING lNTELLECfUAL PROPERTY 
LAw§ lA, at 1-2 n.l (1992): · 
J 
At no time in history has there been greater public expectation that the science and 
technology community will devise solutions to dietary, health, environmental, and other 
proble.-ns. It is to this corruTIUiiit"j that the public a.1d public officials look for L1e 
prevention or cure of heart disease, cancer, and AIDS, for better biodegradable 
materials, for more efficient energy use, etc . 
. . . This clamor for new technology comes at a time when there is public 
resistance to higher taxes, which are necessru-y to support high levels of governmental 
spending on research and development. Universities and private firms must rely 
increasingly on private financing for both basic and applied research, which may be 
unavailable without the prospect of financial return to which patents can contribute. 
Furthermore, Bruce Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of 
the Patent and Trademark Office, has recently asserted that 
fp]roperty law has been the very essence of business law for the whole history of 
capitalism, but I do not think a lot of people have realized how much property law has 
shifted from tangible property to intangible. Now we're in an era in which ... the rules 
that define what intellectual property is will be the basis of the economy. 
Reinventing the Patent Qffice, NAT'LL.J., Dec. 26, 1994, atClO. 
Increasingly, law schools are offering patent law and intellectual property courses. 
Institutions like George Mason University School of Law and John Marshall Law School 
have specific patent law curricular tracks. George Washington University School of Law, 
John Marshall Law School, and Franklin Pierce Law Center are recognized for their 
emphasis on intellectual property, specifically patent law. Furthermore, a number of law 
schools offer advanced law degrees in fields generally considered to fall under the umbrella 
of intellectual property. For example, New York University School of Law, George 
Washington University School of Law, University of Houston School of Law, and John 
Marshall Law School offer LL.M. degrees in patent law or trade regulation with an 
emphasis on patent law. Columbia University School of Law established, in 1985, the Julius 
,_t 
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Second, much of the economic literature relating to patent law, while 
espousing somewhat disparate justifications for the existence of a patent 
system, 13 clearly recognizes the patent system's 'rolE~ in encouraging 
Silver Program in Law, Science, & Technology. 
There are approximately 16 journals, law reviews, or legal publications which pertain 
specifically· or reiate in some fashion to law and technology or intellectual property. They 
· are: American Intellectffiil Property Law Association Quarterly JoUr.oal; Computer Law 
Journal; The COmputer Lawyer; Fordham Entertainment/Media & Intellectual Property 
Law Journal; Journal of Intellectual Property; Harvard Journal ofi...aw & Technology; High 
Technology Law Journal; IDEA:· The Journal of Law & Technology; Journal of Law & 
Technology; The Journal of Proprietary Rights; Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office 
Society; RutgerS Computer&·Technology Law·Joumal; ·Santa Clara Computer & High 
Technology. Law Journal; SOftware· Law Journal; Temple Environmental & Technology 
Journal; and the University ofBaltimore Intellectual PrbpertyJoumal. 
13 The most traditional economic theory relating to patent law is the "reward theory," 
which holds that there will be little or no innovative activity in the absence of patent 
protection because ideas are easily appropriated once they are made available to the public. 
See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE 
JUDICIARY CoMMrrrnE; 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., AN EcoNOMIC REviEw OF THE PATEN!' 
SYSTEM, STUDY No. 15 (1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup); Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic 
Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in RATE AND DIREcriON OF 
INvENTIVE AcnvrrY: EcoNOMIC AND SOCIAL FACI'ORS 609-25 {1962); WILLIAM D. 
NORDHAUS, INvENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE 70-90 (1969); F.M. ScHERER, 
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcoNOMIC PERroRMANCE 379-99 {1970); Richard R. 
Nelson, The Economics qf Invention: A Survey of the literature, 32 J. Bus. 101 (1959). 
Another rationale for otir patent system is the "disclosure theory." This theory holds 
that if patents were unavailable, inventors would maintain their inventions in secret in fear 
of competitive exploitation. See, e.g., Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil and Ref. Co., 
322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944); Martin J. Adelman, Property Rights Theory and Patent-Antitrnst: 
The Role q{Compulsory licensing, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 977, 982 (1977). The reward theory 
has been criticized for its failure to explain actual patent decisions. For example, there is a 
great deal of valuable and costly innovation that does not receive patent protection. In light 
of this criticism, alternate economic theories were developed. 
Professor Edmund Kitch formulated his "prospect theory," whereby he focused on the 
role of patents in post-invention innovation. Kitch emphasized the efficient allocation of 
resources thrOugh central coordination of exclusive property rights. See Edmund W. Kitch, 
The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 265 (1977). 
Professor Mark F. Grady and Jay I. Alexander offered yet another economic theory. 
According to Grady and Alexander, the reward and prospect theories do not explain actual 
patent decisions and suggest that patent protection is most likely when inventions are of little 
value but "signal a large potential for improvement." Patent protection is awarded and its 
validity upheld for inventions that fall into this category because the low value and high 
improvement potential minimizes rent dissipation in the pre-inventive and post-inventive 
stages. That is, due to the minimal value of the invention, there will be a lower probability 
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technological innovation, especially in certain industries. 14 
Third, the basis of American patent law is firmly embedded in the United 
States Constitution. The Constitution expressly authorizes Congress to 
"promote the Progress of ... useful Arts;"15 and Congress has done just that 
in the form of Title 35 of the United States Code. 16 Viewed in this light, the 
proper balance of interpretive authority and sta.-1dards of review relating to our 
patent system have constitiltional implications, which, as I will discuss, play a 
significant role in the~Fed~~al'C~ircuit's-con~tion of deference. 17 
D:l....stly, a..11d most LrnpoJ:ta,qtly, a..11 a..Tlalysis of the appropriate allocation of 
of redundant research ·and· development efforts because pioneer inventors will _be 
discouraged from· developing low value technology at the pre-inventive stage; and,) at the 
post-inventive stage, third-party inventors will be discouraged from engaging in duplicative 
research because of the prohibitive nature of the patent scope. See Mark F. Grady & Jay I. 
Alexander, PatentLawandRent Dissipation, 78VA. L. REv. 305, ns'"-21 (1992); see also 
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRAc/81-110 (3d ed. 1950) 
(Schumpeter;s anaiysis suggests that technoiogical innovation may be promoted by patent 
monopolies}. For a general economic overview of our patent system that is currently being 
written, see Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic I11eories About the 
Benefits and Costs of Patents (unpublished manuscript on file with author). For a study of 
the role of patents in the industrial revolution, see HAROLD I. DUTTON, THE PATENT 
SYSTEl\t. AND INVENTIVE ACriVfiT DURING THE ll'IDUSTRIAL P~VOLlJflON 1750-1852 (i984). 
14 See, e.g., Edwin Mansfield, Unauthorized Use of Intellectual Property: Effects on 
Investment, Technology Transfer, and Innovation, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF lNTELLECfUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 107-45 (Mitchell B. Wallerstein et al. 
eds., 1993); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research 
and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcoN. AcrJVITY 783-820 (1987); Edwin 
Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 1986 MGMT. So. 173-81; Robert 
P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH 'IECH. L.J. 1, 10-12 
nn.30-31 (1992). 
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, states: "[The Congress shall have the power t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 
The framers, employing colonial syntax as one would expect, were respectively 
referring to the works of authors and inventors when they used the terms "Science" and 
"useful Arts." In the 18th century, the term "Science" meant learning in general or 
knowledge in a vast array of disciplines. See Kenneth J. Burchfield, Revisiting the 
"Original" Patent Qause: Pseudohistory in Constitutional Construction, 2 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 155 (1989); Edward S. Irons & Mary Helen Sears, The Constitutional Standard of 
Invention-The Touchstone of Patent Refonn, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 653; Giles S. Rich, 
Prindples of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 393, 394-97 (1960); Karl B. Lutz, 
Patents and Sdence: A Oari.fication of the Patent Qause of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEo. 
WASH. L. REV. 50 (1949). 
16 35 u.s.c. §§ 1-376 (1988). 
17 See discussion infra part ll.A.2. 
-·i 
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interpretive authority between the Federal Circuit and PTO, in the context of 
patent law, has never fully been performed. 18 The need to reme<;Iy this 
scholarly void assumes a sense of \lrgency in light of the fact that the Pto, a8 
of )ate, has displayed an independent temperament, at times to the point of 
defiance, 19 and has argued for greater deference with respect to its patentability 
decisions and interpretations ofvarious provisions of the patent code (i.e., Title 
35).20 When· confronted with a question of law pertaining to patentability on 
appeal from the.fTO's Board of]~atent Appeals and .Interferences (BPAI),21 the 
18 See generally R. Carl Moy,. Judicial Deference to the PTO ~ Interpretations of the 
Patent Law, 14 1. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 406, 409 (1992) (arguing against 
deference because "the PTO is outside the class of Fed~ral agencies to whose statutory 
interpretations the judiciary owes deference"); Clarence M. Dillow lli, Judicial Review l!f 
Patent d.fi;ce Action: A More Rational Review System, 53 I. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 205 (1971). 
19 For example, th~ PTO issued a directive to examiners on March 29, 1994, 
instructing them •t6 cllsreg~ the Federal Circuit's decision in /n re Baird, 16 F.3d 380 
(Fed. Cir. 1994), whe11 assessing prima fu.cie obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. PTO ffill 
Not Follow C4FC Decision on Obviousness ofOlemical Compounds, 41 Pat. Trademark & 
Copyright J. (BNA) 500(Apr. 7, 1994). In addition, the PTO refused to follow the Federal 
Circuit's interpretation of the sixth paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 set forth in In re Bond, 
910 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. ~990). PTO Issues Directive to Examiners on Means-Plus-Function 
Equivalency, 41Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 411-12 (Mar. 14, 1991). The PTO 
followed this directive with a public notice articulating its position. PTO Notice on 
Application l!f 35 U.S.C 112 16, 43 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) (Dec. 19, 
1991). See discussion infra part ill.B. 
20 For cases in which the PTO has argued for greater deference with respect to 
patentability determinations, In re Napier, 55 F.3d 610, 614 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Brana 
51 F.3d 1560, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re McCarthy, 763 F.2d 411, 412 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (PTO arguing for greater deference with respect to patentability determinations); see 
also Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft v. Quigg, 917 F.2d 522 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (mterpretation of 
the phrase "regulatory review period" in 35 U.S.C. § 156); Glaxo Operations U.K. Ltd. v. 
Quigg, 894 F.2d 392 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (mterpretation of the term "product" in 35 U.S.C. 
§ 156); Ethicon v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (mterpretation of the phrase 
"special dispatch" in 35 U.S.C. § 305). See discussion infra part ill.B. Furthermore, 
Commissioner Bruce Lehman, in an interview with the author, stressed that the PTO should 
be given greater deference: "Deference is clearly an issue and there is no doubt where I 
stand on it. I have a very strong personal opinion that we [the PTO] should have a much 
more deferential standard of review for our cases." Interview with Bruce Lehman, 
Commissioner of the PTO, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 2, 1994). 
21 The BPAI is an adjudicative board within the PTO which hears (1) appeals from the 
patent examiner's decision refusing to issue a patent on a particular claimed invention; (2) 
questions of priority in interference proceedings between two or more inventive entities for 
the. same invention; and (3) entitlement proceedings, which are proceedings to determine 
whether the inventor or the federal government is the owner of a patent on an invention 
developed during work on a space program under the National Aeronautics and Space 
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Federal Circuit has resisted applying the Chevron doctrine.22 Instead', the court 
has adopted a highly questionable, if not erroneous, de nov~- standard of 
review. With respect to the JPTO Commissioner's statutory interpretations of 
the patent code, not directly related tO patentability, the Federal Circuit, 
although invoking the Chevron doctrine, employs divergent theories of 
statutory construction resulting, ·invariably, in a finding that the statutory 
language in question is unambiguous. In essence, the Federal Circuit, in the 
context of.patent law, hasceschewectJheChevr.on doctrine, while, at the same 
time, applied the doctrine to nonpatent related cases, including an appeal from 
the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board.23 Regarding questions of fact, the 
Federal Circuit employs a "clearly erroneous" standard of review. This 
standard is also troublesome, and like the de novo standard applied to questions 
of law, appears to be inconsistent with .Present case law, the Administrative 
Procedures Act (APA),24 and underlying policy considerations .. 
The question to be asked, is what standard of review ·best serves the 
constitutional purpose of promoting the "Progress of [the] useful Arts." My 
objective i.n this Article is to demonstrate that the JPTO's patentability 
determinations are questions of policy and, therefore, the Federal Circuit's 
standards of review, as applied to these determinations, are unsound.25 With 
Administration. J. THOM ..AS MCC.A.Rnnr, MCC.A.RTH.-i's DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 32 (1991). Of the three listed above, I am concerned only with 
appeals from an examiner's rejection because these actions directly relate to patentability. 
For a general history of the BP AI, see Michael W. Bloomer, Tne Board of Paient Appeals 
and interferences, AM. lNrELL. PROP. L. Ass'N BULL., Dec. 1992, at 188; Paul J. 
Federico, The Board of Appeals 1861-1961, 43 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 691 (1961); Paul J. 
Federico, Evolution of Patent Office Appeals, 22 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 838 (1940). 
22 See discussion infra partJI.A. This Article is not concerned with the appropriateness 
of the OJevron decision in and of itself. Given the doctrine, my focus is on the reluctance of 
the Federal Circuit to embrace the OJevron doctrine in the context of patent law. 
23 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Management Prods. Co., 994 
F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The Trademark Trial and Appeals Board (ITAB), like the 
BPAI, is an adjudicative body within the PIO. The ITAB hears (1) appeals from the 
trademark examiner's decision rejecting an application for a trademark; and (2) decides 
inter partes proceedings (i.e., oppositions and cancellations) relating to challenges to 
registered trademarks. See MCCARTHY, supra note 21, at 343. 
24 5 u.s.c. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1988). 
25 See discussion infra part TI.A.-B. Instead of appealing to the Federal Circuit, a 
patent applicant may appeal the BPAI's decision to the District Court for the District of 
Columbia. However, this Article focuses only on appeals to the Federal Circuit because 
patent applicants, in a vast majority of cases, ta..lce their appeal to the Federal Circuit. This is 
not to suggest that appeals to the district court are not worthy of discussion. In fact, just the 
opposite is true, especially in light of the fact that a civil action is a de novo proceeding in 
that it is not limited to review "on the record,; as is an appeal to the Federal Circuit. See 35 
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respect to the Commissioner's statutory interpretations, I intend to demonstrate 
that the court's "traditional factors of statutory construction,"26 which are used 
in such~·a. way as to avoid deferring to the PTO, result in irrational decisions, or 
at the very least, an alternative theory of interpretation no more convincing 
than that put forth by the PTO. 27 My principle assertion, grounded in both 
doctrine and policy, is that the Federal Circuit's judicial review of the BPAI's 
patentability determinations and the Commissioner's statutory interpretations is 
paternalistic and results, in a less than optimal balance of interpretive power. 
What i ultimately advocate, therefore, is a "paradigm shift" with respect to the 
way deference is viewed by the Federal Circuit. 
This Article is divided into three main parts. In Part ll, I review the 
standards of review employed by the Federal Circuit when reviewing the 
decisions of the BPAI. Specifically, I explore the court's treatment of questions 
of law and questions of fact. Part ill addresses the Federal Circuit's use of 
"traditional tools of statutory construction" as applied to the Commissioner's 
sta..tutory interpret..ation..s. Lastly, I discuss the policy concerns as they relate to 
the proper balance of interpretive authority. 28 
ll. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND THE PrO: A UNIQUE RELATIONSIDP 
Traditionally, the standard of review adopted by a court was dictated by 
the type of question it was reviewing, that is, a question of law or question of 
fact. However, at times, it was very difficult to distinguish law from fact, and 
the dichotirnization of such has long plagued and confused courts. 29 Indeed, 
U.S.C. §§ 144-145 {1988); see also 3 DoNALDS. CmsUM, PATENTS§ 11.06[3], 11-190 to 
11-191 (1994). 
26 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
843 n.9 (1984). 
27 See discussion infra part m. 
28 While I am critical of the Federal Circuit's judicial review analysis, it is important to 
keep in mind that, as Jerome Frank once stated, "one who calls attention to defects should 
not be presumed to be delighting in defects. The physician who publicizes the prevalence of 
a dangerous and preventable disease does not desire its perpetuation but its cure." JEROME 
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND XXVll (6th ed. 1970). Indeed, I recognize the 
perplexing nature of this area of administrative law. There are no easy answers, for Justices, 
judges, and commentators have struggled with scope of review issues for years. I am no 
exception. 
29 See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) (referring to the 
"vexing nature of the distinction between questions of fact and questions of law."); see also 
Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1, 11-
12 (1985). Among the first commentators to address this issue were Professors Kenneth 
Culp Davis and Louis L. Jaffe .. See KENNETH C. DAVlS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 
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law and fact often overlap, forming a third category called mixed questions of 
law and fact or law application to fact. 30 In light of this law-fact bluredness, 
some .have opined that because questions of law had been generally regarded to 
be within the domain of the judiciary, if a court desires to decide an issue or 
disagrees with the agency's decision, it would define that issue as one of law. 
On the other .hand, if the court wished for the agency to make the decision, the 
court would charact~rize. the , issue .~ one of fact. 31 . Despite this potential 
confusion-, once a federal appellate eourt ascertained the type of question on 
appeal, the applicable standard of review usually reflected the fact that an 
agency's decision was being reviewed. That is, the standard of review was 
generally more deferential than if a decision of an Article m tribunal were on 
appeal. As will be discussed below, the Chevron decision did away with this 
ch. 30 (1st ed. 1958); Loms L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION ch. 
16 (1965). 
30 See, e.g., JAFFE, supra note 29, at 546-47 (toward the center of the law-fact 
continuum a "finding of fact [shades] imperceptibly into conciusion of iaw. >;); see also 
Campbell v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 27 F.3d 1560, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("In cases ... 
which fall within the zone of logical overlap, '[t]here [can be] no fixed distinction [between 
questions of law and fact] .... The knife of policy alone effects an artificial cleavage at the 
point where the court chooses to draw i:he line .... "'). 
31 See, e.g., JAFFE, supra note 28, at 572: 
[W]here the judges are themselves convinced that certain reading, or application, of the 
statute is the correct or the only faithful reading or application, they should intervene 
and so declare. Where the result of their study leaves them without a definite 
preference, they can and often should abstain if the agency's preference is 
"reasonable." 
/d.; Ernest Gellhom & Glen 0. Robinison, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. 
L. REv. 771,780 (1975); Levin, supra note 29, at 8 n.41; see also William H. Rogers, Jr., 
Judidal Review of Risk .;l.ssessments: The Role of Decision 17leory in Unscrambling the 
Benzene Dedsion, 11 ENVrL. L. 301, 302 (1981). The Federal Circuit has also stated: 
When law and fact merge, "courts in such situations do not decide to defer because 
they have concluded a priori that something is a question of fact, but rather, decide 
something is a question of fact because they have concluded it is wise policy to defer .. 
. . The mixed question at issue here ... is not sufficiently close to one end of the [law-
fact] spectrum or another to permit an easy answer based on logic alone. 
Characterization therefore must follow from an a priori decision as to whether deferring 
to the [Merit Systems Protection] Board's application ... is sound judicial policy. We 
would be Jess than candid to suggest othervtise. 
i 
:: 
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law-fact distinction. 
However, with respect to the Federal Circuit's administrative caseload, 
specifically decisions of the BP AI, the issue of what is a question of law and 
question of fact is still of great relevance and leads to the application of 
standards of review less deferential than those applied by other federal circuit 
courts.32 Specifically, questions of law and questions of fact are reviewed by 
the Federal Circuit under ~c~ _ .9~ DQV() <m,A-' _clearly erroneous standards, 
respectively. In modern administrative law, these standards of review are 
rarely, if ever, applied, and it is the Federal Circuit's adoption and use of these 
standards, as well as the court's review of the Commissioner's statutory 
interpretations, which form the primary thesis of this Article. 
A. Appeals from the BPAI: Questions of Law and De Novo Review 
1. The Chevron Dedsion 
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Chevron, NLRB v. Hearst 
Publications Inc. 33 and Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB34 were generally 
considered as representative of the Court's view on deferring to an agency's 
statutory interpretation. Hearst is often cited for the proposition of limited 
judicial intervention in an agency's statutory interpretation;35 whereas Packard 
32 See discu~ion infra part II.A.-B. 
33 322 u.s. 111 (1944). 
34 330 u.s. 485 (1947). 
35 The issue in Hearst was whether "newsboys" were "employee[s]" as that term was 
used in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). If they were employees, the newsboys 
could organize; if not, however, the newsboys would be "independent contractors." The 
Court initially decided de novo the proper legal standard, that is, whether the common law 
standard applied in determining whether newsboys were employees. The Court decided that 
the common law did not apply because Congress meant for there to be a uniform standard 
in this regard. After holding that the common law did not apply, the Court decided that the 
term "employee" must be determined. in light of "the history, terms and purpose of the" 
NLRA. Until this point, the Court had not mentioned the agency in setting these legal 
parameters. However, the Court deferred to the agency in determining whether certain 
persons are employees under the NLRA. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 123-30. The Hearst Court 
also stated: 
It is not necessary in this case to make a completely definitive limitation around the 
term "employee." That task has been assigned primarily to the agency created by 
Congress to administer the Act .... Everyday experience in the administration of the 
statute gives it familiarity with the circumstances and backgrounds of employment 
relationships .... The experience thus acquired must be brought frequently to bear on 
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is seen as being at odds with Hearst and supporting a court's independent 
review. 36 Thus, for nearly forty years there existed these diverging and, at 
the question who is an employee under the Act. Resolving that question, like 
determining whether unfair labor practices have been committed, "belongs to the usual 
administrative routine" of the Board. 
In making that body's determinations as to the facts in these mattern conclusive, if 
supported by evidence, Congress entrusted to it primarily tlle decision -w"hether the 
evidP.,nce esmblished the IJ1l!!erinl fuct__s. Hence in reviewi_ng !he Board's ultirru!!e 
conclusions, it is not the court's function to substitute its own inferences of fact for the 
Board's, when the latter have support in the record .... Undoubtedly questions of 
statutory interpretation, especially when arising in the first instance in judicial 
proceedings, are for the courts to resolve, giving appropriate weight to the judgment of 
those whose special duty is to administer the questioned statute . . . . But where the 
question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which 
the agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's 
function is limited .... [f]he Board's determination that specified persons a.--e 
"employees" under this Act is to be accepted if it has "warrant in the record" and a 
reasonable basis in law. 
Hearst, 322 U.S. at 130-31 (citations omitted). 
The Court seemed to bifurcate (1) pure questions of law like statutory interpretation 
and (2) application of law to filet. With respect to the former, the court is to give 
"appropriate weight" to the agency if the agency administers the statute. As for (2), the 
agency's decision is to be affirmed if there is "warrant in the record and a reasonable basis 
in law." See also Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 4D2 (1941) (deferring to the decision of the 
National Bituminous Coal Commission that the Seaboard Airline Railway was not a 
"producer" under the Bituminous Coal Code and was therefore not exempted from its 
provisions). But see Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation 
of Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REv. 470, 473-75 (1950) (asserting that the broader issue in Gray 
was "whether the regulatory provisions of the statute authorizing maximum and minimum 
prices could be applied to deliveries of coal which involved no change of ownership."). 
36 The issue in Packard, as in Hearst, was the scope of the term "employee" under the 
NLRA. However, instead of "newsboys," the question was whether "foremen" were 
employees. A more conspicuous contrast with Hearst is that the Packard Court defined the 
issue as a "nalced question of law," and although the Court affirmed the Board's decision, it 
did not give any weight to the reasoning of the Board. Furthermore, the Packard Court did 
not cite Hearst even though the two cases involved seemingly similar issues. Arguably, 
Packard involved a "tremendously important" issue having national industrial ramifications. 
Thus, perhaps the Court thought it was best to decide independently whether foremen were 
employees; whereas ramifications related to whether newsboys were employees were 
relatively insubstantial. Nevertheless, it seems umvise to base the scope of deference on the 
subjective detenniru!!ion of importance of the issue being decided. It should also be noted 
that the Packard Court found the statutory language unambiguous. Therefore, it is uncertain 
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times confusing, approaches to deference, 37 which attempted to resolve "one of 
the most persistently intriguing puzzles" in administrative law: What is the 
proper balance of interpretive power between an agency and a court?38 
Chevron addressed this question and sought to relieve the tension associated 
with the legacy of Hearst and Packard. 
In Orevron, the issue before the Court was the Environmental Protection 
Agency~~"~(EPA) definigon of the phrase "statiollllcy sour~" in the . :P:~W. 
source review" program established in the 1977 amendments to the Clean' Air'· 
Act.39 The EPA required "nonattainment" states, that is, states that have failed 
to reduce air pollution to levels below specific ambient air quality standards, to 
establish permit programs "for the construction and operation of new or 
whether the Court would have deferred to the agency if the statute was ambiguous. 
37 See, e.g., Starr, supra note 5, at 292-93 ("Prior to O!evron, it was difficult to 
discern any single standard for judicial review of agency interpretations."); Sunstein, Law 
and Administration, supra note 5, at 2082 ("Before 1984 [the year O!evron was decided], 
the law . . . reflected a puzzling and relatively ad hoc set of doctrines about when courts 
should defer to administrative interpretations of law. j; KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. 
PIERCE, JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.1, 107-08 (1994) (Prior to O!evron, 
"[t]he [Supreme] Court ... substitutes judgment in some cases and uses the reasonableness 
test in other cases, without providing any guide as to what actuates its choices .... It has 
consistently kept the scope of review unpredictable, and for that reason the volume of 
litigation has been large."); see also Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 
35 (2d Cir. 1976), qffd, 432 U.S. 249 (1977), wherein Judge Friendly stated: 
We think it is time to recognize . . . that there are two lines of Supreme Court 
decisions on this subject [of deference] which are analytically in conflict, with the resuh 
that a court of appeals must choose the one it deems more appropriate for the case at 
hand. Leading cases support the view that great deference must be given to the 
decisions of an administrative agency applying a statute to the facts and that such 
decisions can be reversed only if without rational basis .... However, there is an 
impressive body of law sanctioning free substitution of judicial for administrative 
judgm~t when the question involves the mesning of a statutory term. 
ld. at 49. 
38 See Farina, supra note 5, at 452; see also William S. Jordan ill, Deference 
Revisited.· PoUtics as a Detenninant of Deference Doctrine and the End of the Apparent 
Chevron Consensus, 68 NFB. L. REv. 454, 458 (1989) (The ultimate question is "[h]ow to 
assure agency compliance with the law and protection of individual rights 'without 
detracting from the efficiency of the administrative agencies in their legitimate operations in 
their legitimate field."' (quoting Dean Pound, Administrative Law and the Courts, 24 B.U. 
L. REv. 201, 202 (1944))). 
39 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
840 (1984). 
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modified stationary sources" of air pollution.40 
During the Carter Administration, the EPA interpreted "stationary source" 
to mean each pollution emitting device within a plant. Thus, if a plant modified 
an existin!!: "stationarv source" or added a new one, it was required to aonlv 
- ., - ...... ., 
for a permit. When the Reagan Administration was electf<..d to office, however, 
the JEP A repealed these existing rules and adopted the so-called "bubble" 
doctrin~ .. :Under, the "bubble" approach, .a "stationary source" was defined as 
the entire plant, not each pollution emitting device.41 It became possible for a 
plant to add or modify a pollution emitting facility without having to apply for 
a permit, as long as there was no net increase in the amount of pollution 
emitted from the entire plant. In essence, the plant as a whole was viewed as 
being enveloped in a notional bubble. 
The D.C. Circuit rejected the "bubble" approach and substituted its own 
interpretation, despite the court's recognition that there was an absence of 
congressional intent regarding the tenn "stationary source. "42 However, the 
Supreme Court, i.ll'!. a l.!!l.a.nk.o1ous oph!ion, 43 reversed the D, C Circuit L! light 
of the ambiguity of the statute at issue and lack of congressional guidance, the 
Court thought it unwise that the D.C. Circuit willingly supplanted its 
interpretation for that of the agency.44 As such, the Supreme Court developed a 
two-step analytical approach (i.e., the Chevron doctrine) for addressing an 
agency's inte1vretation of law: 
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the 
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unrunbiguousiy expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines 
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does 
not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in 
the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is 
whether the agency's !mSWer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.45 
40 ld. at 840 n.l. 
41 ld. at 840. 
42 Id. at 841. 
43 Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor and Marshall did not participate in the Olevron 
N2tud T'c"r'';Coc ]~.ffn.<:e Cct'TlC'il, Inc., ·170 lJ.~.] L 11~~.') . 
. q C:;arcn, C,{:,j U.S. at 2,.:!2. 
•15 Jd. at lj42-A3. With respect to step one, a court is to use «traclition?J tools of 
statutory construction" to ascertain whether Congress spoke to the "precise question at 
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It is important to note that the Chevron doctrine does not apply to every 
governmental agency, but only to agencies charged with administrative 
authority. 46 
This two-step inquiry47 sent shock waves through the legal community and 
has provoked a tremendous· amount of commentary, both criticai48 and 
favorable.49 According to Justice Scalia, "Chevron has proven to be a highly 
important decisian·,perhaps·omorer<important in.,the field of administrative law 
since Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC';5° Kenneth Starr, then 
Judge Starr, ha8 referred to Chevron as a "revolutionary" decision;5I 
Professors Davis and Pierce have called Chevron "one of the most important 
decisions in the history of administrative law. "52 
The primary reason for this reaction is that Chevron, read to its fullest, 
would dictate that agencies assume the primary responsibility of interpreting 
federal statutes when the statutory term at issue is ambiguous or the statute is 
silent as to its meaning. The agency would assume the role of that which has 
been traditionally reserved for an Article ill court; whereas the court's 
interpretive prowess would only come into play when the relevant statutory 
term is unambiguous. Because of this shift of interpretive power, Chevron has 
been viewed by some as a "counter-Marbury. "53 However, Chevron has 
proven to be le.Ss than "revolutionary" in practice and the impending doom or 
deliverance, depending on your judicial philosophy, forecasted by many has 
not been realized.54 Nevertheless, Chevron's impact has been significant, for it 
has been cited by the federal appellate and district courts no less than 1600 and 
900 times, respectively;55 and the effect of the Chevron doctrine on the issue of 
deference has been noteworthy. 56 
issue." Id. at 842 n.9. 
46 Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) ("A precondition to 
deference under Orevron is a congressional delegation of administrative authority."). 
47 The Orevron doctrine has been referred to as the Chevron two-step. See DAVIS & 
PIERCE, supra note 37, at 109; Pierce, New Hypertextualism, supra note 5, at 749. 
48 Aman, supra note 5, at 1101; Farina, supra note 5, at 452; Mikva, supra note 5, at 
1; Sunstein,-Interpreting-Statutes; supra note 5, at 407. · 
49 Pierce; New Hypertextualism, supra note 5, at 749-50; Scalia, supra note 5, at 511; 
Starr, supra note 5, at 512. 
50 Scalia, supra note 5, at 512. 
51 Starr, supra note 5, at 284. 
52 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 37, at 110. 
53 Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 5, at 2075. 
54 Merrill, Judidal Deference, supra note 5, at 980-93. 
55 These figures were gathered from conducting a Westlaw search. My query was 
"467 +2 u.s. +2 837." 
56 According to Professors Schuck and Elliott, the affirmance rate of agency decisions 
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2. The Federal Circuit and the Chevron Doctrine 
The impact of Cfu;v,on has been lost on tt'le Federal Circuit as it relates to 
the BPAJ!'s patentability determinations;57 whereas just the opposite can be said 
about the Federal Circuit's nonpatent administrative caseload. An examination 
of the Federal Circuit's post-Chevron ad..rn.i.PJstrative 01..seload in Table 1 
illustrates this point. ss 
rose from 60.6% in 1975 (prior to Chevron) to 76.6% in 1984-85, the year aff.er CJ>.evron 
was decided. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 5, at 1007-09. 
57 A patentability determination is an informal adjudication because a hearing is not 
statutorily required. A formal adjudication is "required by statute to be determined on the 
record after opportunity for an agency hearing." See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988). It should be 
noted, however, that a patent applicant may request a hearing upon paying a fee. See 35 
U.S. C. § 41(a)(6) (i988). The BPAI is required to grant a hearing if such is requested. See 
37 C.F.R. § 1.194 (1994). Regardless of the informal nature of a patentability 
determination, the PTO, like other agencies involved in informal adjudication, is required to 
produce a record of the informal proceeding. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Parle, Inc. v. 
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973). As such, if an applicant 
appeals an adverse decision of the BPAI, "the Commissioner shall transmit to the [Federal 
Circuit] a certified list of the documents comprising the record in the Patent and Trademark 
Office." Furthermore, "the Commissioner shall submit to the [Federal Circuit] in writing 
the grounds for the decision of the [PTO], addressing all the issues involved in the appeal." 
See 35 U.S.C. § 143 (1988). With respect to an issued patent, the examiner must ensure 
that the patent prosecution record is complete and that the reasons for allowing the patent 
are "evident from the [prosecution] record." See PATENT AND TRADEMAJUC OFFICE, 
MANuAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1302.14 (5th ed. 1983 & Supp. 1989) 
[hereinafter M:PEP]. If the examiner determines that the file history is not clear as to the 
reasons for allowance, she may, under 37 C.F.R. § 1.109, provide additional reasons for 
allowing the patent to issue. The MPEP states: 
[W]here the examiner's actions clearly point out the reasons for rejection and the 
applicant's response explicitly represents reasons why claims are patentable over the 
reference, the reasons for allowance are in all probability evident from the record and 
no statement should be necessary. Conversely, where the record is not explicit as to 
reasons, but allowance is in order, then ... the examiner [under 37 C.F.R. § 1.109] 
should make reasons of record and such reasons should be specific. 
M:PEP supra, § 1302.14. 
58 Column A reflects those agencies over which the Federal Circuit has appellate 
jurisdiction: (1) Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB); (2) International Trade 
Commission (ITC); (3) Patent and Trademark Office (BPAIIITAB); (4) Board of Contract 
Appeals (BCA); (5) Court of Federal Claims; (6) Court of Veterans Appeals (CVA); and (J) 
International Trade Administration (Commerce). The "Commissioner of PrO" reflects the 
----·~ 
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statutory interpretations of the Commissioner, not directly related to patentability, which 
were initially appealed to a federal district court. I will discuss these cases in detail in part 
ID.B. Column B posed some difficulties. There are some problems in deciding which cases 
include a deference issue. For example, as Professor Thomas W. Merrill, to whom I am 
indebted for the idea of constructing Table 1 above, points out: "[I]t is commonly perceived 
that there are many cases in which the Court substitutes its judgment for that of the agency 
and fails even to mention the possibility of deference." See Merrill, Judicial Deference, 
supra note 5, at 981 n.51 (although Merrill was referring to the Supreme Court, the same 
principle applies to the Federal Circuit). Professor Merrill also states that "[o]n the other 
hand, it would be very difficult to determine all the cases involving a question of federal 
statutory interpretation." Jd. Therefore, I conducted a Westlaw search and selected only 
cases which cited OJevron. This search was conducted on Apri13, 1995~ My search query, 
as in the CAFC database, was "DA(aft 10-1-84) and AB(name of agency) and 467 +2 U.S. 
+2 837." I realize that I may have missed some deference cases, but my main concern is 
with those cases that cited OJevron and applied (or did not apply) the two-step doctrine. In 
column C, I included cases which affirmed the agency in its entirety or affirmed the agency 
in part (the part being the issue relating to deference), In column D, the criteria I used to 
determine if the Federal Circuit applied the OJevron doctrine was whether the court quoted 
the two-step doctrine and proceeded to analyze the case within that framework, or 
structured its analysis around the doctrine. I did not include decisions that merely cited 
OJevron or asserted the proposition that "if an agency administers a statute its decision is 
entitled to deference if it is not inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute." In other 
words, there was no analysis within the OJevron framework. This approach does not run 
the danger of exaggerating the effect of OJevron and its influence on the Federal Circuit's 
administrative caseload. Indeed, there were cases that expressed what could be considered 
as reflecting the spirit of OJevron. Lastly, column E reflects cases that found statutory 
ambiguity and were decided at step two of OJevron (i.e., a reasonableness determination). 
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A 
Agenc~, 
Name 
MSPB 
ITC 
BPAI 
TTAB 
BCA 
Court of 
,~;:~ 
CVA 
Commerce 
Comm'rof 
PTO 
TABLE 1 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT POST-CHEVRON 
ADMINISTRATIVE CASELOAD 
B c D 
Chevron Agency Chevron 
Cited Affirinoo Doctrine 
Applied 
21 12 3 
8 6 4 
0 0 0 
2 2 1 
3 1 1 
18 13 7 
I 
5 4 2 
11 9 3 
3 0 
I 
3 
E 
Decision 
.... Based on 
Step 2 
3 
2 
0 
1 
1 
6 
I 
0 
3 
0 
I do not mean to suggest that Chevron has had a "revolutionary" impact on 
the Federal Circuit's administrative caseload; nor am I asserting that the court 
has consistently applied Chevron to non-patent related cases. Rather, my point 
is that a panel majority has not only cited Chevron, but has applied it to every 
adjudicative body except the BPAI,59 including the: (1) International Trade 
Commission;6° (2) Merit Systems Protection Board;61 (3) Court of Federal 
59 Although the Federal Circuit has applied the OJevron doctrine to the 1T AB and the 
statutory interpretations of the Commissioner, the court has never applied the doctrine to a 
patentability determination of the BP AI. Moreover, Otevron has been cited only in a 
dissenting opinion. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1577 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Mayer, J., 
dissenting). 
60 See, e.g., Texas Crushed Stone Co. v. United States, 35 F.3d 1535, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) (applying O!evron doctrine); Tell"" Tn,;:truments Inc. v. United States Int'! Trade 
Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1993), dismissed, 1994 WL 745517 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) (same); Chaparral Steel Co. v. UnitedStates, 901 F.2d 1097, 1101 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(same); Lannom Mfg. Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 799 F.2d 1572, 1579-80 
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (same); Springfield Indus. Corp. v. United States, 842 F.2d 1284, 1285-
86 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (same); see also Avesta AB v. United States, 914 F.2d 233, 236-38 
(Fed. Cir. 1990), cerl. denied, 499 U.S. 920 (1991); Borlem SA Empreedimentos 
Industriais v. United States, 913 F.2d 933 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Corning Glass Works v. United 
I 
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Claims;62 (4) Board of Contract Appeals;63 (5) Court of Veterans Appeals;64 
and (6) Secretary of Commerce (i.e., International Trade Administration).65 
What is most telling, however, is that the Federal Circuit, in Eastman Kodak v. 
Bell Document Management Products Company, 66 applied the Ch...P\!Ton 
doctrine to an appeal from the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board, a close 
relative of the BP AI. 
' · "' 'In EaStman Kodak; ·Bell & Howell (B & H) filed'"an intent.,to-use trademark . 
application under 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) in an attempt to register the numbers 
States Int'l Trade Comm 'n, 799 F.2d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1986); American Lamb Co. v. United 
States, 785 F.2d 994, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
61 See, e.g., Vesser v. Office of Personnel Management, 29 F.3d 600, 604 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) (applying O!evron doctrine); Wassenaar v. Office of Personnel Management, 21 
F.3d 1090, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (same); see also Osbiver ex rei. Osbiver v. Office of 
Personnel Management, 896 F.2d 540, 541 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Money v. Office of Personnel 
Management, 811 F.2d 1474 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Morgan v. Office of Personnel 
Management, 773 F.2d 282 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In determining the validity of an 
administrative regulation, the court stated in Morgan that 
[a]s long as the regulation reasonably implements the purpose of the legislation and 
is not inconsistent with any constitutional or specific statutory provision, we have no 
basis on which to overturn it .... We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the 
agency with respect to the determination of which requirement will best serve the 
statutory purpose. 
ld. at 287. 
62 See, e.g., Chacon v. United States, 48 F.3d 508 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("When we 
consider the merits of a party's challenge to an agency's interpretation of a statute it has 
been charged with administering, we take our analytic framework from the Supreme 
Court's decision in Olevron .... "); DeCosta v. United States, 987 F.2d 1556, 1558-59 
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (applying Chevron doctrine); Essex Electro Engineers, Inc. v. United 
States, 960 F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 408 (1992) (same); Collins 
v. United States, 946 F.2d 864, 868-69 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (same); Pine Products Corp. v. 
United States, 945 F.2d 1555, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (same); New York Guardian 
Mortgagee Corp: v. United States, 916 F.2d 1558, 1559..:c6Q (Fed;· Cir; 1990) (same). 
63 See, e.g., United States v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 927 F.2d 575, 578 (Fed. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 (1991) (applying Chevron doctrine). 
64 See, e.g., Skinner v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1571, 1572-73 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (applying 
O!evron doctrine); Gardner v. Brown, 5 F.3d 1456, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (same), ajf'd, 
115 S. Ct. 552 (1994). 
65 See, e.g., Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) ("Our review •.. is guided, however, by the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron . 
. . . "); Suramerica de Aleaciones I.aminades, C.A. v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 665 
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (applying Chevron doctrine). 
66 994 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
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"6200," "6800," and "8100. "67 The examiner approved the applications for 
publication in the principal register. Upon their publication, Eastman Kodak 
filed an opposition to these marks stating that they were "merely descriptive," 
a.'ld should not be registered.63 Under the La.'lha.T. Act,69 which goverr..s the 
federal registration of trademarks, § 1051(b) precludes registration of a mark if 
it "oo!l..sists of a mark which ... when used on or in connection with the goods 
of the applicant is ':merely descr~ptive ..• of them." The examiner, in ruling 
for B & H, asserted that the numerical marks were not "merely descriptive. "70 
Kodak appealed u'1e exarniner's decision to u'1e Trademark Trial ru!d Appeals 
Board (ITAB). After the ITAB affirmed the examiner, Kodak appealed to the 
Federal Circuit.71 According to the Federal Circuit, "[t]he statute on its face 
neither requires nor precludes the Board's interpretation. "72 fu other words, the 
statutory provision (i.e., "merely descriptive") was ambiguous. Instead of 
reviewing the applicable law de novo, the Federal Circuit applied the "Chevron 
doctrine," deferred to the TT AB, and held that the Board's decision was 
"reasonable" under step two of Ou:vron.73 
Thus, the Federal Circuit has ushered Ch.evron into t.he realm of trademark 
law _74 But instead of following this approach and applying the Chevron 
doctrine when reviewing questions of patentability arising from the informal 
adjudications of the BPAJ,75 the Federal Circuit has adopted a de novo 
67 ld. 
63 !d. An "opposition" is a proceeding before the IT AB whereby a person who 
believes she will be injured by the federal registration of a trademark can oppose the 
registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (1988). 
69 15 u.s.c. §§ 1051-1178 (1988). 
70 Eastman Kofklk, 994 F.2d at 1570. 
71 !d. at 1570-71. 
72 !d. at 1572. 
73 !d. at 1571-73. Keep in mind that this was a trademark case. The degree of 
expertise needed to determine whether a mark is "tradernarkable" does not approach that 
which is necessary in examining complex inventions for patentability purposes. I will 
discuss the "expertise" of the patent examiners and the BP AI in part N .C, infra. 
74 This is particularly relevant because the Commissioner of the PrO derives his 
congressionally delegated authority to grant and issue patents and trademarks from the same 
statutory source. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1988). I discuss the statutory delegation provisions 
of the BPAI and ITAB in part ll.A.3.b., infra. 
75 It is important to note that although 01evron was a rulemaking case, it is well 
established that the Chevron doctrine applies to adjudications. See, e.g., NLRB v. United 
Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1987, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987); Fall River 
Dyeing and Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 42-43 (1987); Kohler Co. v. Moen 
Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 633-34 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying Chevron to a Trademark Trial and 
Appeals Board adjudication); Eastman Korlak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document 
Management Prorls. Co., 994 F.2d 1569, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (applying Chevron to 
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standard of review; 76 despite the fact that the use of de novo review by federal 
appellate courts is extremely rare and "is reserved for extraordinary cases. "77 
The de novo standard was first enunciated in 1990 by the Federal Circuit 
Trademark Trial. and Appe$ Board adjudication); Midtec Paper Corp. v. United States, 
•' l.~f.~~.: ··~··'),. ·:~·· ,. ,.;:; ......... ~:":?.~:;. - ···-· - ':.._ . ...,_~ ';'" -~'"'·· - --~ . . 
857 F.2d 14&7, 14~97 (D;C~ Cir. 1988); National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. F;E.R.C., · 
811 F.2d 1563, 1569-70 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 869 (1987); BERNARD 
ScHwARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW§ 10.35, 703-05 (1994). 
76 See, e.g., In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (applying de novo 
review to the "on-sale" bar and "public use" bar}; In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1582 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994) ("This court reviews the Board's determination of obviousness de novo."); In re 
Harvey, 12 F.3d 1061, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("Obviousness is a question of law which we 
review de novo. j; A via Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc. 853 F.2d 1557, 
1561-62 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (patent validity is a question of law); Paperless Accounting, Inc. 
v. Bay Area Rapid Transit System, 804 F.2d 659, 664 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 
U.S. 933 (1987) (whether the specification is enabling is a question oflaw to be reviewed de 
novo). 
77 ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYI'ON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 459 (1993); 
See also 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 
174 (1994); Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971) 
(De novo review is to be applied in only two circumstances: (1) "when the action is 
adjudicatory in nature and the agency factfinding procedures are inadequate" and (2) "when 
issues that were not before the agency are raised in a proceeding to enforce nonadjudicatory 
agency action."); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 141 (1973) ("It is quite plain from our 
decision in Qtizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Vope, that de novo review is appropriate 
only where there are inadequate factfinding procedures in an adjudicatory proceeding, or 
where judicial proceedings are brought to enforce certain administrative actions.") (citation 
omitted). It should also be noted that de novo review may be guaranteed by statute, but such 
a provision does not exist in Title 35. 
To my knowledge, the administrative courts of Germany are the only tribunals in an 
industrialized country to employ de novo review of legal determinations of an agency. See 
MAHENDRA P. SINGH, GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN CoMMoN LAw PERsPECTIVE 65 
(1985) (The administrative law courts "[c]an go into all questions of legality whether 
apparent on the· face of the record or hidden in or behind it and can also replace the 
administrative determination by their own;"). Singh cites § 113(2) cl.3 of the Law on 
Administrative Courts, which states that an administrative law court "may also order the 
gr<>...nt of a benefit in addition to invalidation of an administrative action. For example, if 
denial of licence by an administrative authority is found to be wrong by the court, it may 
not only invalidate the order of denial, but also order that licence be granted." In the United 
States, there was an attempt, in 1975, to codizy de novo review of agency questions of law. 
Senator Dale Bumpers of Arkansas, in an attempt to encourage courts to play a more active 
role in reviewing agency decisions, introduced a bill, which was ultimately defeated, to 
amend § 706 of the AP A requiring courts to review all questions of law "de novo" and 
"independently." 
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in In re Kulling, 73 and since its adoption, the court has failed. to explain., 
analyze, or define exactly what it means by de novo review. One could assume 
that de novo implies independent review, and there is federal Circuit support 
for t~is asswTJption. 79 However, if this is correct a.."ld it cer*ulli"'lly appears to be, 
73 897 F.2d 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
79 In a 1979.opinion ofthe..Court ofCust()ms•:.!lJld Patent.Appeals, a predecessor to the 
Federal Circuit, the court stated: 
[O]bviousness is a legal conclusion based on factual evidence, . ·. . and not a 
factual determination. Therefore, the proper issue before us is whether the board 
[BPAI] erred, as a matter of law, in holding that the claims were properly n:jected 
under 35 U.S.C. § 103. In deciding this issue, the court will make "an independent 
determination as to the legal conclusions and inferences which should be drawn from .. 
. [the findings of fact]." 
In re Carleton, 599 F.2d 1021, 1024 n.14 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (citations omitted). 
See also G-ardner v. Tee Sys., Inc., 725 F.2d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1984), ce/1. 
denied, 469 U.S. 830 (1984) ("A conclusion on obviousness is one of law and subject to full 
and independent review in this court."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 830 (1984); In re Vaeck, 
947 F.2d 488, 493 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Obviousness is a legal question which this court 
independently reviews .... "). However, Judge IVfichel, in a recent speech, put somewhat 
of a different spin on this interpretation of de novo: 
For issues catego~ by precedent as issue of law, our revie-vv is termed "de 
novo." An example is in-validity for obviousness. However, since we do nothing truly 
"anew," this standard is better expressed as "simple error" or "free review," i.e., 
neither mandatory nor fixed deference. Now that does not mean no deference can or 
will be afforded in a particular case, but only that we are free to deny or limit deference 
according to the specifics of the case. Only where the issue is one of pure law, ll!l 
statutory construction usually is, is our review truly independent. Then there is little or 
no deference to the court or Board being reviewed. 
Michel, supra note 3, at 9. 
What exactly does Judge Michel mean when he says that the court is "free to deny or 
limit deference according to the specifics of the case?" What are these specifics? Perhaps de 
novo review can mean whatever the Federal Circuit wants it to mean. More likely, 
however, de novo review as applied by the Federal Circuit is in accord with Professor 
Farina's definition: 
The term 'de novo' is not meant to suggest that the court will necessarily try the 
case afresh. Indeed, in many instances, the case will proceed on a record compiled 
before the agency. Rather, the decision is de novo in the same sense that we speak of 
an appellate court reviewing, de novo, a trial court's conclusions of law: the court will 
reach its own independent conclusion on the record before it. 
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the Federal Circuit's analytical framework for reviewing questions of law is in 
direct contravention of the Chevron doctrine. 80 
The Federal Circuit's view on the deference doctrine generally and the 
court's apparent disregard for Chevron specifically can be illustrated by 
examining how the court approaches a nonobviousness determination. 81 
According to the Federal Circuit, although a nonobviousness determination 
entails a number of antecedent factua4consideratio~::w.hich are re.v:i~waLunder 
the "clearly erroneous" standard, 82 the ultimate question of nonobviousness is 
one of law to be reviewed de novo. 83 I choose nonobviousness because it is the 
Farina, supra noteS, at 453 n.7. 
See 35 U.S.C. § 144 (1988) ("The [Federal Circuit] shall review the decision [of the 
BPAI] on the record before the Patent and Trademark Office."). 
80 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
81 The statutory basis for a nonobviousness determination is embodied in 35 U.S.C. § 
103: 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or 
descnbed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject 
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole 
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made by a person having 
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. 
35 u.s.c. § 103 (1988). 
Even if an invention is novel and has utility it may nevertheless be unpatentable if it 
discloses and claims a trivial advancement in the art; in other words, if it is obvious. The 
nonobviousness requirement assures that the inventor contributes something to society 
before she is granted a 17 year exclusive right to exclude others from making, selling, or 
usirig her invention. It wasn't until 1850 that nonobviousness became a requirement for 
patentabilitY. In the Supreme Court case of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 
248 (1850), the Court rejected a patent because itlacked the "degree of skill and ingenuity 
which constitute essential elements of every invention." /d. . at 266. This notion of 
"invention" or "inventiveness" became an additional requirement for patentability, but it 
was a vague concept, easily manipulated by a court. This led to a lack of unifonnity in its 
application. Therefore, in 1952, Congress created-§ 103, above, in an-attempt to .. lend 
structure and coherency to what became known as the nonobviousness requirement. In 
1966, the Supreme Court recognized that§ 103 was a "codification" of Hotchkiss. Graham 
v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). 
82 See irifra part ll.B. for a discussion on the Federal Circuit's review of questions of 
fact. 
83 See supra note 76 for cases holding that a nonobviousness determination is a 
question of law. The legislative requirement for nonobviousness was reiterated by the 
Federal Circuit in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) The factual 
determinations include the (1) scope and content of the prior art; (2) differences between the 
prior art and the claims at issue; (3) level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and (4) the 
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most litigated issue relating to patent validity34 and, arguably, the most 
important patentability requirement. In fact, some commentators have called it 
the "ultimate condition of patentability"35 and the "final gatekeeper of the 
patent system. "36 11. 1985, one year cu.4:er Chevron was decided, the PTO, in an 
appeal from a BP AJ! decision rejecting a claimed invention as obvious, argued 
that the Federal Circuit should grant the BP AJ! greater deference. The Federal 
-Circuit was less than receptive: . · -
The Commissioner, through the Solicitor, raises the threshold question of the 
sc...ope of appellate review. The Commissioner urges the novel position that this 
court's role, in fulfillment of the mandate of 35 U.S. C. §§ 141-144, is limited 
to an inquiry as to this appeal, the Commissioner states "[t]here is a mtiorud 
basis for the Board decision. Consequently, there would not be reversible error 
therein." 
... We have articulated, on occasion, the standard by which we review a 
Board determination that a claimed invention would have been obvious under 
35 U.S.C. § 103. Obviou...c:ness is a conclusion of law. It is our responsibility, 
as for all appellate courts, to apply the law correctiy; without deference to 
Board determinations, which may be in error even if there is a rational basis 
therefor. 37 
so-called "objective" indicia like commercial success and long felt need.) After these factual 
determinations are made, the question becomes would the claimed invention have been 
obvious to a person having ordinary s..lcill in the art at the time the invention was made. This 
latter inquiry is, according to the Federal Circuit, a question of law. See CHISUM & JACOBS, 
supra note 12, at 2-58 (The Graham opinion "for the most part, merely restates the 
language of Section 103. ");see also Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg., 310 F.2d 1561, 1566 
(Fed. Cir.), cel1. denied, 481 U.S. 1052 (1987). The Federal Circuit's characterization of 
nonobviousness as ultimately a que.,'tion of law is in and of itself somewhat troublesome. In 
fact, a nonobviousness determination is actually a mixed question of law and fact; or, as 
some have argued, a question of fact. See Jens H. Hillen, Note, The Coul1 of Appeals for 
the Federal Qrcuit: irzdependent Review of Patent Dedsions and the Constitutional Facts 
Doctrine, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 187 (1993); Bradley G. Lance, Note, A Proposal to View 
Patent Oaim No110bviousness from the Policy Perspective of Federal Rule of Ovil 
Procedure 52(a), U. MICH. J.L. REP. 1157, 1200 (1987). However, it is not my intention to 
challenge the Federal Circuit's characterization of nonobviousness as ultimately a question 
of law based on underlying fu.ctse P~ther 1 assuming such is true, I am more concerned with 
the applicable standard of review. 
84 See CHISUM, supra note 25, at 11-102. 
85 See NONOBVIOUSNESS-TH:E ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John F. 
Witherspoon ed., 1980). 
36 See RoBERTP. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 379 (1992). 
!!7 In re McCarthy, 763 F.2d 411, 412 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). Most 
recently, the PTO has argued for greater deference in in re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 
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Given the fact that the statutory term "obvious," as I will discuss below, is 
an ambiguous and undefined term, 88 the court's appellate review framework is 
exactly what Otevron so strongly denounced. As a recent empirical study 
demonstrates, this lack of deference is reflected in the BP AI' s affirmance rate 
with respect to decisions based on § 103 (i.e., nonobviousness).89 This study 
found that 35 U.S.C. § 103 issues on appeal from the BPAI were affirmed 
-79% ·of"'the time;90 Initially, one may presume,"'as does .. fuis,swdy, that a 19·.%,, 
affirmance rate is high. What this means, however, is that roughly one in every 
five § 103 appeals from the BP AI is either reversed or vacated. When 
compared to the Federal Circuit's 95% and 91% affirmance rates of MSPB and 
ITC decisions, respectively,91 the 79% affirmance rate does not appear so 
deferential. This is especially true given the highly technical nature of the 
patentability determination. 
Although correlation is not causation, it is at least plausible, if not 
probable, that the Federal Circuit's de novo review of the BPAI's 
nonobviousness determinations is a strong factor in the court's 79% affirmance 
rate. Because nonobviousness is an extremely important, if not the most 
important, requirement in a patentability determination, this low affirmance rate 
is troublesome in that it suggests that the court is supplanting its interpretation 
of the nonobviousness requirement in place of the BPAI's. Furthermore, the 
court's use of de novo review calls into question the very existence of the PTO 
as an administrative agency, and compels us to focus on the Federal Circuit's 
reasoning behind its "checkerboard" deference policy.92 Why is the Federal 
Circuit so resolute in its application of de novo review to questions of law on 
appeal from the BP AI, especially § 103 nonobviousness determinations? 
Another way of asking the same question is why is the Federal Circuit reluctant 
to apply the Chevron doctrine to questions of law on appeal from the BP AI, yet · 
is willing to apply the doctrine to non-patent related cases? I believe there are 
primarily three answers to these questions, which are also challenges to my 
thesis. 
1995), and In re Napier, 55 F. 3d 610 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
88 See infra notes 154-57. 
89 Donald R. Dunner et al., A Statistical Look at the Federal arcuit's Patent 
Decisions: 1982-1994, 5 FED. CmcurrB.J. 151 (1995). 
90 ld. at 163. 
9l ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECfOR OF THE ADM. OFF. {1983-94). It should be noted that 
while the Annual Report is not broken down issue by issue (i.e., § 102 or § 103), the 
affirmance rate was roughly 80%, almost the same as that put forth by Dunner et al., supra 
note 89. · 
92 I use the term "checkerboard" to mean an inconsistent application of a particular 
rule or principle to similar situations justified on policy considerations. See RoNALD 
DwORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 178-84,217-18 (1986). 
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3. A Look Behind De Novo Review: Some Answer.s and Challenges 
a. 111e "Uniformity" and "Specializalion" Challenge 
This challenge asserts that the characterization of patent validity as a 
·- · question- of law, to be reviewed under the de novo standard;· promotes 
uniformity in the application of our patent laws,93 and Congress created the 
Federal Circuit for this very purpose.94 Therefore, if the PrO were granted 
greater deference, the Federal Circuit's review of the patentabilit-y 
requirements, as initially interpreted by the PrO, would differ depending upon 
whether the appeal was from the BP AI or a federal district court. This would 
lead to one set of validity standards for the BPAI and another for federal 
district courts. For example, this argument asserts that under my proposal, the 
BPAI, in affirming an examiner's rejection, may interpret an ambiguous 
statutory tenn and that interpret..ation will be given Chevron deference by th.e 
Federal Circuit. Assuming the interpretation is reasonabie, the BP AI will be 
affirmed. On the other hand, with respect to an issued patent, that same 
interpretation, reviewed de novo, may be overruled by the Federal Circuit, 
even though reasonable, because the court does not agree with the examiner's 
interpretation. 
The answer to this dilemma is for the Federal Circuit to provide, as it now 
does, the same degree of deference to the PTO, whether the appeal is from the 
BPAI (rejected claimed inventions) or a federal district court (issued patents). 
However, the degree of deference presently accorded to the PTO and district 
courts, although the same, does not necessarily result in an optimal balance of 
interpretive power. That is, although the same degree of deference shouid be 
accorded by the Federal Circuit, the degree accorded should foster an optimal 
balance of interpretive authority. As long as the same degree of deference is 
applied to PTO patentability decisions, stability and uniformity will not be 
threatened. 
Another aspect of this challenge suggests that the Federal Circuit is a 
specialized court with the necessary expertise to handle patent cases. Yet a 
majority of the judges on the Federal Circuit possesed little if any prior patent 
experience before coming to the bench. Furthermore, the legislative history 
93 See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg., 810 F.2d 1561, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("One 
effect of considering the § 103 question one of law in this court is to fucilitate a consistent 
application of that statute in the courts and in the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). "), 
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1052 (1987). 
94 See H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-23 (1981); S. REP. No. 275, 97th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6 (1981). 
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makes it clear that it was not the intention of Congress to make the Federal 
Circuit a "specialized court. "95 
In addition, the creation of the Federal Circuit was prompted by a post-
issuance phenomenon. The lack of uniformity in the application of the patent 
laws was due· to the disparities extant in the regional circuit courts, not the 
PrO. A patent issued by the PrO may have been declared invalid in one 
·circuit court; ·but,;;:jts .validity11pheld in another.96 Thus, one of the•,:primary '''flr~.~. i"·' 
policies behind the creation of the Federal Circuit was to prevent forum 
shopping by patentees and alleged infringers,97 and had very little, if anything, 
to do with the competency of the PTO or its application of the patent laws.98 
The PrO is just as able, if not better suited, than the Federal Circuit to 
interpret the patentability requirements. In fact, as I will discuss below, by not 
defining the patentability requirements, Congress · delegated to the PTO the 
authority to interpret the statutory provisions relating to patentability;99 and 
there are cogent policy considerations which support this conclusion. 100 
A brief review of the history of § 103 nonobviousness further illustrates 
95 See H.R. REP. No. 312 at 19 ("By combining the jurisdiction of the two existing 
courts along with certain limited grants of new jurisdiction, the bill creates a new 
intermediate appellate court markedly less specialized than either of its predecessors and 
provides the judges of the new court with a breadth of jurisdiction that rivals in its variety 
that of the regional courts of appeals. The proposed new court is not a "specialized court." 
Its jurisdiction is not limited to one type of case, or even to two or three types of cases. 
Rather, it has a varied docket spanning a broad range of legal issues and types of cases."); 
S. REP. No. 275 at 6 ("[The Federal Circuit's] rich docket assUres that the work of the ... 
court will be broad and diverse and not narrowly specialized. The judges will have no lack 
of exposure to a broad variety of legal problems. Moreover, the subject matter of the new 
court will be sufficiently mixed to prevent any special interest from dominating it.") 
96 H.R. REP. No. 312 at 20-22 ("[S]ome circuit courts are regarded as 'pro-patent' 
and other 'anti-patent,' and much time and money is expended in 'shopping' for a favorable 
venue." Furthermore, "the validity of a patent is too dependent upon geography (i.e., the 
accident of judicial venue) to make effective business planning possible."). 
97 Jd. at 22 ("A single court of appeals for patent cases will promote certainty where it 
is lacking to a significant degree and will reduce, if not eliminate, the forum'-shopping that 
now occurs."); see also S. REP. No. 275 at 5 ("The creation of the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit will produce desirable uniformity in this area of the law. Such uniformity 
will reduce the forum-shopping that is common to patent litigation."). 
98 For purposes of deference to the BP AI, we are not concerned with the action of 
patentees (i.e., patent holders) or regional circuit courts; rather our focus is on pre-issuance 
patent applicants, who are unable to forum shop because the PTO is the only governmental 
entity authorized to examine and issue patents. With respect to the pre-issuance time frame, 
uniformity is built in to the patent examination process. 
99 See infra part II.A.4. 
100 See infra part IV. for discussion of policy considerations. 
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the reasons behind the creation of the Federal Circuit Prior to the enactment of 
35 U.S.C. § 103 in 1952, it was generally thought that to be patentable a 
claimed invention had to possess an "inventive step," which became known as 
u'le "invention" requirement. 101 However, there were no legislative guidelines 
or criteria for determining when the "invention" requirement was satisfied; 
and, as a result, the term "invention" was interpreted differently by the various 
regional· circuit courts. By creating:"a legi...slative· requirement with certain 
guidelines to be followed, the authors of § 103 thought they were bringing a 
sense of statutory stability to the 1.4invention" determination.102 Tne enactment 
of a legislative requirement Lil 1952, however, did not prevent the region~! 
circuit courts from creating their own standards for what is now called the 
nonobviousness requirement. A major benefit in creating the Federal Circuit 
was that Congress took away from the regional circuit courts the ability to 
interpret the patentability requirements, which led to divergent and varying 
standards of patentability and, in turn, prompted a spree of forum shopping. 103 
Thus, the Federal Circuit, iilce the creation of§ 103 before it, was designed to 
infuse stability and w-JfonrJty into our patent laws. Yet, stabiliPJ a,.'ld 
uniformity do not necessarily mean that the court should interpret the 
patentability requirements, particularly when the requirements are Wldefined 
and ll!nbiguous.I04 As stated below, if the same degree of deference is applied 
to P'TO decisions, stability and uniformity will not be threatened, especially 
since the regional circuit courts are statutorily precluded from hearing patent 
appeals. In this regard, the Federal Circuit's role in promotLilg u11JforroJty in 
10l The invention requirement was the precursor to the nonobviousness requirement. 
See supra note 81. 
102 See Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of "Invention" as Replaced by Section 103 
of the 1952 Patent Act, in NONOBVlOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF 
PATENTABILITY, supra note 85, at 1:4D1: 
"One of the greatest technical weaknesses of the patent system is the lack of a 
definitive yardstick as to what is invention. To provide such a yardstick and to assure 
that the various courts of law and the Patent Office shall use the same standards, 
several changes are suggested. It is proposed that Congress shall declare a national 
standard whereby [mark these words] patelltability of an invention shall be determined 
by the objective test as to its advancement of the arts and sciences." 
(alteration in the original) (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 239, 78th Cong., at 6, 10). 
Furthermore, the House Report on§ 103, states that: "This section should have a stabilizing 
effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases." H.R. REP. No. 
1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952). 
103 See supra notes %-97. 
104 See infra notes 154-57. 
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the application of the patent laws is fulfilled simply by its exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction over appeals relating to patent law and its authority, as an Article 
m court, to patrol the boundaries of the PrO's congressional delegation. IOS 
Implicit h1 this uniformity challenge, however, is yet another challenge. 
That is, the ex parte nature of the patent examination proceeding is problematic 
in terms of increasing the breadth of deference for issued patents because it is 
possible, for the ·PTO ·to' issue;a,'patent without COJ1Sid~ all- of the relevant 
prior art. My concern here is not with the PrO's ability to examine patent 
applications or interpret statutes that it is authorized to administer;106 rather, 
my concern relates to the PrO's search mechanism and failure, for whatever 
reason, to consider a: material prior art reference during the examination 
process.I07 With respect to issued patents, therefore, Chevron deference should 
105 See infra notes 127-30. 
106 Where a district-court upholds a patent's validity, the Federal Circuit affirms the 
district court 89% of the time. See ROBERT L. HARMoN, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL 
Cmcurr 793 (3d ed. 1994); see also Dunner et al., supra note 89, at 154 ("The most 
notable trend, similar to that observed by Harmon, is that, in district court cases, the 
Federal Circuit was significantly more likely to affirm judgments in favor of patent owners 
than accused infringers. For example, the court affirmed validity of the patent under § 103 . 
. . about 88% ofthe time .... "); Ronald B. Coolley, What the Federal arcuit Has Done 
and How Often: Statistical Study of the CAFC Patent Decisions-1982 to 1988, 71 J. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 385, 391 (1989) (From 1982 to 1988, where the district court 
upheld the validity of a patent, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court 25 out of 28 
times or 89%. However, if the district court held the patent claims invalid, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court only 18 out of 37 times or 47%.). In light of this high 
affirmance rate, one could argue that my claim for greater deference is emphasizing form 
over substance. At the same time, however, with such a high affirmance rate, the Federal 
Circuit is sending a message that the PTO is entitled to deference. Moreover, de novo 
review fosters judicial waste and duplication and calls into question the function of the PTO 
as a governmental agency. See infra part N. 
107 In ·order to obtain a patent, an applicant must file a patent application, as well as 
what she considers to be material prior art, with the PTO claiming what her invention is. 
The application is assigned to a patent examiner based on the technology disclosed- in the 
application. The examiner, after searching the prior art to determine if the claimed 
invention meets the requisite patentability requirements, either issues a patent or rejects the 
patent application. If the application is rejeCted, the examiner issues an office action ~tting 
forth the reasons why the application was rejected. The applicant may amend her claims in 
light of the office action, and resubmit her application. Again, the examiner may issue a 
patent or reject the application (at this stage the rejection is usually final). See 35 U.S. C. §§ 
131-133 (1988); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.101-1.127 (1994). At this point, the applicant may (1) 
simply abandon her quest for a patent; (2) file a continuation application; or (3) file an 
appeal with the BP AI asserting that the examiner improperly rejected her application. See 
35 U.S.C. §§ 120, 134 (1988); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.191-1.198 (1994). With respect to the 
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be accorded to the examiner's patentability determination only when a prior art 
reference had previously been considered by the examiner during the 
examination process. On the other hand, deference is not warranted if the 
examiner failed to consider the prior art reference, 108 and the court should 
independently review the patentability requirements with respect to the 
nonexarained reference. 
Ideally, to the extent that prior art-has not;cbeen considered,,by the PrO, 
patent litigants should be compelled, or at least, strongly encouraged to utilize 
latter, if the BPAI a."fi..-ms the examiner's rejection, the applicant may abandon her 
application or appeal to either the Federal Circuit or the District Court for the District of 
Columbia. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 141-145 (1988); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.301-1.304 (1994). This 
Article is primarily concerned with the Federal Circuit's judicial review of BPAI 
patentability determinations. 
lOB The Federal Circuit, to a very limited extent, has adopted this approach. However, 
the deference to which the court refers is procedural, not substantive. That is, a person 
asserting invalidity has the burden of proving such because an issued patent is presumed to 
be valid under 35 U.S.C. § 282. Thus, the Federal Circuit reviews de novo whether an 
invention is "obvious," but places the burden of proving obviousness on the person 
asserting it. See ft.merican Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 
1360 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984): 
[Section] 282 creates a presumption that a patent is valid and imposes the burden 
of proving invalidity on the attacker .... Deference is due the Patent and Trademark 
Office decision to issue the patent with respect to evidence bearing on validity which it 
considered but no such deference is due with respect to evidence it did not consider. 
See also Solder Removal Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 582 F.2d 628, 633 & 
n.lO (C. C.P.A. 1978) ("Application of§ 282 in its entirety has suffered from analogy of the 
presumption itself to the deference due administrative agencies."). In Kloster Speedsteel AB 
v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 
(1987), the district court properly held that defendant 
failed to proffer prior art more pertinent than that considered by the PTO and therefore 
had the "added burden of overcoming the deference that is due to a qualified 
government agency presumed to have properly done its job." That deference merely 
recognizes the statutory mandate that all patents shall be presumed valid. 
(citatio!l omitted) (quoting American Hoist & Derrick Co., 725 F.2d at 1359). Fromson v. 
Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 755 F.2d 1549, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("The presumption of 
validity under § 282 is a procedural device, placing the burden of proving invalidity on the 
party asserting it. It is not substantive law."); Alco Standard Corp. v. TVA, 808 F.2d 1490, 
1497 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987) (The introduction of prior art 
that was not considered by the PTO "makes it easier for the party challenging the validity of 
the patent to carry his burden of proof."). 
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the reexamination process.109 The reexamination process has the benefit of 
reincorporating the P'IU's expertise into the patentability determination. 
Furthermore, after the patent is reexamined the district court would not have to 
apply different standards of review because each prior art reference would have 
been con8idered by the PTO. Yet another potential solution would be for the 
PTO to adopt a European style opposition proceeding.1 10 Indeed, there seems 
to be-,growing support for an opposition proceeding. aiROng. memb~ +>.f,the . 
private bar. 111 
b. The "Constitutional" Challenge 
This challenge, less conspicuous than that of "unifOrmity," lies in the 
history of the issue of patent validity, particularly the nonobviousness 
requirement. Patent validity was not always viewed as a question of law. In 
fact, the Supreme Court, in the first quarter of the twentieth century, reviewed 
nonobviousness112 as a question of fact;ll3 and in a later opinion, identified 
109 A reexamination is a procedure "pursuant to which a patent owner or anyone else 
can seek review by the [PfO] of the validity of a patent on the basis of additional prior art 
not previously considered by the PTO." See McCARTHY, supra note 21, at 280. See also 35 
U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (1988). A reexamination proceeding has the advantage of permitting the 
patent's validity to be "tested in the Patent Office where the most expert opinions exist and 
at a niuch.red\lced cost." See H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980), 
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6463. Although the reexamination process as it now 
stands permits limited third party involvement, there is legislation pending in Congress that 
would broaden the role of a third party ·participation in reexamination proceedings. See 
Senate Bill1070, which was introduced on July 25, 1995, and the counterpart to S. 1070 in 
the House of Representatives, H.R. 1732. S. 1070, 104th Cong., 1st Sess (1995); H.R. 
1732, H;>4th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). For a discussion of the Senate and House bills, 
respectively, see 50 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 331 (1995); 50 Pat. Trademark 
& Copyright J. (BNA) 115, 126 (1995) .. 
llO The deference doctrine and its relation to opposition and reexamination procedures 
brings to the fore the subject of my second article. In this article, I intend to advocate the 
creation of an ArtiCle I "BOOrd of ValiditY and Infringement' (BVAI) or, in the alternative, a 
pre-grant opposition proceeding or compulsory reexamination whenever a patent is 
litigated. . 
lll See Lawrence G. Kastriner, U.S. Oppositiop.s: A Procedure Whose Tzme Has 
Cmne, J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y (forthcoming 1995) (Mr. Kastriner conducted a 
survey of 65 patent counsel cutting across the technological spectrum. Of those 65, 42 
responded. Of those 42, 80% said they favored a European style pre-grant opposition 
proceeding, whereas 90% indicated that they would support a post-grant opposition 
proceeding.). 
112 Prior to 1952, nonobviousness was referred to as "invention," or the "invention 
requirement." See supra note 81. 
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patent validity as a question of ultimate fuct. 114 fu 196ti, however, the Supreme 
Court decided Graham v. John Deere Co., 115 which held that "the ultimate 
question of patent validity is one of law. "116 Implicit in the Court's opinion, 
written by Justice Clark, is that :nonobviom:nes.s is a question of law. 
The lack of strong precedent and rationale for Justice Clark's assertion 
ro..ake.s it difficu.J.t, at first glance, to ascertain why the Court held that validity is 
. a questioii.,.of law. Yet,,~in light of the fact that patentability requirements like 
nonobviousness are necessary to further the constitutional goal of "promoting 
the Progress of u~e useful Ai··w" and to ensure that the public domain is 
adequately safeguarded, a plausible reading of Graham is that the Court may 
have wanted to place constitutional limits on Congress's authority in the area of 
patent law and accentuate its power of judicial review over Congress arull the 
JPTQ.ll7 
This interpretation is helpful in discerning why the Federal Circuit is so 
reluctant to embrace Chevron in the context of patent law. Not only does 
OtevTon have the potential to seveiely enfeeble t.lte Federal Circuit's judicial 
review of patent validity detefiTiin.atio:ns, but it goes furt_her, calling Lnto 
113 See Thomson Spot Welder Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 265 U.S. 445, 446-47 (1924). 
114 See United States v. Esnault-Pelterie, 299 U.S. 201, 205 (1936). 
115 383 u.s. 1 (1966). 
116 !d. at 17. 
117 See Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the "Invention" Requirement, in 
NONOOVlOUSNP.,SS-,THEULTIMATECONDITIONOFPATENTABILITY, supra note 85, at 1:501: 
X am going to discuss § 103 of Title 35 United States Code, the 1952 Patent Act, 
the unobviousness provision, because it is the heart of the patent system and the 
justification of patent grants. Why do i say that? For two reasons: First: it is Section 103 
which brings about statutory compliafiCe with the Constitutional/imitation on the power 
of Congress to create a patent system .... Second, it is the provision which assures 
that the patent grant of exclusive right is not in cmiflict with the anti-m01wpoly policy 
brought to this country from England .... 
ld.; see also Charles D. Reed, Same Reflections on Graham v. John Deere Co., in 
NoNOOVIOUSNP.SS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENT ABILITY, supra note 84, at 2:305: 
[O]ne must recall that the Court has consistently indicated that there is a constitutional 
issue involved in the grant of a patent. Call it sensitivity to stare decisis or be cynical 
and call it a form of judicial politics necessary to accommodate those on the Court who 
instinctively equated patent monopoly with other monopolies, but the Court affirmed the 
existence of constitutional limitations and noted that the "ultimate question of patent 
validity is one of law." 
Mr. Reed was Justice Clark's law clerk at the time Graham was decided. !d. at 2:301. 
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question the court's perceived constitutional role as the final arbiter of our 
patent system. The Federal Circuit may view Chevron as not only weakening 
its duty ·as an Article ill court "to say what the law is," but also its perceived 
function as the gatekeeper of Article I, Section 1, Clause 8. This contention is 
buttressed by the fact that the Federal Circuit has applied Chevron to an appeal 
from the TTAB.l 18 Trademark law is not inextricably linked with a 
CQP§P11Jtional di~, as is patent}aw,ll? yet, as I will discuss below, 120 the 
Commissioner derives his delegated authority, as it pertains to patent law and 
trademark law, from the same statutory source;121 and the statutory provisions 
pertaining to the 'IT AB and BP AI are very similar .122 
Therefore, it is somewhat doctrinally disingenuous to characterize patent 
validity as a question of law and then refuse to invoke the Chevron doctrine 
because, according to the Federal Circuit, it is the court's "responsibility ... 
to apply the law correctly; without deference to Board determinations. "123 
How can the Federal Circuit justify applying the Chevron doctrine to questions 
of law arising from the TI AB, but not applying such to questions of law on 
appeal from the BPAI? Perhaps the underlying reason is that the Federal 
Circuit, in response to the Chevron doctrine and all that it implies, 
characterizes patent validity as a question of law in order to maintain its sense 
of constitutional integrity that Chevron seemingly threatens. 
Yet, what is truly being threatened by the Federal Circuit's resistance to 
118 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Management Prods. Co., 
994 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
119 It is generally thought that Congress derives its authority to legislate in the area of 
trademark law from Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution (i.e., the Commerce 
Clause). See PAUL GoLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHf, PATENI', TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE 
DocrRINEs 20 (rev. 3d ed. 1993). Thus, the Federal Circuit is perhaps more willing to 
apply the OJevron doctrine to an appeal from the TI AB because the empowering 
constitutional provision is not as explicit as Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 (i.e., "to promote 
the Progress of [the] useful Arts.") 
120 See infra notes 151-53. 
121 Specifically, 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) states that "[t]he Commissioner ... shall 
superintend or perform all duties required by law respecting the granting and issuing of 
patents and the registration of trademarks." See infra note 153. 
122 See 35 U.S.C. § 7 (1988) and 15 U.S.C. §§ 1067, 1070 (1988); see also infra note 
149. Also of relevance is the Federal Circuit's recent decision holding that BPAI members 
are not independent of the Commissioner, but are "examiner-employees of the PTO, and 
the ultimate authority regarding the granting of patents lies with the Commissioner." See In 
re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Given the virtually identical statutory 
provisions, it stands to reason that the TIAB, like the BPAI, also lacks independence from 
the Commissioner. 
123 See In re McCarthy, 763 F.2d 411, 412 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
1448 OHIO STATE LAW JOliRli!AL [VoL 56:1415 
Chevron is the PTO's explicit congressional delegation to "superintend or 
perform all duties required by law respecting the granting and issuing of 
patents."l24 Granted, the Federal Circuit's de novo review of questions of law 
appears to have impressive support The Administrative Procedure Act states 
that "the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law," 125 and 
Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison, instructed us that "[i]t is, 
en1phatically, the prov"ip,ce. and ~uty . of""tJle judicial <l~artJ.:nent, to say what the 
law is. "126 However, in the post-Ozevron era, the question of law is one of 
delegation. 127 One of the reasoP.s Chevron is so welcomed in my opinion is 
124 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1988). See ilifra notes 141-43. 
125 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). But see COMMITIEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GoVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 90-91 (1941) (appointed by the Attorney General): 
The question of statutory interpretation might be approached by the court de novo 
and given the answer which the court thin.lcs to be the "right interpretation." Or the 
court rnigt'it appr-oach it, some-vvl"-Uit as a question of fact, to ascertain, not the "rig!1t 
interpretation," but only whether the administrative interpre!lltion has substantial 
support. Certain standards of interpretation guide in that direction. Thus, where the 
statute is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court may accept 
that of the administrative body. Ag-,J.n, the adminisL-at.:.ve interpretation i;; to be given 
weight not merely as-opinion of some men or even of a lower tribunal, but as the 
opinion of the body especially familiar with the problems dealt with by the statute and 
burdened with the duty of enforcing it. This may be particularly significant when the 
legislation deals with complex matters calling for expert lmowledge and judgment. 
/d. (footnote omitted); see also Scalia, supra note 5, at 512-13 (asserting the Attorney 
General's Report "formed the hasis for enactment of" the APA); Sunstein, Law and 
Administration, supra note 5, at 2086 ("The APA's provision for independent judicial 
interpretation of law is not inconsistent . . . with Chevron's deference to the agency's 
interpretation if Congress has, under particular statutes, granted the relevant authority to 
administrative agencies."). 
126 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
127 See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. 
REv. 1, 27 (1983): 
The court's task [in reviewing an administrative action] is to fix the boundaries of 
delegated authority, an inquiry that includes defining the range of permissible criteria .. 
. . [T]he judicial role is to specify what the statute cannot mean, and some of what it 
must mean, but not all that it does mean. In this context, the court is not abdicating its 
constitutional duty to "say what the law is" by deferring to agency interpretations of 
law: it ill simply applying the law as "made" by the authorized law-making entity. 
Indeed, it would be violating the legislative supremacy by failing to defer to the 
interpretation of an agency to the extent that the agency had been delegated law-making 
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that it has shifted the focus from the law-fact distinction, which is nothing short 
of confounding at times, 128 to the scope of the agency's delegation. As the 
Supreme Court has held: "[a] precondition to deference under Chevron is a 
congressional delegation of administrative authority. "129 The issue that is 
unquestionably within the province of the judiciary is to determine the extent to 
which Congress has delegated "administrative authority" to an agency. In this 
vein, Chevron ~as relegau;~!-:tl:!-~ juc:liciarY: ,~ policing th,e boundaries of the 
agency's delegation.130 -- · ·· 
c. The "Comparative Competence" Challenge 
This third challenge, which primarily emanates from the private patent bar, 
asserts that the Federal Circuit is more competent than the PTO to make 
patentability determinations. There is a wide spread belief among members of 
the patent bar that the PTO is in need of greater technological expertise and, 
for the most part, view the Federal Circuit as a "court of correction." Because 
my response to this challenge is grounded in policy considerations and focuses 
on the comparative advantages of the PTO, I will defer my discussion until Part 
authority. 
/d.; see also DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 37, at 114-15 (asserting that Marbury is consistent 
with Orevron). 
128 See supra notes 29-31. 
129 See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990). 
130 See Monaghan, supra note 127, at 6 (When reviewing administrative action, "[t]he 
court's interpretational task is •.. to determine the boundaries of delegated authority."); see 
also Starr, supra note 5, at 308; Scalia, supra note 5, at 516: 
"The extent to which courts should defer to agency interpretations of law is 
ultimately 'a function of Congress' intent on the subject as revealed in the particular 
statutory scheme at issue." An ambiguity in a statute committed to agency 
implementation can be attributed to either of two congressional desires: (1) Congress 
intended a particular result, but was not clear about it; or (2) Congress had no particular 
intent on the subject, but meant to leave its resolution to the agency. When the former is 
the case, what we have is genuinely a question of law, properly to be resolved by the 
courts. When the latter is the case, what we have is the conferral of discretion upon the 
agency, and the only question of law presented to the courts is whether the agency has 
acted within the scope of its discretion-i.e. , whether its resolution of the ambiguity is 
reasonable. 
/d. (quoting Process Gas Consumers Group v. United States Dep't of Agric., 694 F.2d n8, 
791 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en bane) (quoting Constance v. Secretary of Health & Human 
Servs., 672 F.2d 990, 995 (1st Cir. 1982)), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 905 (1983)). 
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IV of this Article. For present purposes, however, I will make two comments: 
First, I agree with those members of the bar who believe that the PrO could be 
more efficient and technologically savvy .m Indeed, this is a serious concern. 
Yet, it does not necessarily follow that the balance of interpretive power should 
lie with the court. There are other policy concerns which must be considered 
like judicial efficiency, security in property rights, and the economics of 
patentability, 132 and it should be kept)p .nlind that gr~er defernece does not 
mean blind faith. In short, our inquiry should be framed 'in terms of what is the 
optimal balance of interpretive power. Second, if there is a competency 
problem with the PTO, the answer, in all due respect, does not lie with twelve 
judges in black robes. 133 Agency incompetence is a congressionai and 
executive concern. 
4. Applying Chevron to a Patentability Detennination 
In order to demonstrate t."'e application of the 01evron doctrine to the issue 
of patentability, I will continue focusing on a nonobviousness determination.I34 
As stated earlier, the Federal Circuit characterizes the nonobviousness 
requirement as ultimately a question of law with underlying factual 
considerations. 135 As such, the judicial review analysis is bifurcated, whereby 
the court reviews the factual issues under the clearly erroneous standard and the 
legal issues de novo. Instead of these standards, however, what I propose is 
that the Federal Circuit review the underlying factual considerations under the 
"arbitrary and capricious" standard, 136 and apply the Chevron doctrine to the 
ultimate question of no:nobviousness (i.e., a question of law). 137 This approach 
131 It should be pointed out, however, that these claims of incompetency are difficult 
to sustain in view of the FIO's 89% affirmance rate with respect to patent validity. 
132 See part IV. infra for a detailed discussion of these policy considerations. 
133 See Interview with Judge Plager, supra note 1, at 6: 
Some people say that the PTO is the most wonderful place in the world; other 
people say it's a nightmare. I don't know what it is. But, as an appellate judge, I really 
='t operate under either of those theories .... I have to assume that the executive 
branch of the federal government is doing its job. I ='tact on the basis of what are 
essentially allegations, or gossip, or hearsay .... 
134 The analysis that follows is also applicable to an "enablement" determination under 
35 U.S.C. § 112. The Federal Circuit characterizes nonobviousness and enablement as 
questions of law reviewed under the de novo standard of review. See supra note 76. 
!35 See cases cited supra in note 76. 
136 See infra part TI.B. for a discussion of the "arbitrary and capricious" test. 
137 See infra part ll.A.4.a.-c. 
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can best be illustrated by constructing a hypothetical. 
Mary invents a treatment for cancer. She files a patent application for her 
invention (ADRIO) with the PTO. Mary's invention is a composition of matter, 
which is comprised of 10% X, 50% Y, and 4{)% Z. Upon conducting a prior 
art search, the examiner, who has a master's degree in organic chemistry, 
discovers two scientific articles which were published before Mary invented 
ADRIO. One of the articles diScloses a COilli!Qsig~:m of ~ccomprisingepf .· ... 
. ,. . 10% X and 50% Y, but'says notlling.ofZ. Article- two discloses chemical W .. 
and suggests that if mixed with chemicals X and Y the resulting composition of 
matter may have cancer fighting effects. Further research into the chemical 
literature reveals that Z and W are chemically interchangeable. As a result, the 
examiner, based on his interpretation of the legislative requirement put forth in 
35 U.S.C. § 103,138 rejects Mary's patent application, stating in his office 
action that Mary's invention "would have been obvious at the time the 
invention was made to a person of ordinary skill in the art. "139 After 
unsuccessfully amending her application, Mary appeals the examiner's rejection 
to the BPAI. The BPAI's interpretation of the nonobviousness requirement 
leads to an affirmance of the examiner's rejection. Dissatisfied with the BPAI's 
decision, Mary files an appeal with the Federal Circuit. 
a. Has Congress Delegated to the PTO the AUJhority to Administer the 
Statutory Provisions Pertaining to Patentability? 
In order for Chevron to apply, it must first be determined if the PTO has 
been granted the authority to administer the applicable statute. 140 The PrO's 
organic statute states: 
The Commissioner, under the direction of the Secretary of Commerce, shall 
superintend or perform all duties required by law re-specting the granting and 
issuing of patents ... shall have the authority to carry on studies, programs, or 
exchanges of items or services regarding domestic and international patent . . . 
law or the administration of the Patent and Trademark Office, including 
programs to recognize, identity, assess and forecast the technology of patented 
inventions and their utility to iridU.stry; and shall have charge of property 
belonging to the Patent and Trademark Office. He may, subject to the approval 
138 Recall, the Graham opinion, "for the most part, merely restates the language of 
section 103." CHISUM& JACOBS, supra note 12, at 2-58. 
139 This statement would be part of a much larger and more detailed analysis of the 
prior art and claimed invention and would also provide the patent applicant with a detailed 
analysis as to why her claimed invention is "obvious." See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.104--1.107 
(1994). 
140 See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990). 
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of the Secretary of Commerce, establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, 
for the conduct of proceedings in the Patent and T mdemark Office. 141 
Furthermore, the Commissioner shall cause an examination to be made of 
the application and the alleged new invention; and if on such examination it 
appears that the applicant is entitled to a patent under the law, the 
'?'"Commissioi_l~r ~hall issue a patent therefor.142 
With respect to the BP AI, the statute states: "The Board of Patent Appeals ".· 
and Interferences shall, on written appeal of an applicant, review adverse 
decisions of examiners upon applications for patents .... Each appeal . . . 
shall be heard by at least three members of the [BPAI], who shall be designated 
by the Commissioner. "143 
Thus, the Commissioner has the explicit authority to (1) "superintend or 
perform all duties required by law respecting the granting and issuing of 
patents . . . . "; (2) examine a patent application and determine if an applicant is 
entitled to a patent "under the law"; (3) "establish regulations, not inconsistent 
with law, for the conduct of proceedings in the [PTO]"; and (4) appoint BPPJ 
panels to review an examiner's rejection. 144 As a result, the PrO has both 
adjudicatory and rulemaking authority .145 
141 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (Supp. 1993). See aiso 48 Fed. Reg. 14735, § 3.01: 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Commerce by 35 U .S.C. 3 ... 
the functions of the Patent and Trademark Office and its officers specified in Title 35 of 
the U.S. Code, as amended, are hereby vested in the Secretary of Commerce and 
redelegated to the Assistant Secretary [Commissioner of the Patent and Trademark 
Office]. 
ld.; see also 48 Fed. Reg. 14,735, § 4.14 (1983) (The Commissioner of the PTO is to 
"[p]erform ... functions required, or which the [Commissioner] deems necessary and 
proper, in exercising the authority delegated herein."); Alan L. Koller, The Role of the 
Patent Commissioner in Designating Paneis from the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences, 34 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 185, 199 (1994) ("The Commissioner is charged 
with superintending or performing all duties required by law respecting the granting and 
issuing of patents. He or she has responsibility for steering the agency according to a 
multitude of legal, logistical and political concerns."). 
142 35 u.s.c. § 131 (1988). 
143 ld. § 7(b). 
144 It is important to note that the BPAI, as will be di~ussed below, is subservient to 
the Commissioner and the· latter has authority to appoint the BP AI panel to any given case 
or to. reconsider a case that was originally decided contrary to PTO policy. See infra notes 
164-69. 
145 The rules to which I am referring are embodied in Title 37 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations and fit within the meaning of "rule" as defined by the APA: "[T]he whole or a 
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Although some commentators have asserted that the Commissioner's 
rulemaking authority is limited to issuing interpretive rules, 146 the exact nature 
of the Commissioner's rulemaking power is unclear, at best.147 In fact, an 
argument can be made that the Commissioner is authorized to promulgate not 
only interpretive rules, but legislative rules, as well. 148 The Commissioner's 
··~ part ~f..an agency.·statement of-general or particular applicability and future effect·designed -~, .,, ".~:' 
to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or descnoing the organization, 
procedure, or practice requirements of an agency." 5 U.S. C. § 551(4) (1988). 
146 See, e.g., Rayan Tai, Substantive Versus Interpretive Rulemaking in the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office: The Federal Orcuit Animal League Defense Fund 
Decision, 32 IDEA: J.L. & TEcH. 235,247 (1992); Moy, supra note 18, at 427. 
147 The distinction between interpretive and legislative ~es iB very important, in that 
the latter iB entitled to the force and effect of the law and are accorded greater deference 
than interpretive rules. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424-26 (1977); DAVIS & 
PIERCE, supra note 37, § 6.3; ScHwARTZ, supra note 75, § 4.8. One of the reasons that 
legislative rules are given greater deference iB that an agency can only promulgate a 
legislative rule pursuant to a congressional delegation and after a notice and comment 
proceeding under § 553 of the APA. To issue an interpretive rule, neither delegated 
authority, nor notice and comment proceedings are required. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra; 
ScHwARTZ, supra. 
148 For instance, as authority for the proposition that the Commissioner is limited to 
issuing interpretive rules, commentators point to Animal League Defense Fund v. Quigg, 18 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1677 (Fed. Cir. 1991), and its interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 6(a). In Animal 
League, the Federal Circuit held that the language in§ 6(a) (i.e., "establish regulations ... 
for the conduct of proceedings in the [PTO]") does not authorize the Commissioner to issue 
legislative rules. /d. at 1686. However, the court did not deny that the Commissioner 
possessed the authority to promulgate legislative rules: 
[T]he authority granted in section 6 iB directed to the "conduct of proceedings" before 
the [Pro]. A substantive declaration with regard to the Commissioner's interpretation 
of the patent statutes . . . does not fall within the usual interpretation of such statutory 
language .... Thai is 110110 say that the Conunissioner does 1101 have aurhority to issue 
such a [rule] but, if not issued under the statutory grant, the [rule] cannot possibly have 
the force and effect of law. 
/d. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The court, unfortunately, did not specifY from 
where exactly the Commissioner derives biB authority to issue legislative rules if indeed § 
6(a) limits the Commissioner to interpretive rulemaking. See also Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 
849 F.2d 1422, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Consistent with its legislative function, Congress 
'may leave it to administrative officials to establish rules within the prescribed limits of the 
statute.' •.• In thepatent field, Congress has done precisely that by [enacting 35 U.S.C. § 
6(a)]." The court, citing Olevron, proceeded to state that "'the validity of a regulation 
promulgated thereunder will be sustained so long as it is "reasonably related to the purposes 
of the enabling legislation."'") (citations omitted). 
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Second, § 19 of the Patent Act of 1870 is the first expres-s statutory grant authorizing 
rulemaking by the Commissioner. The wording of § 19 and § 6(a) of the present Patent Act 
is virtwilly identical. However, the iegislative history of§ 19 and §6(a) offers little g-uidance 
as to the meaning of the phrase "for the conduct of proceedings in the [PI'O]." See Herbert 
C. Wamsley, supra note 8, at 49'1...-97 (1982). One reading of thlll provi..sion is that given by 
the Federal Ci.n;uit in AniJnr.l League (i.e., .. Collliilissioner may only issue intetpretive rules 
under § 6(a)). Howeve~, .another reading is put forth by Herbert C. Wamsley, who at the 
time of writing the following was Director of the Trademark Examining Operation at the 
PTO: 
[S]ince the Commissioner's main duty is "conduct of proceedings" concerning patent 
and trademark rights, he can establish regulations on both substantive [legislative] and 
procedural [mterpretive] matters relating to that duty. This is the view that was taken by 
the CCPA [the Federal Circuit's predecessor] .... 
This broader reading of section 6(a) would be upheld by most courts today. Tne 
Commissioner has the power to promulgate rules on rnatters of substa..r1tive patent a.11d 
trademark law. According to the doctrine of National Petrolewn Refiners, he could 
adopt a legislative rule on any matter that the Office has the power to adjudicate. Any 
such rule should be upheld if reasonably related to the pmposes of the patent and 
trademark laws. 
Herbert C. Wamsley, The Rulemaldng Power of the Commissioner of Patents and 
Trademarks (Part 2), 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc;Y 539, 555-56 (1982). Wamsley asserts: "If the 
rulemaking power is limited merely to establishing procedures, why the debate in Congress 
in 1870 over whether to give the Commissioner the power, inasmuch as he had already 
established procedural regulations [prior to the 1870 Act] .... " Jd. at 555. 
Finally, legislative rules are distinguishable from interpretive rules in that the former 
must be promulgated after notice and comment proceedings and pursuant to an agency's 
congressionally delegated authority. See supra note 147. Ever since the Supreme Court in 
Olevron held that Congress may impJidtly delegate to an agency the authority to interpret a 
statutory provision, legislative and interpretive rules have merged to a certain extent and the 
distinction between the two is not as clear as it once was. That is, if an agency is given an 
implicit congre..."llional delegation to interpret a statute, interpretive rules issued by an agency 
may have legislative effect. See Kevin W. Saunders, Interpretive Rules With Legislative 
Effect: An Analysis and a Proposal for Public Participation, 1986 DUKE L.J. 346, 352-58; 
see also Arrow Air, Inc. v. Dole, 784 F.2d 1118, 1122-26 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (applying 
Olevron deference and giving legislative effect to interpretive rules (rules issued without 
notice and comment)); General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1564-67 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074 (1985) (applying 01evron 
deference and giving legislative effect to interpretive rules (rules issued without notice and 
comment)). Thus, an argument can be made that the statutorily ambiguous patentability 
requirements are an implicit delegation authorizing the PTO to promulgate legislative rules, 
or interpretive rules with legislative effect. 
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ability to issue legislative rules, 149 coupled with adjudicative authority, would 
strongly indicate that Congress has authorized the PTO to "administer" the 
patent statute as it relates to patentability determinations. 
Regardless of the Commissioner's rulemaking authority, the above 
mentioned provisions of the PTO' s organic statute indicate that the PTO has the 
authority to "administer" the applicable statutory provisions relating to 
patentability, 150 ,~pec:ially ~m.ce the Feq"eral Circuit has given Cheyron 
. ' '-"7'.:~· ~. . '· . . ..... ~. - ~ 
149 Even if the Commissioner were not authorized to promulgate legislative rules, 
there are cogent policy reasons for deferring to the Commissioner's interpretive rules. As 
Professors Davis and Pierce state: 
An agency often has devoted considerable thought to ~ issue before it publishes 
an interpretive rule that addresses the issue. The agency often has considered carefully 
how potential altern!ltive resolutions of the issue relate to the language and legislative 
history of the statute it is implementing. The agency's position may reflect careful 
consideration of the relationship between alternative resolutions of the issue and the 
resources the agency has available to enforce its statute. 1, all these respects, the agency 
has unique advantages over a court because of its day-to-day efforts to implement its 
statutory mission. A court would be foolish not to give serious consideration to the 
views expressed by an agency in an interpretive rule, even though the rule has no 
binding effect. 
DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 37, at 243; See also ScHwARTZ, supra note 75, § 4.9. The 
Federal Circuit has deferred to the PTO when the latter promulgates rules pertaining to 
patent practice. See, e.g., Gerritsen v. Shirai, 979 F.2d 1524, 1527-28 (Fed. Cir. 1992): 
When a decision pursuant to a permissive statute concerns only PrO practice, we 
review the decision for abuse of discretion .... AB the Commissioner established 37 
C.F.R. §1.616 under the authority of 35 U.S.C. § 6(a), we see no reason in law or 
logic to apply a different standard of review to the Board's decision merely because it 
acted directly under a permissive regulation, rather than a permissive statute. Congress 
granted the Commissioner broad powers over PrO practice. By imposing an unduly 
expansive standard of review, which in effect limits that discretion, we would be acting 
contrary to the statute and congressional intent. 
/d. (citation omitted); see also Morganroth v. Quigg, 885 F.2d 843, 848 (Fed. Cir. 1989) 
("The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks is primarily responsible for the application 
and enforcement of these narrow technical and specialized statutory and regulatory 
provisions [35 U.S.C. §§ 133, 41(a)(7), and 37 C.F.R. § 1.137(b)] governing abandonment 
and revival of patent applications. His interpretation of those provisions is entitled to 
considerable deference."). 
150 In an international trade case on appeal from the ITC, the Federal Circuit implied 
that the PTO administers the Patent Code. In Corning Glass Works v. International Trade 
Comm'n, 799 F.2d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1986), althGugh the main issue related to international 
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deference to the TIAB.lSl The Commissioner's delegated authority pertaining 
to the granting and issuing of patents and trademarks stems from the same 
statutory provision; 152 and the statutory provisions relating to the IT AB and 
BP.A.J parallel one another in significant ways.153 
trade, there was a secondary issue pertaining to patent validity. The Federal Circuit deferred 
to the ITC on the trade issue, but not on the patent issue. In footnote 5 of the opinion, the 
court explained why: "In contrast [to the Tariff Act], the Commission is not charged with 
administration of the patent statute, 35 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. Thus we do not defer to its 
interpretation of patent law." Jd. at 1565 n.S. Implicit in this footnote is that the Federal 
Circuit would defer to the PTO's interpretation of the patent statute. If the PTO does not 
administer the patent statute, then who does? 
151 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Management Prods. Co., 
994 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
152 See 35 U.S.C. · § 6(a) (Supp. 1993) ("The Commissioner ... shall superintend or 
perform all duties required by law respecting the granting and issuing of patents and 
trademarks .... ");supra note 141 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the last sentence 
of § 6(a) has a parallel provision in the trademark statute: "The Commissioner shall make 
rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of proceedings in the Patent 
and Trademark Office .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1123 (1988); see also 48 Fed. Reg. 14,735 § 4 
(1983). This section warrants that the Commissioner shall perform the following functions: 
"Examine applications for patents to determine if they meet the requirements of law for the 
issuance of patents and, upon such determination, grant patents." Jd. § 4.01. "Examine 
applications for the registration of trademarks to determine their entitlement to registration 
under the law .... " Jd. § 4.06. 
153 Compare 35 U.S.C. §7(1988)with the TTAB's governing provision, 15 U.S.C. § 
1067 (1988). Section 7 states: "The Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant 
Commissioners, and the examiners-in-chief shall constitute the [BPAI] .... Each appeal .. 
• shall be heard by at least three members of the [BPAI], who shall be designated by the 
Commissioner." Section 1067 states: "The [TTAB] shall include the Commissioner, the 
Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioners, and members appointed by the 
Commissioner . . . . Each case shall be heard by at least three members of the Board, the 
members hearing such case to be designated by the Commissioner." /d. 
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b. Has Congress Directly Spoken to the Precise Question at Issue? 
The Commissioner has the explicit authority to determine which claimed 
inventions are patentable "under the law." The relevant law are those statutory 
sections pertaining to patentability, which include 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 
and 112. We are concerned with § 103 (nonobviousness) for our 
hypothetical:154 ''"'-''-'"~--- _,_,~ . ,,.,;:""''" 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed 
or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between 
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the 
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention 
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject 
matter pertains.155 , 
Given the relevant statutory provisiOn, the Chevron two-step can be 
applied: (1) Has Congress directly spoken to the precise question at issue? That 
is, has Congress defined "obvious"? If the statutory term "obvious," as defined 
by Congress, is unambiguous that is the end of the matter. If, however, the 
Federal Circuit determines that 35 U.S.C. § 103 is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the term "obvious," then, (2) the Federal Circuit must ascertain 
whether the PTO's patentability determination under§ 103 is reasonable. 
It is evident from a review of § 103 and Title 35 that Congress did not 
define "obvious, "156 especially when one considers that § 103 embodies a 
154 An "enablement" determination under 35 U.S.C. § 112, characterized by the 
Federal Circuit as a question of law, would be equally appropriate because it too is an 
ambiguous and undefined term. 
155 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988) (emphasis added). 
156 In the context of administrative iaw, the term "obvious" is similar to the phrase 
"just and reasonable" embodied in the Natural Gas Act (NGA). See 15 U.S.C. § 717 
(1988). The NGA of 1938 was an attempt to regulate natural gas. The Federal Power 
Commission (the predecessor of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) was 
empowered through the NGA to ensure that the rates charged by the natural gas companies 
for the sale and transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce were "just and 
reasonable." Due to the gas shortage of the 1970s and resulting increase in gas prices, 
Congress enacted the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) in 1978. In order to encourage an 
increase in natural gas production, the NGPA allowed the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERq to set higher price ceilings on the price companies can charge for 
natural gas. The only limitation on the FERC was that the new ceilings had to be "just and 
reasonable" within the meaning of the NGA. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3314(b)(1), 3316(a) (1988). 
In Mobil Oil Exploration and Produdng Southeast, Inc. v. United Distribution Co. , the 
price ceiling set by the FERC was challenged as not being "just and reasonable." The 
Court, holding that the price ceiling was "just and reasonable," stated: "The Court has 
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requirement, not a defined standard. 151 Implicit in this statutory ambiguity is a 
congressional delegation to the PTO to interpret the term "obvious," or in 
repeatedly held that the just and reasonable standard does not compel the Commission to use 
any single pricing formula .... By incorporating the "just and reasonable" standard into 
the NGPA, Congress clearly meant to preserve the pricing flexibilit'J the Com.mission had 
· ·· his'.orically exercised under the NGA." 498 U.S. 211, 224-25 (1991)(citations omitted); In 
a footnote, the Court, citing O!evron, spoke to the issue of deference to the Commission: 
"Even had we concluded that §§ 104(b)(2) and 106(c) failed to sp"...ak unambiguously to the 
ceiling price question, we would nonetheless be compelled to defer to the Commission's 
interpretation." Id. at 225. 
157 See PJ. Federico, Further Comments and Observations on the Origins of Section 
103, in NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITIONOFPATENI'ABILITY, supra note 85, at 
1:304: 
u 
JU. 
I look at Section 103 as a requirement or a condition for patentability, rather than a 
standard. A requirement and a standard could be the same thing, and often are, but in 
tl·Js pw...ddcular case t.'le section to me m not a standa..~ . . . . There m no staitda.a-rU brt this 
section. It se!!l up a requirement (in a negative manner); hovJ one is going to determine 
whether the requirement has been met is not answered by the section. 
Federico, as well as Judge Giles S. Rich, was one of the principal authors of the 1952 
Patent Act, including § 103. See also P.J. Federico, Origins of Section 103, in 
NONOBVJOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY, supra note 85, at 1:109, 
quoting a speech given by Judge Giles S. Rich on § 103: 
Section 103 is one of those matters of major importance: The statutory inclusion of a 
requirement for invention, which has never been dealt with in the statutes. Since it is 
firmly established as a prerequisite to patent-ability, it was felt that it was desirable to 
include it in the codification. And in doing so, certain troublesome matters were dealt 
with; b11t withouJ any anempt to define "invention," the undefinable. 
!d. (emphasis added). Furthermore, in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), the 
Supreme Court recognized that: 
This is not to say, however, that there will not be difficulties in applying the non-
obviousness test. What is obvious is not a question upon which there is likely to be 
uniformity of thought in every given factual context. The difficulties, however, are 
comparable to those encountered daily by the courts in such frames of reference as 
negligence and scienter, and should be amenable to a case-by-case development. 
ld. at 18. See also Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1960) (Hand, J.) 
(referring to the nonobviousness requirement as "misty"), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 
(1961). 
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other words, to define the standard by which claimed inventions will be judged 
for nonobviousness.158 In fact, this implicit delegation makes a patentability 
detemiination or patent validity not so much a question of law, as it does a 
question of policy, 159 which must take into consideration the relevant statutory 
158 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
-~-O~IW): 
,,::,~·-:.w:·t~.!i""O'!- ,, .. 
Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit 
rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a 
statutory provision fc;>r a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an 
agency. 
. . . We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an 
executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, 
and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations has been consistently 
followed by this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has 
involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the 
statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge 
respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations. 
Jd.; see also Starr, supra note 5, at 310: 
Many statutes . . . contain terms that are intentionally imprecise. Examples of this 
studied imprecision are the term "public interest," which figures prominently in such 
measures as the Communications Act of 1934 administered by the Federal 
Communications Commission·, and the phrase "closely related to banking," which 
figures prominently in the Bank Holding Company Act administered by the Federal 
Reserve Board .... In my view, Chevron quite properly recognized that such terms 
constitute an implicit, but nonetheless valid, delegation of authority to the agency. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Anthony, supra note 5, at 33; National Fuel Gas Supply 
Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 811 F.2d 1563, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(Bork, J.); Drummond Coal Co. v. Hodel, 796 F.2d 503,507 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Silberman, 
J.), cert. denied, 480 u.s. 941 (1987). 
159 See ~vron, 467 U.S. at 843-44; Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 
680, 696 (1991) ("As Orevro11 itself illtisti'ates, the resolution of ambiguity in a statutory 
text is often more a question of policy than of law."); NLRB v. Bell Aero8pace Co., 416 
U.S. 267, 292-95 (1974) (agency adjudication is a mechanism for policy formulation); 
Lasko Metai Prods., Inc. v. United Staies, 43 F.3d 1442, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1994): 
In situations in which a statute does not compel a single understanding, the 
Supreme Court and this court have held that "our duty is not to weigh the wisdom of, 
or to resolve any struggle between, competing views of the public interest, but rather to 
respect legitimate policy choices made by the agency in interpreting and applying the 
statute." 
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Jd. (citations omitted); see also Suramerica de Aleaciones Lamin<>das, C.A. v. United 
States, 966 F.2d 660, 665 (Fed. Cir.1992); Homemakers North Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 
F.2d 408, 411 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.) ("An ambiguous legal rule does not have a 
single 'right' meaning; th.erejs a range of possible meanings; the selection from the range is 
an act ofpolicymaking. ");Pierce, Chevron and Its 4ftennath, supra note 5, at 305-06: 
Whelf a court "interp~.iJillprecise, anioiguous, or conflicting s<Latutory language 
in a particular manner, the court is resolving a policy issue. Courts frequently resolve 
policy issues through a process that purports to be statutory interpretation but which, in 
fact, is not. For lack of a better term, this process will be referred to as "creative" 
interpretation. 
Jd. (footnote omitted); see also DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 36, at 113 (mterpreting step 
two of Chevron to mean that "policy disputes within the scope of authority Congre..«s has 
delegated an agency are to be resolved by agencies rather than by courts."); Lawrence H. 
Silberman, Chevron: The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 821, 823 
(1990) (Because agencies have a comparative institutional advantage to interpret ambiguous 
legislation, Judge Silberman stated that "[a]mbiguous legislation ... typically suggests that 
Congress has not concretely resolved the policy issue that the case presents."); Sunstein, 
Law and Administration, supra note 5, at 2086-88: 
!d. 
[fjhe Chew·on approach rr1.igi1t well be defended on the ground that the resolution of 
ambiguities in sllitUtes is sometimes a question of policy as much as it is one of law, 
narrowly understood, and that agencies are uniquely well situated to make the relevant 
policy decisions .... If regulatory decisions in the face of ambiguities amount in large 
part to choices of policy, and if Congress has delegated basic implementing authority to 
the agency, the Chevron approach might reflect a belief, attributable to Congress in the 
absence of a clear contrary legislative statement, in the comparative advantages of the 
agency in making those choices. 
See infra part IV. for a detailed discussion of the "comparative advantages" of the 
PTO. See also Rich, supra note 102, at 1:413, n.36: "The presence or absence of 
'invention' before 1953 was always, in my judgment, the determination of an issue of public 
policy-what inventions should be patented. As such it is a 'question of law.' This policy 
has now been legislatively expressed in section 103." At the time Judge Rich wrote these 
comments (i.e., pre-Ozevron), be was perhaps correct in stating that the question of 
"invention" was a "question of law." This assertion, however, is questionable in the post-
[The standard of invention] ... left every judge practically scott-free to decide this often 
controlling fuctor according to his personal philosophy of what inventions should be 
patented, whether or not he had any competence to do so or any knowledge of the 
patent system as an operative socioeconomic force. This was too great a freedom 
because it involves national policy which should be declared by Congress, not by 
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proviSions, technology at iSsue, economic considerations as they pertain to 
research and development practices of a particular industry, and the potential 
benefit to society .16° In short, the PTO must ascertain whether the claimed 
invention at issue "promote[s] the Progress of [the] useful.A...rts. "161 
The assertion that patentability is a question of policy is reinforced in light 
of the Federal Circuit's recent decisions in In re Alappatl62 and Eastman 
KotJak.l63 In Alappat, a thrre-member panel of the ijfAl reversf:(:L,an 
examiner's nonstatutory subject matter rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 10Ll64 
The examiner requested reconsideration, arguing that the board's decision was 
contrary to PTO policy under § 101. The Commissioner, pursuant to 35 
U.S.C. § 7(b), designated an eight member panel, which not only granted the 
examiner's request for reconsideration, but reversed the original board's 
decision. Section 7 states: 
(a) ... The Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant 
Commissioners, and the examiners-in-chief shall constitute the [BP AI]. 
individual judges or even groups of judges on multiple-judge courts .... Those most 
intimately concerned with the writing and expounding of the new patent act in 1952 ... 
knew they were not making a definition but rather a statement of policy, a specific 
required approach to a difficult problem .... 
Giles S. Rich, The Vague Qmcept of "Invention" as Replaced by§ 103 of the 1952 Patent 
Act, Kettering AWard Address, The Paterit, Trademark, and Copyright Research Institute 
144-45 (1964) (emphasis in original). See Comment, Appellate Review ofDetenninations of 
Patentable Inventions, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 185, 195-97 (asserting that patentability is 
largely a question of policy). 
160 The comparative advantages of the PTO suggest that the PTO is in a considerably 
better position to evaluate these factors. See infra part IV for a discussion of the 
comparative advantages of the PTO. 
161 See, e.g., Reiner, 285 F.2d at 503 ("It is not for us [the judiciary] to decide what 
'discoveries' shall 'promote the progress of science and the useful arts' sufficiently to grant 
any 'exclusive right' of [sic] inventors. Nor may we approach the interpretation of§ 103 .. 
• with a predetermined bias.") (citation omitted); see also Interview with Lehman, supra 
note 20 (According to the Commissioner: "Intellectual property law is a major area of 
intellectual property policy, and policy making is reserved for the executive and legislature, 
not the courts."). 
162 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
163 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Management Prods. Co., 994 
F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
164 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) states: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title." 
!.i 
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(b) The [BPAIJ s.hall ••• review adverse decisions of examiners upon 
applications for patents . . . . Each appeal . . . shall be heard by at least three 
members of the [BPAI], who shall be designated by the Commissioner. Only 
the [BPAI] has the authority to grant rehearings.165 
The appellant in Alappat argued that, under § 7(b), only the BPAI has the 
authority to grant rehearings. The Federal Circuit disagreed: "We . ~ . interpret 
th€"Commissioner's express statutory authority to designate the members of a 
pane! hearing an appeal as extending to designation of a panel to consider a 
request for a rehearing .... "166 . 
Tnerefore, the court found "the Commissioner's interpretation of section 7 
to be a reasonable one entitled to deference. "167 In so doing, the Federal 
Circuit spoke in tenns of the BPAI's institutional subservience. The court 
stated that "[e]ven though Board members serve an essential function, they are 
but examiner-employees of the PrO, and the ultimate authority regarding the 
granting of patents lies with the Commissioner. "168 Furthermore, although 
"the Commissioner may not unilaterally overturn a decision of a Board pa.1el 
or instruct other Board members how to vote[,] ... Congress clearly did not 
intend the Board to be independent of any and all oversight by the 
Commissioner. "169 
This holding is significa.nt with re..spect to the Federal Circuit's conception 
and application of the deference doctrine. Recall, In re Alappat centered around 
the issue of patentable subject matter under § 101. The statutory terms 
pertaining to patentable subject matter in § 101, not unlike the term ''obvious," 
are undefined; and it is the responsibility of the PrO to initially interpret these 
terms and determine if the claimed invention fits into one or more of the 
enumerated subject matters. The Commissioner, in Alappat, designated a new 
BPAI panel and reversed the original panel's interpretation of§ 101 as contrary 
to PTO policy. Thus, the Federal Circuit's holding that the BPAI is not 
independent of the Cominissioner implies that the Commissioner is the ultimate 
authority regarding matters of policy, including patentability determinations. 
This implication further implies that the BPAI's patentability detenninations 
warrant Chevron deference.170 
165 35 U.S.C. § 7(b) (1988) (emphasis added). 
166 Aklppat, 33 F.3d at 1533. 
ioi /d. at 1532-33. 
168 /d. at 1535. 
169 /d. at 1535-36. 
170 Interestingly, the court recognized that the Commissioner's interpretation of§ 7(b) 
was a matter of policy: 
Our responsibility ... is to adjudge whether the Commissioner's designation practices 
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What makes this conclusion more compelling is the Federal Circuit's 
decision in Eastman Kodak, which accorded Olevron deference to the 
1TAB.171 As mentioned earlier, the Commissioner derives his authority 
concerning the granting and issuing of patents and trademarks from the same 
statutory source (i.e., 35 U.S.C. § 6(a));172 and the statutory provisions 
pertaining to the BPAI and TIAB parallel one aoother in significant ways, 
~v,;;:specifically 3s,;·.U.S.C.: § ~1,;md 15 U.S.C. § 1067. Section 7 t:ea9s: The""!. 
Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioners, and 
the examiners-in-chief shall constitute the [BP AI]. . . . Each appeal . . . shall 
be heard by at least three members of the [BP AI], who shall be desiglUlted by 
the Conunissioner. 173 
Section 1067 states: "The [TIAB] shall include the Commissioner, the 
Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioners, ·and members appointed 
by the Commissioner .... Each case shall be heard by at least three members 
of the [TIAB], the members hearing such case to be desiglUlted by the 
Commissioner. "174 
If, as In re Alappat held, the BP AI is not independent of the 
Commissioner, it logically follows that the 1T AB lacks independence as well. 
Therefore, the BP AI, like the TI AB, is a mere adjudicatory arm of the 
Commissioner and, like the TT AB, is entitled to Olevron deference. This 
conclusion prompted a dissent by Judge Mayer in In re Alappat: 
8B they were applied in this particular CSBe resulted in a valid decision over which this 
court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction, not to assess whether they were sound 
from a public policy standpoint. We leave to the legislature to determine whether any 
restrictions should be placed on the Commissioner's authority in this regard. Absent 
any congressional intent to impose such restrictions, we decline to do so sua sponle. 
Jd. at 1536. However, the court did not appear to appreciate the significance of its holding 
because it proceeded to interpret 35 U.S.C. § 101 (a patentability provision) without 
according any deference to the decision of the eight-member BPAI panel, which reversed 
the original BPAI's decision on policy grounds. Although the Federal Circuit recognized 
that the Commissioner's interpretation of § 7(b) is a matter of policy, and implicitly 
recognized that the reason the Commissioner redesignated the original BP AI panel is that he 
believed the board's patentability determination was contrary to PTO policy, the court 
nevertheless reviewed the board's patentability decision de novo. 
171 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Management Prods. Co., 
994 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
172 See supra note 152 (35 U.S.C. §6(a) states: "The Commissioner ... shall 
superintend or perform all duties required by law respecting the granting and issuing of 
patents and trademarks • , • . "). 
173 35 U.S.C. § 7 (1988) (emphasis added). 
174 15 U.S.C. § 1067 (1988) (emphasis added). 
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H the Commissioner is correct, as the court apparently thinks, the [BP AI] nrust 
be seen as simply an extension of the Commissioner's policy-making authority 
and thus not independent. H this is so, the standard by which this court reviews 
decisions of the board is questionable. It is now the practice, dubious from the 
start, to review the board under the same standard as we review a district court. 
Questions of law are reviewed de novo, while findings of fact are examined to 
determine whether they are clearly erroneous. But if the board is simply 
imPlementing pijlic:Y' Set out by die 'Conlmissioner, its decisions . cannot be 
considered "legal" but must be subject to review as statements of agency 
policy. . • • [l}t 'at least may be said that the standard of review applied by this 
court to the boaid should include a good deal more deference than has been 
applied heretofore'[citing Eastman Kodak and Chevron]. 
The court seems inclined to let this matter slide, but I believe that decision 
today upholding jurisdiction puts the issue squarely before us, and the 
ramifications of the decision should not go quietly unnoticed. We should not 
pretend we are reviewing judicial decisions if they are really nothing more than 
policy actions.J75 . 
c. Is the PTO 's Pateniability DetennilUllion Reasonable? 
Step two of the Chevron doctrine is a test of reasonableness; virtually the 
same test the PTO argued for in In re McCarthy, 176 but with, perhaps, a harder 
look. Some commentators and appellate decisions have asserted that step two is 
equivalent to the arbitrary and capricious standard put forth in § 706(2)(A) of 
the APA.l77 If step two of Chevron is reached, however, by no means is it a 
175 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1576-77 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). 
176 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
177 See Silberman, supra note 159, at 827-28 (citing decisions of the D.C. Circuit 
which equate step two of O!evron with the arbitrary and capricious test); Sunstein, Law and 
Administration, supra note 5, at 2105. 
As an alternative to the O!evron doctrine, an argument can be made that the "arbitrary 
and capricious" test of§ 706(2)(A} should apply to the BPAI's informal adjudications. This 
alternative is alluring for two reasons: First, a nonobviousness determination is really a 
mixed question of law and fact or laW application to fact, not unlike the issue of whether 
newsboys were "employees" under the NLRA. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications Inc., 322 
U.S. 111, 131 (1944) ("[W]here the question is one of specific application of a broad 
statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must determine 
it initially, the reviewing court's function is limited .... [T]he Board's determination ... is 
to be accepted if it has 'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in law."); see also 
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984) ("Since the task of defining the term 
'employee' is one that 'has been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to 
administer the Act,' ... the Board's construction of that term is entitled to considerable 
deference, and we will uphold any interpretation that is reasonably defensible.") (citation 
1995] DEFERENCE, DEFIANCE 1465 
given that the court will defer to the agency interpretation. In fact, as I will 
discUss below in Part ll.B., the court will review (1) the decision making 
process of the agency and its explanation for its decision; (2) whether the 
agency's decision was based on consideration of the "relevant factors"; and (3) 
whether the agency made a "clear error. "178 This "hard look" at agency 
decisions, while deferential, is not as easily overcome as one would initially 
think. ~~"-'--- ·''""'' . . ' .· .. , 
5. Applying Chevron to ITC Detenninations 
The Federal Circuit's judicial review of lTC decisions is worthy of some 
discussion because it provides a sound approach, which should be applied to 
the BPArs patentability determinations, to questions of law and fact. 
In Corning Glass Works v. United States International Trade 
Commission,l19 the lTC, in interpreting § 337(A) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 
held that a particular activity constituted an "injury to a domestic industry" and 
therefore was illegal. This subsection of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended in 
1988,180 prohibits: 
Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles 
(other than articles provided for in subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D)) into the 
United States, or in the sale of such articles by the owner, importer, or 
consignee, the threat or effect of which is-
omitted); Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 5, at 2094-95. 
Second, "obvious" is an ambiguous and undefined term, and thus it doesn't matter 
whether the "arbitrary and capricious" test or the Olevron doctrine is applied because 
nonobviousness will always be decided under step two of Olevron (i.e., reasonableness). 
However, there are at least two problems with discarding the Olevron doctrine and solely 
applying the "arbitrary and capricious" test to the BPAI's informal adjudications. First, 
Title 35 has statutory terms which are unambiguous and clearly defined by Congress. As 
such, cases pertaining to these unambiguous terms can be decided at step one of Olevron 
without concern for the PTO's action. Second, it is difficult at times to distinguish law and 
fact. The Olevron doctrine circumvents this line drawing analysis. See Sunstein, Law and 
Administration, supra note 5, at 2095 ("[T]he line between purely legal and mixed questions 
is extremely thin. In some cases it will be hard to tell on which side of the line a particular 
question falls. A broader approach to Olevron, applying the rule of deference in all cases, 
has the virtue of simplicity and ease of application."); see also supra notes 29-31. 
178 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983); Citizens to Protect Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
179 799 F.2d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
180 19 u.s.c. § 1337 (1988). 
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(i) to destroy or substantially injure an industry in the United States ... _181 
In ruling on the ITC's statutory construction of subsection (A), the Federal 
Circuit stated: 
Under [the APA] a reviewing court "shall decide all relevant questions of 
law." Thus, this court is not bound by the Commission's interpretation of 
statutory provisions. However, even though an issue limy he denolllinatM one 
of law, the court is not free simply to substitute its view for that of the 
Commission. Deference must be given to an interpretation of a siatute by the 
agency charged with its administrntion, United States v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes, Inc., ... 106 S.Ct 455, 461 (1985) [citing Chevron]. With respect to 
the meaning of the statutory requirements that an unfair method of competition 
must have the "effect or tendency ... to destroy or substantially injure a 
domestic industry . . . in the United States," it is particularly within the 
province and expertise of the Commission to define those phrases. Our 
function then becomes to decide whether the Commission's definitions or 
standards are reasonable in light of the language, policies and legislative 
historj of the statute. I 82 
Having established that the ITC is entitled to deference in deciding whether 
an injury has occurred to a domestic industry, the court went on to bifurcate 
the factual and legal questions involved in the ITC determination: 
Moreover, the determination of injury necessarily must be based upon the 
particular facts of each case. In view of these considerations, the appropriate 
function of this court is to review an injury determination to decide whether 
substantial evidence supports the facts relied on and whether the 
Commissioner's determination, on the record, is arbitrary, capricious, or an 
abuse of discretion. In other words, we must decide "whether the decision was 
ba..~ on a considera..tion of the relevant factors and whether there has been a 
clear error of judgement." 183 
Thus, the Federal Circuit reviewed the fact findings of the ITC under the 
substantial evidence testl 84 and the legal question (i.e., statutory interpretation 
of "injury to a domestic industry") under the Chevron doctrine. Once the court 
181 Prior to the 1988 amendment, subsections (B)-(D) also required the activity in 
question to have an "injurious effect." Presently, only subsection (A) requires an "injury." 
Although Corning Glass was decided before the 1988 amendment, it was based on 
subsection (A). 
1!12 Corning Glass, 799 F.2d at 1565 (citations omitted). 
183 !d. at 1568 (citations omitted). 
l84 The substantial evidence and arbitrary and capricious tests are roughly equivalent. 
See infra part ll.B. 
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concluded that deference was due, it judged the ITC's determination under step 
two of Chevron, which, as stated above, is a reasonableness test. 
The ITC's domestic injury determination is very similar to a 
nonobviousness determination. Both involve (1) agencies which administer 
their respective statutes; (2) ambiguous statutory provisions; (3) an ultimate 
question of law with underlying factual considerations; and (4) determinations 
· .;:::-which require· a great deal of expertise as well as consideration o/;.otl:ler, policy _,'.c...-:,·· 
factors. 
B. Appeals from the BPAi: Questions of Fact and Clearly Erroneous 
Review 
1. The Federal Circuit and the "Qearly Erroneous" Standard 
Traditionally, administrative law prescribes that questions of fact are to be 
reviewed under either the "substantial evidence"185 or "arbitrary and 
capricious"l86 tests. The former has been compared to the scope of review 
judges apply to jury verdicts, 187 while the latter, at one time thought to be 
more deferential than substantial evidence, 188 is now generally considered, at 
185 See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951). The 
substantial evidence standard applies to formal proceedings. According to § 706(2)(E) of the 
APA, "Substantial evidence" applies to cases "subject to sections 556 and SST' of the APA 
"or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency bearing provided by statute." 
186 See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton 
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). The "arbitrary and capricious" standard, 
unlike that of "substantial evidence," applies to any agency proceeding, including informal 
rulemaking and adjudication. 
l87 See, e.g., Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 619-20 (1966) 
("We have defined substantial evidence as 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' 'It must be enough to justify, if the trial 
were· to ajury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it 
is one of fact for the jury;'")(citations omitted); SCHwARTZ, supra note 75, § 10.11 ("The 
test of review of a jury verdict is also usually stated in terms of substantial evidence. This 
leads to the conclusion that the scope of review of jury verdicts and of agency findings is the 
same.") 
188 See, e.g., American Paper Inst. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 
402, 412 n.7 (1983); Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 143 (1%7) (Substantial 
evidence is "a considerably more generous judicial review than the 'arbitrary and 
capricious' test."). See generally American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 
314-16 (1953); Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 2% U.S. 176 (1935); CASS ET 
AL., supra note 9, at 216. 
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least by appellate courts, to be roughly equivalent. 189 In fact, any "distinction 
between the substantial evidence test and the arbitrary or capricious test is 
largely semantic. " 190 These standards of review subject the factual findings of 
an agency to a reasonableness or rational basis standard;191 however, it should 
189 This is still a matter of some debate. However, the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals ili an opinion writtiinby then Judge Scalia essentially equated the two standards. 
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("When the arbitrary or capricious standard 
is performing that function of assuring factual support, there is no substantive difference 
between what it requires and what would be required by the substantial evidence test, since 
it is impossible to conceive of a 'nonarbitrary' factual judgment supported only by evidence 
that is not substantial in the APA sense-i.e., not 'enough to justify, if the trial were to a 
jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn ... is one of fact 
for the jury.") (citations omitted). Furthenno~e, the Supreme Court, in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), has implicitly suggested that 
the substantial evidence and the arbitrary and capricious tests are the same. For instance, at 
one point in the opinion, the Court stated that: "For purpn-ses of these cases, it is also 
relevant that Congress required a record of the rulemaking proceedings to be compiled and 
submitted to a reviewing court, 15 U.S.C. § 1394, and intended that agency findings under 
the Act would be supported by "substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole." 
ld. at 43-44. Subsequently, the Court stated: "The ultimate question before us is whether 
NHTSA's rescission of the passive restraint requirement of Standard 208 was arbitrary and 
capricious." ld. at 46 (emphasis added); see also RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 341-42 (2d ed. 1992) (asserting the substantial 
evidence and arbitrary and capricious tests are virtually identical). 
With respect to the Federal Circuit, although the court has suggested that the "arbitrary 
and capricious" test is "less stringent" than the "substantial evidence" standard, see Hyundai 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 899 F.2d 1204, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 
1990), it has defined both tests in terms of reasonableness. ld. at 1209 (The "touchstone" of 
the arbitrary and capricious test is "rationality."); see Jacobs v. Department of Justice, 35 
F.3d 1543, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that the "substantial evidence" test is one of 
reasonableness). 
190 See Association of Data Processing, 745 F.2d at 684 (citations omitted). The 
substantial eviden9e and arbitrary and capricious tests are identical with respect to the 
degree of factual support that is needed to maintain the agency decision. However, these 
tests diverge with respect to what is reviewed to measure factual support. That is, 
"substantial evidence [is] to be found within the closed-record proceedings" which is a much 
more defined and structured record than the "administrative record" to which the arbitrary 
and capricious test applies. ld. Furthermore, the substantial evidence and arbitrary and 
capricious test differ in that the latter is a "catch-all"; that is, "an agency action which is 
supported by the required substantia! evidence may in another regard be 'arbitrary [and] 
capricious ... '-for example, because it is an abrupt and unexplained departure from 
agency precedent." ld. at 683. 
191 In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951), the Court 
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be noted that the Supreme Court has applied the "arbitrary and capricious" 
standard with increasing intensity .192 Nevertheless, the fact findings of agencies 
defined "substantial evidence" as follows: "[S]ubstantial evidence is more than a mere 
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion." See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 
(1938) (fiFa pte-APA tl'eci.Sion, Chief'JtiSttee Hughes described substantial evidence as 
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.); Jacobs, 35 F.Jd at 1545; Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, n4 F.2d 
1556, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1984). It is worth noting that later in the Universal Camera opinion, 
Justice Frankfurter stated: 
[T]he Board's findings are entitled to respect; but they must nonetheless be set aside 
when the record before the Court of Appeals clearly precludes the Board's decision 
from being justified by a fair estimate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses or its 
infonned judgment on matters within its special competence or both. 
Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 490. Thus, for a reviewing court to overturn an agency's 
factual finding, the record must clearly preclude the board's decision on a fair reading of 
the record. 
By comparison, the Supreme Court has held that in determining whether an agency's 
decision is arbitrary and capricious: 
[T]he court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the 
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. Although this 
inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a 
narrow one. This court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency. 
Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416 (citations omitted). While the "clear error of judgment" 
language has been criticized as destroying "the whole structure of established case law about 
scope of review of juries, judges, and agencies," 5 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINJSTRATNE 
LAw TREATISE § 29.5 (2d ed. 1984), it is generally considered that the "arbitrary and 
capricious" test is one of reasonableness. BREYER & STEWART, supra note 9, at 359 n.102 
(stating that scholars regard arbitrary and capricious test as. a reasonable test); SOIWARTZ, 
supra note 75, § 10.13 (mterpreting arbitrary and capricious test as one of reasonableness); 
see also Hyundai, 899 F.2d at 1209; Horizons Int'l, Inc. v. Baldrige, 811 F.2d 154, 162 (3d 
Cir. 1987). 
192 See State Famz, 463 U.S. at 42-43 (The Court seemed to heed the language in 
Overton Park that the "inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful. ... " Thus, 
according to Justice White, "an agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated 
to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an 
agency does not act in the first instance. But the majority went on to state that a change of 
course does not demand stronger judicial review and [w]e will . . . 'uphold a decision of 
less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned.'" (quoting Bowman 
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are generally accorded considerable deference.193 
These standards of review, however, are not part of Federal Circuit 
parlance when the fact findings of the BP AI are at issue. Instead, the Federal 
Circuit reviews the BPAI's factual determinations under the "clearly 
erroneous" standard of Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.194 
This standard of review is applied by federal appellate courts to the factual 
____ findings of district couns; 195 and,, Jt _is _less ,qe(erenti;,d tha,n,,.,either the-- _ 
"substantial evidence" or "arbitrary and capricious" tests. 196 In essence, the 
Federal Circuit is treating the PTO, namely the BP AI, as if it were an Article 
m Court.197 
The use of the "clearly erroneous" standard is even more puzzling 
Transp. Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)). This "hard 
look" approach has its origins in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943), wherein the 
Court required the agency to furnish an adequate explanation of its action. See Mullins v. 
United States Dep't of Energy, 50 F.3d 990, 992 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("It is well established 
that agencies have a duty to provide reviewing courLS with a sufficient explanation for their 
decision so that those decisions may be judged against the relevant statutory standards, and 
that failure to provide such an explanation is grounds for striking down the action." (citing 
Olenery, 318 U.S. at 80)); see also Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaldng and 
the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509 (1974). 
193 The deference accorded to the fact findings of an agency is based in part on agency 
expertise. See, e.g., Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966) 
(asserting that the "substantial evidence" rule frees the courts from the burden of weighing 
the evidence, respects administrative expertise, and promotes the uniform application of 
statutes); AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 77, § 13.4.1 ("Deference to agencies, ... is 
justified in part out of respect for agency expertise.") Another reason for agency deference 
is that agencies are politically accountable and have a congressional delegation to administer 
a statutory scheme. On the other hand, a court, unlike an agency, does not possess the 
expertise or degree of political accountability to warrant equal or greater deference. 
194 See infra notes 204-10. 
195 See, e.g., Anderson v. City ofBessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,573 (1985). 
196 See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) 
("Since judicial review of findings of trial courts does not have the statutOry or constitutional 
limitations on judicial review of findings by administrative agencies or by a jury, this Court 
may reverse findings of fact by a trial court where 'clearly erroneous.'"); SSlli Equip. S.A. 
v. United States, 718 F.2d 365, 382 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Nies, J., concurring) ("'A substantial 
evidence' standard restricts an appellate court to a greater degree than 'clearly erroneous' 
review."); Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir.) ("[E]vidence sufficient to support 
a jury verdict or an administrative finding may not suffice to support a trial judge's 
findings."), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950); DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 37, § 11.2. 
l97 See, e.g., In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Our review of a 
finding of anticipation [which is a finding of fact] is the same whether it was made by the 
board [BP AI] or by a district court.") 
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considering that the Federal Circuit employs the deferential "substantial 
evidence" or "arbitrary and capricious" tests when reviewing the fact findings 
of other agencies, namely the (1) Boards of Contract Appeals (BCA);l98 (2) 
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB);l99 and (3) IntMlational Trade 
Commission (ITC).200 Although the standard of review, as applied to the 1act 
findings of the MSPB, BCA, and lTC, is statutorily defined2°1 and the Patent 
Code is,-:~.ile!}t in this regard, nothing prevents the Fed~,al;,J:irq~it from> 
abandoning the less deferential "clearly erroneous" standard. it applies to--the · 
fact findings of the BP AI. 202 The PTO is the only agency to which the Federal 
Circuit does not apply either the substantial evidence or arbitrary and 
capricious standards. The Federal Circuit's dual standards of review are 
inexplicable, especially since the degree of expertise associated with PTO 
determinations is relatively greater than that required by the above mentioned 
198 See, e.g., West Coast Gen. Corp. v. Dalton, 39 F.3d 312, 314 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
("This court will not set aside the Board's factual determinations unless they are 'fraudulent, 
or arbitrary or capricious, or so grossly erroneous as to necessarily imply bad faith, or ... 
not supported by substantial evidence. "'(quoting 41 U.S.C. § 609(b) (1988))); Triax-Pacific 
v. Stone, 958 F.2d 351, 353 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
199 See, e.g., Chauvin v. Department of Navy, 38 F.3d 563, 565 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
("Under our narrow standard of review, we affirm decisions of the board unless they are (1) 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) 
obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or 
(3) unsupported by substantial evidence."); Jacobs v. Department of Justice, 35 F.3d 1543, 
1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
200 See, e.g., SSIH Equip., 718 F.2d at 379 (In a concurring opinion, involving an 
appeal from the International Trade Commission ("lTC"), Judge Nies stated, "[t]o be sure, 
on judicial review of agency action, administrative findings of fact must be sustained when 
supported by substantial evidence .... "); see also Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States 
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("We review the Commission's 
factual findings under the substantial evidence standard."), dismissed, 1994 WL 745517 
(Fed. Cir. 1994). 
201 The Federal Circuit's standard of review of BCA, MSPB, and lTC decisions is 
governed by 41 U.S.C. § 609(b), 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c), respectively. 
202 As Commissioner Lehman has stated: 
The Federal Circuit has sent a clear signal that they don't intend to grant greater 
deference to us; and you know, I don't know why that is. I think there are a range of 
opinions on the part of judges but some genuinely feel that a change in the standard of 
review should not be made except by statute, except the Federal Circuit does not apply 
a statutory standard. They could change the standard without legislation, and in my 
opinion, would have every justification and right to do so. 
Interview with Lehman, supra note 20. 
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agencies in their respective enterprises. 203 
It appears that the Federal Circuit first articulated the "clearly erroneous" 
standard in the 1984 case of In re De Blauwe,204 and has since applied it to a 
number of the BPP.J:'s factual determinations relating to patentability: (1) 
utility;205 (2) anticipation;206 (3) best mode;207 and (4) written description.20!l 
Although these patentability requirements are ll..l1doubtedly factual in nature, 209 
203 With respect to the MSPB, the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) of 1978 was 
designed to provide a statutory framework governing the labor relations between federal 
agencies and their employees. As stated by the Federal Circuit, the central purpose of the 
CSRA "was to give agencies greater ability and flexibility to remove or to discipline 
employees who engage in misconduct . . . or whose work performance is unacceptable . . . 
. ,. Lisiecki v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 769 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986). Certainly an argument can be made that the degree of 
expertise required to deal with agency labor relations does not approach that which is 
nece...c:...<:a..ry to make patentability determinations, which involves, not infrequently, an 
analysis of state of the art technology. Whether it was proper to reduce the pay of a 
government employee does not require the technical expertise needed to determine the 
utility of a DNA sequence or whether a semiconductor chip is anticipated by a prior art 
reference. As for the BCA, the Contracts Disputes Act (CDA) of 1978 pertains to 
contractual disputes between an aggrieved contractor and the United States government. 
The Federal Circuit has recognized the experience and expertise of the BCA in construing 
government contracts. See, e.g., West Coast Gen. Corp. v. Dalton, 39 F.3d 312, 314-15 
(Fed. Cir. 1994); United States v. Lockheed Corp., 817 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
This recognition of expertise reflects the deferential nature of the statutory standard of 
review for BCA fact findings. However, as with the MSPB, the expertise associated with 
construing contracts does not compare with the technological expertise involved in a 
patentability determination. One could further argue that the Federal Circuit is as qualified 
as the BCA to interpret a contract; whereas the same could not be said with respect to 
patentability determinations. 
204 736 F.2d 699, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
205 See, e.g., In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("The first issue 
thus is whether the [BPAI's] determination that Ziegler did not establish that the German 
application disclosP...d a practical utility for the polypropylene was clearly erroneous."). 
206 See, e.g., In re Paulsen; 30 F.3d 1475, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("Anticipation is a 
question of fact subject to review under the 'clearly erroneous' standard."); In re Baxter 
Travenol Labs, 952 F.2d 388, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 833 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990). 
207 See, e.g., DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("Best 
mode is a question of fact. Hence, our review of the board's best mode determination is 
under a clearly erroneous standard.") (citations omitted). 
208 See, e.g., Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("Compliance 
with the written description requirement is a question of fact which we review for clear 
error."); In re Spina, 975 F.2d 854, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
209 For instance, to prove anticipation, a patent examiner usually reviews several prior 
1995] DEFERENCE, DEFIANCE 1473 
the "clearly erroneous" standard is not the proper standard of review in that it 
contravenes the APA210 and established caselaw.211 
2. Overton Park, State Farm, and the "Relevant Factors" 
The patent examination process is a form of informal adjudication.212 In 
- Citizens toPresenie:()vertonPark/Ittc~ v. Volpe;'l.l3 the Supreme Court applied 
the deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard embodied in § 706(2)(A) of 
the APAto an informal adjudication.214 
In Overton Park, the Secretary of Transportation approved the use of 
federal funds to construct an interstate highway. Justice Marshall held that the 
Secretary's decision was not an exercise in rulemaking, and therefore, § 553 of 
the APA did not apply.215 Thus, the decision was ·a form of adjudication. 
Because the secretary's decision was not statutorily required to be on the record 
after an opportunity for a hearing, the adjudication was informal in nature.216 
With respect to the scope of review, once it was ascertained that informal 
adjudication was at issue, the "substantial evidence" and de novo tests were 
inapplicable.217 By process of elimination, the Court held that the proper scope 
of review for informal adjudication is the "arbitrary and capricious" test set 
forth in § 706(2)(A) of the APA.218 Yet, before addressing the "arbitrary and 
capricious" issue, the Court posed a preliminary question pertaining to "scope 
of authority." In essence, the Court bifurcated the judicial review analysis, as 
follows: 
art references to see if one of them discloses each and every element in the claimed 
invention. To illustrate, if Mary were to file a patent application with the PTO claiming a 
composition of matter comprising 50% aluminum and 50% zinc, an examiner, to show that 
Mary's invention is anticipated, must find a single prior art reference (e.g., a patent or 
printed publication) which discloses a composition of matter with 50% aluminum and 50% 
zinc. Analyzing the prior art reference and comparing each element in the reference to the 
claimed invention is factually intensive. 
210 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988). 
211 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 
(1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
212 See suvra note 56. 
213 401 u.s. 402 (1971). 
214 This holding was subsequently affirmed in Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 141-42 
(1973). 
215 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 414. 
21 6 Id. at 415. 
217 Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E), (F) (1988). 
218 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416. 
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[1] The court is first required to decide whether the Secretary acted within the 
scope of his authority. This determination natumlly begins with a delineation 
of the scope of the Secretary's authority and discretion .... 
[2] Scrutiny of the facts does not end, however, with the determination that the 
Secretary has acted within the scope of his statutory authority. Section 
706(2XA) requires a finding that the actual choice made was not "arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 
To make this finding the court must consider Whether thcfdeeision was based· 
on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear 
error of judgment. Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and 
careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not 
empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.219 
To summarize, after the "scope of authority" issue is settled, the agency 
decision is reviewed under the "arbitrary and capricious" test. In so doing, the 
court, engaging in a "searching an<i careful," yet "narrow" inquiry, asks 
whether the agency decision was based on "a consideration of relevant 
factors," and whether the agency has made "a clear error of judgment." 
Despite its rollercoaster language, the "arbitrary and capricious" test is one of 
reasonableness.22o However, ever since Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
Association v. State Fann Mutual Insurance Co.,221 the hurdle has been raised 
with respect to this reasonableness standard and the arbitrary and capricious 
test has been applied with increasing intensity. As the Court in State Farm 
held: 
Normally, an agency role would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has 
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed 
to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its 
decision that runs. counters to the evidence before the agency, or is so 
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product 
of agency expertise. 222 
With the Overton Park and State Farm cases in mind, the arbitrary and 
capricious test can be thought of as comprising three components. This 
tripartite standard focuses on: (!)whether the agency decision was based on "a 
consideration of the relevant factors";223 (2) whether the agency made a "clear 
219 !d. at 415-16 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
220 See supra note 191. 
221 463 u.s. 29 (1984). 
222 !d. at 43. 
223 The obvious question is what exactly is a "relevant fuctor" and who determines 
such? In some instances the governing statute sets forth which fuctors are relevant and an 
agency may discern what those fuctors are from the statute. 
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error of judgment";224 and (3) the rationale and decision making process of the 
agency~ Under this last component, the agency decision may be reversed or 
remanded either because the agency's rationale was inadequate225 or the agency 
failed to reflect upon alternative considerations.226 
3. Applying the Arbitrary and Capridous Test to the Fact Findings of the 
-2~c- ''''"'~" BPAJ c;i 
The Overton Park/State Fann analysis provides the Federal Circuit with a 
befitting and doctrinally sound framework within which the fact findings of the 
BP AI can be reviewed. 227 In applying this framework to the fact findings of a 
224 As a test of reasonableness or rational basis, reviewing courts are very reluctant to 
overrule an agency decision as "arbitrary and capricious" based on "clear error of 
judgment." As then Judge Breyer and Professor Stewart stated: 
Courts have been reluctant to overrule a particular agency decision on the ground that 
the agency has made a "clear error of judgment," and for that reason its policy choice 
is "arbitrary." This reluctance is reflected in Overton Park's admonition that the 
"ultimate standard of review" under the arbitrary and capricious standard is a "narrow 
one" and that a reviev.ing court "is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of 
the agency." 
. . . In the thousands of federal court decisions annually reviewing federal 
administrative action, only a few invalidate agency action on this ground. Litigants 
attempting to persuade a reviewing court that the balance struck by an agency among 
relevant factors is arbitrary and capricious' must be prepared to persuade the court that 
the agency's decision has no rstional basis whatsoever. Given the artfulness of agency 
opinion writers, the skills of government lawyers, and the plausibility of agency claims 
of 'expertise,' this is a difficult burden to carry. 
BREYER & STEWART, supra note 9, at 361-62. Given the improbable nature that an 
agency's decision will be overturned because of a "clear error of judgment," it seems that 
the battleground revolves around the "relevant factor" portion of the "arbitrary and 
capriCioiis" test, as well as the decision making process of the agency.-
225 ' ' . See, e.g., Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1373 (D.C. Crr. 1985); 
New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC, 727 F.2d 1127, 1130-31 (D.C. Cir. 
1984); Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 653, 660-61 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also Patricia 
M. Wald, The Contributions of the D.C. Orcuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 
500, 528 (1988) (stating that the D.C. Circuit has reversed 67 out of 222 agency decisions 
in 1987 because of the agency's inadequate rationale). 
226 See, e.g., City of Brookings Mun. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 822 F.2d 1153, 1169-70 
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1507 
(D.C. Cir. 1986). 
227 The Federal Circuit has adopted the Overton Park version of the "arbitrary and 
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patentability determination, the first question is whether the Commissioner, 
who delegates the examination of patent applications to patent examiners and 
the BPA.i, "acted within the scope of his authority." As stated earlier, the 
Commissioner has a congressional delegation to examine and issue patents. 228 
With such a clear delegation, the Commissioner's authority should not be a 
concern. 
Witl:kstep one of Qverton Park satisfied, . the issue becomes whether the 
factual determinations involved in a patentability decision are "arbitrary and 
capricious." The Federal Circuit should ascertain whether the BP AI considered 
"the relevant factors" and "whether there has been a clear error of 
judgment, "229 keeping in mind that "[a]lthough this inquiry into the facts is to 
be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow 
one ... [and t]he court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of 
the agency. "230 In addition, the Federal Circuit must be mindful of State Farm, 
which dictates that the reasoning or decision making process of the BP AI 
should be reviewed to determine if the board failed to ::~rlequately explain its 
decision. 231 
The one poL11t X want to emphasize is that although the arbitrary and 
capricious test is more deferential than clearly erroneous review and should be 
applied to the factual determinations of the PTO, it is by no means an empty 
standard. TI1e Overton Park and State Fann fnuuework subject the agency's 
decision to a searching and thorough review and require the agency to 
adequately explain its decision. 
capricious" test when reviewing the fact findings of the: (1) ITC, see Hyundai Elec. Indus. 
Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 899 F.2d 1204, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1990); (2) 
MSPB, see Ginnodo v. Office of Personnel Management, 753 F.2d 1061, 1065 (Fed. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 848 (1985); (3) Claims Court, see Hines v. Department of Health 
and Human Servs., 940 F.2d 1518, 1527 <f:ed. Cir. 1991) (citing both Overton Parle and 
State Fann); and (4) Court of International Trade, see Texas Crushed Stone Co. v. United 
States, 35 F.3d 1535, 1539-40 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
228 See supra notes 154-61. 
229 See Citizens to Preser;e Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
230 Jd. . 
231 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983). 
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C. Missed Opponunities or Avoiding the Inevitable? 
1. The PT'O's Full Coun Press 
Recently, the PTO has argued for greater deference in In re Brana232 and 
In re Napier. 233 In both cases the court seemed amenable, with respect to 
factual determinations'r,<W;•granting 'tB'e""PTO greater·' deference, but ultimately 
failed, or refused, to fully address the issue. 
For example, in In re Brana, the court stated: 
In our consideration of this issue, there is a reality check: would it matter to the 
outcome in a given case which formulation of the standard a court articulates in 
aniving at its decision? . . . 
. . . A preliminary question, then, is whether this is one of those cases in 
which a difference in the standard of review would make a difference in the 
outcome. 234 
With respect to the factual issues, the court held that the BP AI must be 
reversed no matter what standard of review was applied. Therefore, the court 
did not feel compelled to discuss the standard of review issue. Furthermore, the 
court held that the question of enablement under § 112 was a question of law 
and therefore, "[u]nder [the court's] traditional standard or under the APA 
standard no deference is owed the Agency on a question of law . . . . "235 
Thereafter, the court nevertheless left the door open for furture assertions that 
the PTO was entitled to greater deference. The court stated: 
If the question concerning the standard of review, raised by the Commissioner, 
is to be addressed meaningfully, it must arise in a case in which the decision 
will tum on that question, and, recognizing this, the parties fully brief the 
issue. This is not that case. We conclude that it is not necessary to the 
disposition of this case to address the question raised by the Commissioner; 
accordingly, we decline the invitation to do so.236 
Shortly after In re Brana was decided, the Commissioner raised the issue 
of greater deference once again in In re Napier. However, the court "decline[d] 
the invitation," stating that: 
232 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
233 55 F.3d 610 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
234 51 F.3d at 1569. 
235 /d. 
236/d. 
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WhateveJr m...<>rit may lie in that position, the CommissioneJr will no doubt be 
gratified to know that we were able to affum the Board in this instance under 
ilie more stringoot standard. We thus find it unnecessary to address the 
question of whether the AP A standard is, in an appropriate case, the applicable 
one.237 
Why has the Federal Circuit avoided facing the issue of deference head on? 
Were In re Brana and In re Napierreall)rinappropriatecases? Clearly, the 
court in In re Napier could have articulated the appropriate standard of review 
with respect to the factual considerations. The court conspicuously evaded the 
deference issue by saying tt'1at the Board must be reversed no matter what 
standard of review applied or that the board will be affirmed even under "the 
more stringent standard" of review. Nevertheless, it seems that some judges on 
the court are more amenable to granting the PTO greater deference, at least 
with respect to questions of fact. Perhaps, these judges are in the minority and 
view the timing of the cases, and not so much their appropriateness, as the 
determining factor. ln any event, the issue of deference is something that the 
court must inevitably address, and based on in re Brana and In re Napier, the 
PTO will give the court as many opportunities as it desires. 
2. Slwuld the "Arbitrary and Capricious" Test Apply to the Ultimate 
Question of Patentability? 
X have argued that the Chevron doctrine should apply to patentability 
determinations. The PrO posits that the AP A provides the proper standard of 
review (i.e., the "arbitrary and capricious" test). I agree with the PTO that the 
APA's "arbitrary and capricious" test should apply to questions of fact, but X 
do not believe that such is the appropriate standard of review for patentability 
determinations (i.e., questions of law). 
This is not to say that the arbitraa.-y aa.J.d capricious test is without appeal. 
An argument can be made that the "arbitrary and capricious" test of 
§ 706(2)(A) should apply to the BPAI's informal adjudications. This alternative 
is alluring for two reasons, especially in the context of a :nonobviousness 
determination.. First, a nonobviousness determination is really a mixed question 
of law and fact or the application of law to fact, not unlike the issue of whether 
newsboys were "employees" un.der the NLRA.233 Second, "obvious" is an 
237 55 F.3d at 614. 
23!! See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1994) ("[W]here the 
question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the 
agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's function is 
limited .... [T]he Board's determination ... is to be accepted if it has 'warrant in the 
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ambiguous and undefined term, and thus it doesn't matter whether the 
"arbitrary and capricious" test or the Chevron doctrine is applied because 
nonobviousness will always be decided under step two of Chevron, which is, in 
essence, an arbitrary and capricious standard. 
However, there are at least two problems with discarding the Chevron 
doctrine and solely applying the "arbitrary and capricious" test to the BPAI's 
Jnfqrmal adjudications. First, Title 35. has statutofy ,-terms whieh are 
unambiguous and clearly defined by Congress. As such, cases pertaining to 
these unambiguous terms can be decided at step one of Chevron without 
concern for the PrO's action. Second, it is difficult at times to distinguish law 
and fact. The Chevron doctrine circumvents this line drawing analysis. 239 
III. THE STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS OF'THE COMMISSIONER: 
PAYING LIP SERVICE TO CHEVRON 
A. 1he Chevron-One Step? 
Although the Federal Circuit has failed to apply the Chevron doctrine to 
the decisions of the BP AI, the court has proven somewhat less reluctant to 
invoke the doctrine when reviewing the Commissioner's statutory 
interpretations not directly related to patentability. Despite the fact that the 
Federal Circuit has applied, or at least addressed, the Chevron doctrine in three 
such cases,240 the court has yet to apply step two of Chevron because its 
"traditional tools of statutory construction," namely intentionalism241 and 
record' and a reasonable basis in law."); see also Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 
891 (1984) ("Since the task of defining the term 'employee' is one that 'has been assigned 
primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act,' the Board's construction 
of that term is entitled to considerable deference, and we will uphold any interpretation that 
is reasonably defensible."); see also Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 5, at 
209~95. 
239 See Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 5, at 2095 ("[T]he line between 
purely legal and-mixed questions is extremely thin. In some cases it will be hard to tell on 
which side of the line a particular question falls. A broader approach to OJevron, applying 
the rule of deference in all cases, has the virtue of simplicity and ease of application."); see 
also sources cited supra notes 29-31. 
240 See Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft v. Quigg, 917 F.2d 522 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Glaxo 
Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 
F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988). I discuss these cases in detail below. 
241 Intentionalism has been defined as follows: "Intentionalism refers to the use of a 
variety of tools, including legislative purpose and legislative history, in an effort to 
determine the intent of the legislature when it included a particular word or phrase in a 
statute." Pierce, New Hypertextuolism, supra note 5, at 750; see also Merrill, Textuolism, 
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textualism,242 or what I refer to as "pseudo-textualism, "243 invariably lead to a 
supra note 5, at 351-58. 
The use of legislative history has been criticized for several reasons. For example, (1) 
legislative history is result-oriented and may be manipulated to fit a judge's desired result; 
(2) judges should not rely on unenacted texts; and (3) legislative history is indeterminate. 
See, e; g. , Frru:iK 'H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11· · 
HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 59 (1988); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use qf 
Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371; Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism 
& the l11terpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & M..A.R.Y L. REv. 827, 837 (1991). The 
late Judge Harold Levanthal once stated that the use of legislative history is like "looking 
over a crowd and picking out your friends." See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on 
the Use if Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Tenn, 68 IowA L. REv. 195, 214 
(1983). 
242 Textualism has been defined as that which: "refers to the use of a different set of 
tools, including dictionary definitions, rules of grammer, and canons of construction, in an 
effort to derive the putatively objective meaning of the statutory word or phra._.:e." Pierce, 
New Hypertextualism, supra note 5, at 750; see aiso Merrill, Textualism, supra note 5, at 
351-58. Textualism, unlike intentionalism, eschews the use of legislative history as an 
interpretive aid and embraces the plain meaning rule. It is generally thought that Justice 
Scalia is the leading advocate of textualism. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 
U.S. 504, 527-30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (same); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 
87, 97-100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the use of legislative history); Daniel 
A. Farber & PhillipP. Frickley, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423, 
455 (1988). But see Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's 
Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 401 (1994) 
(arguing that Scalia is not a pure textualist because he employs extratextual interpretive aids 
(e.g., a dictionary) to derive meaning from a statutory provision). For articles criticizing 
textualism, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Ihe New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 
(1990); John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory 
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565 (1992); Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 5, at 
405; Patricia M. Wald, 17w Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing 
Statutes in the 1988-89 Tenn of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277 
(1990); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a 
Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295 (1990). 
243 This is a hybrid of intentionalism and textualism. For example, the Federal Circuit, 
in two of the three statutory construction cases where Chevron was addressed, applied the 
plain meaning rule and used a dictionary to discern the "ordinary, contemporary, common 
meaning" of the statutory term. However, after finding no ambiguity, the court proceeded 
to examine the legislative history to see "if Congress meant something other than what it 
said statutorily." See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Glaxo 
Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392, 395-96 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In the third statutory 
construction case, the court began its analysis with the plain meaning rule, but after finding 
statutory ambiguity, engaged in a searching review of the legislative history. Towards the 
end of the opinion, however, the court returned to the plain meaning rule and attempted to 
~ 
···-! 
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finding that the statutory language in question is unambiguous.244 
It is beyond the scope of this Article, and it is not my intention to propose 
a theory of statutory interpretation; rather, I only wish to manifest the extent to 
which the Federal Circuit will go to avoid deferring to the PTO and the 
unconvincing decisions which result from this lack of deference. 245 The court, 
contrary to a consistent and unitary theory of statutory construction, seems to 
·. '" simply cas~a broa<l.·net of,int~retive .theories witb the intent of catching any 
semblance of statutory clarity and unambiguity. 246 As Professor Davis and 
Pierce have stated, because there are several interpretive theories, "judges can 
support widely differing constructions by applying different sets of tools or 
even by applying the same set of tools in different ways. "247 The Federal 
bootstrap the "congressional intent" found in the legislative history into the plain meaning 
rule by referring to the "plain meaning of the statute" and the "explicit" provisions of the 
statute. See HoechSt Aktierigesellschaft v. Quigg, 917 F.2d 522, 528-29 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
244 Some commentators have convincingly argued that the use of textualism on the 
Supreme Court will diminish, if not entirely eviscerate, the Oievron doctrine. See Merrill, 
Textuolism, supra note 5, at 354 ("textualism poses a threat to the deference doctrine. For 
those who believe that judicial deference to agency interpretation of law is a good thing, this 
should be cause for concern, ..• "); Pierce, New Hype11extualism, supra note 5, at 752 
("The Court rarely defers to an agency's construction of ambiguous statutory language in an 
agency-administered statute because a majority of Justices have now begun to use textualist 
methods of construction that routinely allow them to attribute 'plain meaning' to statutory 
language that most outside observers would characterize as ambiguous or intemally 
inconsistent."); Scalia, supra note 5, at 521 ("One who finds more often (as I do) that the 
meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws, 
thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for Oievron deference exists."). 
245 I refer to the decisions as "unconvincing" in that the Federal Circuit's 
interpretation of the statutory provision in question is no more convincing than that put forth 
by the PfO (i.e., Commissioner). 
246 In fact, the Supreme Court has inconsistently applied the Olevron doctrine, and 
part of the problem is that the Court cannot agree on which "traditional tools of statutory 
construction" to apply under step one of Oievron. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 37, § 
3.6 ("The root of the problem is the absence ofagreement among Justices as to which of the 
many available 'traditional tools of statutory construction' they should use when one or 
more of those tools suggests a particular construction of an arguably ambiguous agency-
administered statute."); Pierce, New Hypenextuolism, supra note 5, at 750 "The Court's 
inconsistency in applying the test is largely attributable to post-Oievron changes in the 
Court's choice of 'traditional tools of statutory construction,' . . . . As the Court has 
changed the mix of 'tools' it uses and the manner in which it uses those tools, it has 
gradually ceased to apply step two of the Oievron test to uphold an agency construction of 
ambiguous statutory language, because it rarely acknowledges the existence of ambiguity." 
/d. 
247 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 37 § 3.6. 
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Circuit has done just that with little or no deference to the Commissioner. 24!! 
1. Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg 
The case of Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg249 is a prime example of the extent to 
which the Federal Circuit will go to avoid deferring to the PTO. The issue 
before the cou_rt in Ethicon was the meaning of the··phrase "special dispatch" in 
35 u.s.c. § 305.250 
In Ethicon, a patent ('591 patent) pertah1ing to a medical device was 
assigned to United States Surgical Corporation (USSC). In 1981, USSC filed a 
- -
patent infringement suit against three parties in the District Court for the 
District of Connecticut.25l The '591 patent was one of four patents alleged by 
USSC to be infringed. The Connecticut trial ended in September of 1987 and 
the parties were awaiting a decision.252 USSC, in April of 1986, filed a second 
patent infringement suit in Ohio against Ethicon alleging that Ethicon was 
iP..:frLr1gi..P.g the '591 patent.253 Ethicon counterdaLrned asserting nor.in:fringement 
and that the '591 patent was mvalid. On March 12, 1987, Ethicon, pursua...nt to 
35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307, sought to re-exa.rnine the validity of the '591 patent;254 
and, the followmg day, moved the Ohio court to stay the litigation pending 
resolution of the reexamination.255 The court denied Ethicon's motion to stay, 
stating that "[i]f and when the [P'TO] moves relating to the validity of any of 
248 See, e.g., Michel, supra note 3, at 9 ("[W]here the issue is one of pure law, as 
statutory construction usually is, our [i.e., Federal Circuit] review is truly independent. 
Then there is little or no deference to the court or Board being reviewed."). 
249 849 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
ZSO Specifically, this case involved statutory interpretation through rulemalcing. 
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(a), the Commissioner promulgated 37 C.F.R. § 1.565(b), which 
states, in relevant part: "If a patent in the process of reexamination is or becomes involved 
in litigation . . . the Commissioner shall determine whether or not to stay the 
reexamination . . . . " 
According to the court, "[t]he ultimate question here is whether the Commissioner's 
exercise of authority to stay a reexamination purportedly pursuant to section 6(a) conflicts 
with" 35 U.S.C. § 305, which states in relevant part: "All reexamination proceedings under 
this section ... will be conducted with special diq;atch with the Office." Ethicon, 849 F.2d 
at 1423-24 (emphasis added). 
251 Ethicon, 849 F.2d at 1423-24. 
252Jd. 
25J !d. The defendants in the Connecticut litigation had no relation to Ethicon, Inc., the 
defendant in the Ohio litigation. 
254 See supra note 109 for a discussion on reexamination. 
255 Ethic~n, 849 F.2d at 1424. 
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the patents in dispute, at that time this matter can be re-examined. "256 The 
reexamination request was granted by the PTO on May 21, 1987, and again, 
Ethioon moved the Ohio court to stay the litigation. In September of 1987, 
however, USSC, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.565257 and MPEP § 2286,258 
asked the PTO to stay the reexamination of the '591 patent "in deference to an 
ongoing trial being conducted in Connecticut," and advised the PTO that the 
. ·.· •. Connecticut trial had ended. 259 Tl:le PTO stay,~:Lthe ree:x:amin_ciDon pendingJhe 
decision of the Connecticut court. The PTO cited § 2286 of the MPEP, which 
is based on 37 C.F .R. § 1.565(b ), as support for its decision to stay the 
reexamination. 260 Thereafter, Ethicon sought to enjoin the Commissioner from 
staying the reexamination, asserting that the stay was "unlawful and contrary to 
the reexamination statute, particularly 35 U.S.C. § 305. "261 The District Court 
for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Ethicon's request and granted 
summary judgment for the Commissioner. Ethicon appealed to the Federal 
Circuit. 
Recognizing this case as one involving an issue of statutory interpretation, 
the Federal Circuit cited Chevron for the proposition that "an agency's 
interpretation of a statute it administers is entitled to deference. "262 However, 
the court's "traditional tools of statutory construction" and eventual decision 
discounted the Olevron doctrine. The Federal Circuit expressly acknowledged 
that "special dispatch" was not defined in the statute.263 Employing a textualist 
interpretive aid, the court consulted a dictionary to determine the "ordinary, 
contemporary, and common" meaning of "special dispatch. "264 Although this 
256 Jd. 
257 See supra note 250. 
258 The MPEP is the Manual of Examination Procedure.§ 2286 states: 
H the reexamination is ordered the reexamination will continue until the . . . 
[PfO] becomes aware that a trial on the merits has begun at which time the 
reexamination proceeding normally will be stayed, sua sponte, by the examining 
group director unless a proper petition to stay has been filed which is not rendered 
moot by the sua sponte stay. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OmCE, MANUAL OF EXAMINATION PROCEDURE§ 2286 (5th ed. 
1983 & Supp. 1979). 
259 Ethicon, 849 F.2d at 1424. 
260 Jd. 
261 Jd. 
262 Jd. at 1425. 
263 Jd. at 1426. 
264 Jd. at 1426. The court stated: "According to Websters New World Dictionary, 
special means distinctive, unique, exceptional, or extraordinary, and dispatch means to 
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textualist approach led to a finding of "no ambiguity," the court proceeded to 
explore the legislative history "to see if Congress meant something other than 
what it said statutorily. "265 Not unlike the statute in question, the legislative 
history was silent as to the definition of "special dispatch. "266 
The Federal Circuit employed a dictionary as a means to establish "an 
ordinary, contemporary, and common" definition and inferred an endorsement 
<?f.this definition from the silence of the statute and le~lative history. But how 
could an unambiguous definition of the phrase "special dispatch," as-used in § 
305 of the Patent Act, be found in a dictionary where the statute and legislative 
history are silent?267 As Professor Merrill has stated, "[t]extualism ... seems 
to transform statutory interpretation into a kind of exercise in judicial 
ingenuity. "268 According to the Federal Circuit, if the statute did not suggest a 
meaning of "special dispatch" opposite to that of the definition set forth in the 
dictionary, the dictionary definition prevailed: 
Whatever else special dispatch means, it does not admit of an indefinite 
suspension of reexamination proceedings pending conclusion of litigation. If it 
did, one would expect to find some intimation to that effect in the statute, for it 
would suggest the opposite of the ordinary meaning. But there is none. 269 
Needless to say, this method of statutory construction will rarely lead to a 
finish quickly or promptly. Consequently, the ordinary, contemporary, and common 
meaning of special dispatch envisions some type of unique, extr..ordinary, or accelerated 
movement." ld. 
265 ld. 
266 ld. 
267 Professor Pierce has referred to this aggressive use of textualism as 
"hypertextualism." See Pierce, New Hypertextualism, supra note 5, at 752: 
The [Supreme] Court has carried the transition into a new phase that I characterize 
as ... hypertextualism. The Court now rarely defers to an agency's construction of 
ambiguous statutory language because a majority of Justices have now begun to use 
textualist methods of construction that routinely allow them to attribute "plain meaning" 
to statutory language that most outside observers would characterize as ambiguous or 
internally inconsistent. 
168 See Merrill, Textualism, supra note 5, at 372. Furthermore, Professor l.Vfe .. Jl 
stated that "the textualist interpreter does not find the meaning of the statute so much as 
construd the meaning." Jd.; see also Pierce, Chevron and Its ~ermath, supra note 5, at 
305-06 ("Courts frequently resolve policy issues through a process that purports to be 
statutory interpretation but which, in fuct, is not. For lack of a better term, this process will 
be referred to as 'creative' interpretation."). 
269 Ethiam, 849 F.2d at 1426. 
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·· finding of ambiguity, thus eviscerating the Chevron doctrine. 27° 
The Federal Circuit, like the D.C. Circuit in Chevron, supplanted its own 
construction for the agency's. However, in the face of congressional silence, 
deference to the PTO was clearly warranted under the Chevron doctrine. 271 In 
fact, the district court, citing Chevron, recognized an implicit congressional 
delegation to the PTO to interpret "special dispatch": 
There is no ~~it· that the ieex8mlDation procedure, adopted in 1980, was 
designed to settle validity disputes more quickly and less expensively than 
could be accomplished through protracted litigation. Use of the term "special 
dispatch" exemplifies this design. But the term is not one of art; and its 
meaning is nowhere discussed in the legislative history. The statute itself 
provides little guidance . . . . 
. . . It is only reasonable to assume that some admiriistrative interpretation 
of the term "special dispatch" was contemplated by Congress. Courts have 
long recognized an agency's authority reasonably to interpret enabling 
legislation and to establish rules and regulations which carry out the act's 
purpose.272 
In addition, the Commissioner's decision to stay the reexamination 
proceeding was consistent and reasonably related to the policy underlying the 
reexamination statute; that is, to provide for a more efficient and cost-effective 
procedural mechanism to settle validity disputes.273 The Connecticut litigation 
was completed just days after USSC petitioned the PTO to stay the 
reexamination of the '591 patent.274 If the Connecticut court invalidated the 
'591 patent, the reexamination proceeding would become moot. The Federal 
Circuit, in Ethicon, admitted as much, stating that "if a court finds a patent 
invalid, and that decision is either upheld on appeal or not appealed, the PTO 
may discontinue its re-examination. This is consistent with Blonder-Tongue 
270 Merrill, Textualism, supra note 5, at 366-73; Pierce, New Hypertextualism, supra 
note 5, at 750-52. 
27l ~e Ch~vron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 843 (1984) ("[I]fthe statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction 
of the statute."). 
272 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1138, 1140--41 (E.D.Va. 1987) (citations omitted), rev'd, 849 F.2d 
1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
273 See H.R. 1307(1), %th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6460,6463. 
274 The Connecticut trial was over on September 14, 1987, "and the parties there have 
submitted their post trial briefs and proposed findings of filet to the court." Ethicon, 5 
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1140. 
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Laboratories, Inc. v. University of lllinois Foundation. "275 
Thus, there was a distinct possibility that a reexamination proceeding of the 
'591 patent would be conducted with very "special dispatch." That is, no 
reexamination proceeding at all. The district court recognized this possibility: 
The court concludes that [37 C.F.R. § 1.565(b) and MPEP § 2286] are well 
within the statutory mandate of the reexamination statute because they are 
"reasonably related t(j"'' ~,. pui})oSe8""bf~'" the . enabling"~ IegiSiatian," namely 
expeditious and non-duplicating resolution of validity issues. . .. 
Here the case in Connecticut is not just in trial; the trial bas been 
completed and post trial briefs and proposed findings and conclusions of law 
have been submitted. If ever there was a situation where the PTO 's stay . is 
reasonable, this is it .... 276 
The Federal Circuit dismissed the "expeditious" and "duplication" policy 
arguments based on the fact that the "PTO and the courts employ different 
standards of proof when considering validity, and the courts, unlike the PTO 
during reexamination of patent claims, are not lLmJted to review of prior art 
patents or printed publications. "277 The fact that a patent is presumed valid and 
the reexamination proceeding is limited to certain prior art is all the more 
reason to stay the reexamination. If the Connecticut court were to hold the '591 
patent invalid, almost certainly the same result would be reached by the PTO in 
a reexamination proceeding inasmuch as the court's ability to review prior art 
is not limited. 
Furthermore, the court, and apparently Ethicon, Inc., failed to appreciate 
the adversarial nature of a trial court setting. 278 In response to the 
Commissioner's argument that the Connecticut trial will yield a more complete 
record on the validity issue, the court extolled the neutrality of a reexamination 
proceeding: "'Reexamination is ... neutral, the patentee and the public having 
an equal interest in the issuance and maintenance of valid patents.'"279 Yet, 
neutrality in this instance is not as virtuous as the Federal Circuit suggests. 
Recall, Ethicon, Inc. is attempting to invalidate the '591 patent. The defendants 
in the Connecticut trial, faced with potential infringement, are just as likely as 
Ethioon, Inc~ to vigorously challenge the validity of the '591 patent; and USSC 
275 Ethicon, 849 F.2d at 1429. 
276 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1141 (emphasis added). 
277 Ethicon, 849 F.2d at 1427. 
278 The Federal Circuit stated that "[t]he inequity of a stay is illustrated by the fact that 
here Ethicon is not involved in the litigation in Connecticut . . . . " Ethicon, 849 F.2d at 
1427. 
279 ld. at 1428 (quoting In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 856 (Fed.Cir. 1985)). 
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will certainly be able to defend against these claims of invalidity. 280 Besides, a 
holding by the Connecticut court that the '591 patent is not invalid does not 
preclude Ethicon, Inc. from asserting that patent's invalidity in a reexamination 
proceeding or subsequent litigation. . 
The Federal Circuit's failure to attribute significance to the potentially 
dispositive nature of the Connecticut trial and its claims relating to the 
neutrality of reexamination proceedmgs"tnanifesteit:~Jer an insensitivity and lack 
of appreciation of the finer policy concerns at play or a reluctance to defer to 
the PTO. The latter is more likely given the considerable sophistication of the 
judges on the Federal Circuit. 
2. Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg 
In Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg,281 the Federal Circuit reviewed the 
Commissioner's statutory interpretation of the term "product" in 35 U.S.C. § 
156(t)(2). In 1984, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Term Restoration Act (Act).282 Under the Act, a patent owner may have the 
term of her patent extended if a number of conditions are satisfied. Specifically, 
a patent term may be extended if "the product has been subject to a regulatory 
review period before its commercial marketing or use";283 and "the permission 
for the commercial marketing or use of the product after such regulatory 
review period is the first permitted commercial marketing or use of the product 
under the provision of law under which such regulatory review period 
occurred. "284 
In the definitional section of 35 U.S.C. § 156, "product" is defined as "the 
active ingredient of a new drug, . . . including any salt or ester of the active 
ingredient. "285 
Pursuant to the Act, the assignee, Glaxo, sought to extend the term of its 
patent ('320 patent) "because of the lost marketing time due to the lengthy 
280 Entities accused of patent infringement are likely to scour the earth in search of 
prior art. This evidence is obtained through months, sometimes years, of discovery. On the 
other hand, persons requesting reexamination are very limited in their rights. The requester 
may only (1) receive notice of the Patent Office's decision regarding reexamination, (2) 
receive a copy of the patentee's response to the request, and (3) file a rejoinder to that 
response. See 35 U.S.C. § 304; 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.530, 1.535. Also, as mentioned earlier, the 
Commissioner relies solely upon printed publications and patents in a reexamination. 
281 894 F.2d 392 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
282 98 Stat. 1598. 
283 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4) (Supp. V 1987) (emphasis added). 
284 Jd. § 156(a)(S) (Supp. V 1987) (emphasis added). 
285 /d. § 156(f)(2) (Supp. V 1987) (emphasis added). 
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FDA approval process. "286 The active ingredient in the '320 patent was 
cefurmdme axetil, an ester of cefuroxime, which is an organic acid. 287 Glaxo 
marketed the '320 patent under the tradename CEFTIN. To be effective, 
CEfTIN had to be administered orally. The FDA approved CEFTIN on 
December 28, 1987. Glaxo also had another patent ('153 patent), which 
claimed cefuroxime and its salts.288 Glaxo marketed the '153 patent under the 
tradenames ZINACEF and KEFUROX, which had to. be administ~red 
intramuscularly or intravenously. The FDA approved ZINACEF in 1983 and 
¥..EFUROX in 1987.289 
It was undisputed that cefuroxime axetil was the active ingredient in 
CEFTIN; and that ZINACEF and KEFUROX were neither esters, nor salts of 
cefuroxime axetil. Nevertheless, the Commissioner denied the tenn extension 
based on his assertion that "Glaxo has already had a prior approval of the 
'product' before it sought a term extension for its '320 patent. "290 According 
to the Commissioner, § 156(t)(2) defines "product" broader than the three 
categories of compounds enmnerated i..1 the statute,291 and encompasses "a.11y 
'new chemical entity. "'292 
The Commissioner asserted that its interpretation is entitled to Chevron 
deference,293 but the Federal Circuit rejected this assertion, stating that "[t]he 
rule of deference enunciated in [Chevron] is limited to when the statutory 
hL.'1guage has 'left a gap' or is &.vnbiguous. "294 The court, employh1g a textualist 
approach, invoked the plain meaning rule and held that§ 156 is unambiguous: 
236 Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 394. 
287 ld. at 393. 
238 Jd. 
289 Jd. at 394. 
290 Jd. 
291 The three categories are: (1) an active ingredient; (2) a salt of an active ingredient; 
or (3) an ester of an active ingredient. 
292 Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 394. The Commissioner asserted that the term "product" in 35 
U.S.C. § 156(1)(2) includes "new active moiety, which would encompass all acid, salt, or 
ester forms of a single therapeutically active substance even if the drug before being 
administered contained only other substances." Therefore, the Commissioner argued that: 
/d. 
becaUlle after being orally administered CEFfiN tablets combine with digestive 
substances in the human body to produce the same therapeutically active. substance 
contained in both ZINACEF and KEFUROX, then ... Glaxo has already had a prior 
approval of the "product" before it sought a tenn extension for its '320 patent. 
293 Jd. at 398. 
294 Jd. 
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We conclude that section 156(t)(2)'s terms, "active ingredient of a new 
drug .•. including any salt or ester of the active ingredient," all have a plain 
meaning. We reach this conclusion because we must interpret statutory words 
as "taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning .... In particular, 
the terms "active ingredient," "salt," and "ester" bad well-defined, ordinary 
meanings when Congress enacted the Act. 295 
1489 
1.'2""' As in Eihiton, 'however, the Federal Circuit broadened''fits ';'statutory '""'-
analysis by exploring the legislative history "'to determine whether there is a 
clearly expressed legislative intention contrary to the statutory language.' "296 
The court did not find a contrary intention in the legislative history. 
One could argue that the Federal Circuit's finding of no ambiguity in 
Gla:xo is more easily justified than its decision in Ethicon in that § 156 had a 
definitional provision setting forth what the term "product" means;297 and that 
section did not say anything about "new chemical entity" or "new active 
moiety." One could conclude that Congress has spoken directly to this issue, 
and therefore, step one of Chevron was the appropriate place to decide this 
case. Even if this approach would lead to "absurd results," the fault and 
potential remedy lie with Congress, not the courts. 
On the other hand, the Federal Circuit found that the Commissioner's 
interpretation is consistent with the "general purposes" of § 156, which leads 
one to believe that the statutory term at issue is ambiguous, and the 
Commissioner's interpretation was a reasonable alternative.298 Given these 
cOmpeting interpretations, a strong argument could be made that the Federal 
Circuit should have deferred to the Commissioner. 299 
295 Jd. at 395 (citations omitted). 
296 ld. (quoting Madison Galleries Ltd. v. United States, 870 F.2d 627, 629 (Fed. Cir. 
1989)) (emphasis added). 
297 Recall, the court in Ethicon acknowledged that the statute and legislative history 
were silent with respect to the term "special dispatch." 
298 Gloxo, 894 F.2d at 396 ("Although we agree that the Commissioner's 
interpretation of the meaning of section 156 is consistent with [the] general purposes [of the 
Act], the plain meaning of section 156 is also consistent .... "). 
299 See Abbott Laboratories v. Young, 920 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
502 U.S. 819 (1991). The court, like Gloxo, had before it the term "active ingredient" as 
put forth in the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act. Although the 
statutory section in Abbott was different, the statutory definition of "active ingredient" was 
essentially the same. In fact, the applicant in Abbott cited Gloxo in support of its contention 
that the phrase "active ingredient" is unambiguous under the plain meaning rule. The court 
disagreed: 
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's guidance in Chevron, we must first determine whether 
Congress manifested an "unambiguously expressed intent" that resolves this dispute 
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Deference may also have been warranted in light of the Commissioner's 
assertion that "applying the plain meaning of section 156 . . . will create 
absurd results contrary to [the general purposes of § 156]. "300 The absurd 
results that would occur, according to the Commissioner, may be due to 
unforeseen circumstances at the time the Act was enacted. This is especially 
true when the following statement by the cou11: is considered: "We simply 
cannot say tpat the plain ill~g of section 156 would provide unwanted 
results because Congress may very well have contemplated all the ramifications 
of its chosen defi..11Jtion in light of the political realities as seen played out in the 
over the statute's meaning. Of course, the language of the statute itself is always the 
best indication of Congressional intent. Abbott [applicant] argues, with the support of 
the Federal Circuit, that the "plain meaning" of the language supports its interpretation. 
Both Abbott [applicant] and the Federal Circuit [citing Glaxo] . . . focus only on the 
phrase "active ingredient," claiming it has a well understood meaning . . . . [f]he 
government . . . reads the . . . phrase ("including any ester or salt of the active 
ingredient") to pennit aJl interpretation of "active ii1gredier1t" ta'"'ARt i.."'lcludes even more 
tlmn salt or ester derivatives. According to the government, that phrase can be 
interprcted to mean that Congress was using the term active ingredient loosely, possibly 
as a virtual synonym for active moiety. 
/d. at 987. This is what the Commissioner of the PrO essentially argued in Giaxo. See 
Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 394. The Abbott court held: "Putting aside for a moment the relative 
merits of the various constructions offered, we first conciude the ianguage is ambiguous ... 
. " Abbott, 920 F.2d at 987. Although the court did not accept the government's 
construction, it stated that: 
Once we reject the agency's interpretation of the statute as unreasonable it does not 
follow that appellant's competing construction must be adopted. Even if we thought 
appellant's interpretation were reasonable we could not acc...yt it if we perceived still 
other possible reasonable constructions. h is, qfier all, for the agency to make the 
choice between Sl4clz ahernatives. 
/d. at 988 (emphasis added). The court, in remanding the case to the district court 
instructing the latter to remand to the agency, stated: "We hold only that the statute is 
ambiguous [and given that both constructions were unreaso11able] ... we may not proceed 
since we have no authority to place a construction on the statute that the agency has not 
offered." ld. at 989. 
300 Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 396. Traditionally, the Plain Meaning Rule was usually 
inapplicable if it would lead to absurd results. See United States v. Missouri Pacific R.R. 
Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929) ("[WJhere language of an enactment is clear and 
construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd and impracticable consequences, 
the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the meaning intended.") 
(emphasis added). 
L l:c 
I. 
I 
I 
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legislative process, and we must assume it did. ,301 
However, it is just as likely, if not more likely, that Congress did not 
foresee "all of the ramifications of its chosen definition." This lack of 
congressional foresight is one of the major benefits of deferring to an agency's 
interpretation. 302 
Furthermore, Congress explicitly delegated to the Commissioner the 
authority to ,determine if,!!_,P~!lt is eligi~Jor a termj~J(tension, and the court 
in Glaxo conceded as much. 303 As such, an argument can be made that the 
Commissioner should have the authority to define the statutory terms related to 
a patent extension determination. However, the court, based on the "plain 
meaning of 'product,'" stated that all Congress delegated to the Commissioner 
was the authority to determine "whether any patented chemical compound 
named in a patent term extension application fell within the statutory definition 
of 'product,' but not what 'product' was to mean. "304 
This conclusion not only igilores Ozevron, but the realities of a patent term 
extension determination as well. Although the court said that the determination 
in question was not based on policy, but "a narrow dissection of statutory 
language," it seems that policy is a factor and in order to make an informed 
patent term extension determination, the Commissioner should be given greater 
deference in defining what a "product" is.3os A determination of whether a 
301 Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 397. 
302 See Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 5, at 2088: 
Sometimes regulation is made more difticuh because of the pervasive problem of 
changed circumstances. New developments involving technological capacity, 
economics, the international situation, or even law may affect regulatory performance. 
Congress is unable to amend every statute to account for these changes, a situation that 
creates a genuine problem for those who must apply the statute. . . . In these 
circumstances, a grant of interpretive authority to administrators, allowing them to take 
changed circumstances into consideration, seems to be a valuable if partial corrective. 
Id.; see also Scalia, supra note 5, at 517-18. 
Jd. 
303 See 35 U.S.C. § 156(e)(1) (1988), stating that: 
A determination that a patent is eligtble for extension may be made by the 
Commissioner solely on the basis of the representations contained in the application for 
the extension. If the Commissioner determines that a patent is eligtbie for extension ... 
the Commissioner shall issue to the applicant for the extension of the term of the patent 
a certificate of extension .... 
304 Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 399. 
305 See Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 5, at 2084 n.64 ("Because the 
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claimed invention named in a patent term extension application is a "product," 
and a determination of what "product" means are inextricably linked, 
especially given the reasonable alternative interpretations of "product," the 
requisite tecr.nica! expertise involved, and potential lack of congressional 
foresight with respect to new technologies and other unforeseen circumstances. 
3. Hoechst AJctiengesellsch~ft v. Quigg 
The Federal Circuit's approach to statutory construction in Hoechst 
Akfi.engesellschaft v. Quigg,306 like that Lr1 Ethicon and GlaJt.o, stops at step one 
of Chevron. The issue in Hoechst centered around the meaning of the phrase 
"regulatory review period." 
In Hoechst, the patent owner filed an application with the PTO to have the 
term of its patent ('433 patent) extended under 35 U.S.C. § 156. The 
Commissioner denied the application because the patent owner's product was 
not subject to a "'reguiatory review period" set forth in 35 U.S.C. 
§ 156(a)(4).307 The phrase "regulatory review period" is def1n.ed i.Il 35 U.S.C. 
§ 156(g): "For purposes of this section, the term 'regulatory review period' has 
the following meanings: (l)(A) In the case of a product which is a new drug, 
antibiotic drug, or human biological product, the term means the period 
described in subparagraph (B) to which the limitations described in paragraph 
(6) applies. "303 
In rejecting the term extension application, t.h.e Corrunissioner argued t.h.at 
"the language [in § 156(g)(l)(A)] 'to which the lLrnitation described in 
paragraph (6) applies' ... incorporates the paragraph (6) limitations into the 
definition of a regulatory review period. "309 Because none of the lLrnitations (or 
categories) set forth in paragraph (6) applied to the '433 patent,31° the patent, 
delegation to the agency to implement the statute is . . . permissible, the delegation of 
power to give meaning to statutory terms should be seen as a legitimate part of the authority 
of implementation."). 
306 917 F.2d 522 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
307 ld. at 523. 
303 35 U.S.C. § 156(g) (1988) (emphasis added). 
309 Hoechst, 917 F.2d at 525. 
310 /d. at 525. Section 156(g)(6) sets forth three limitations. Subparagraph (A) pertains 
to patents issued after the enactment of the Patent Term Extension Act. The '433 patent was 
issued before the enactment of the Act. Subparagraph (B) pertains to patents that issued 
prior to the Act but only if no FDA exemption had been applied for as of the date of 
enactment of the Act. The owner of the '433 patent applied for an exemption at the time of 
enactment of the Act. Lastly, subparagraph (C) applies to patents which issued prior to the 
enactment of the Act if the regulatory review period had begun but commercial marketing 
and use had not yet been approved. The '433 patent had already been approved before the 
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according to the Commissioner, did not undergo a "regulatory review period." 
Needless to say, the patent owner asserted that the limitations of paragraph (6) 
are not part of the definition of regulatory review period "and are thus not part 
of the statute's eligibility requirements. "311 
The district court, stating that there was "sufficient ambiguity in that 
[statutory] language to accommodate and bear the weight of both positions," 
,~,held, for the, .. Gammissioner .lH The district court based its holding on an 
extensive review of the legislative history.313 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit analyzed the statutory language within the 
confines of the Chevron doctrine, and, after reciting the plain meaning rule, 
agreed with the district court that the statutory language of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 156(g)(l)(A) was ambiguous.314 However, the court proceeded to examine 
the legislative history in great detail and eventually reached a conclusion 
opposite to that of the district court and Commissioner.315 The Federal Circuit 
initially stated that "the legislative history is silent" as to whether Congress 
intended the '433 patent "and those similarly situated patents for drugs 
approved shortly before enactment of the Act, to be eligible for a term 
extension. "316 However, the court proceeded to say that the "legislative history 
is not silent" with respect to whether § 156(g)(6) is part of the definition of 
"regulatory review period, "317 and cited the following language to support its 
holding that "[i]t is clear from the ... House Report that Congress intended .. 
. Section 156(g)(6) to be a limitation on the extension term" and not part of its 
definition:318 
1he dqinition of the various regulatory review periods is in sedions 156(g)(l)-
(3) .... 1he additional limitation on the period of extension is found in 
seaion ... [156(g)(6)]. That section provides different maximum periods of 
extension depending on whether the approved product was developed before or 
after the date of enactment.319 
enactment of the Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(g) (1988). 
311 Hoechst; 917 F.2d at 525. 
312 Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft v. Quigg, 724 F. Supp. 398, 401-03 (E.D. Va. 1989), 
rev'd, 917 F.2d 522 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The district court judge in Hoechst, Thomas Selby 
Ellis, ill, also wrote the Glaxo opinion. 
313 Hoechst, 724 F. Supp. at 401-03. 
314 Hoechst, 917 F.2d at 526. 
315 /d. at 527. 
316 /d. 
317 /d. 
318 /d. 
319 /d. The court also stated: "Whether a drug has undergone a regulatory review 
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After reaching its conclusion, based on a reading of the legislative history, 
that § 156(g)(6) is only a limitation and not part of the definition of "regulatory 
review period," the court began to speak in terms of the plain meaning rule as 
if the statute were unambiguous on its face.320 
However, the statute is not clear and unambiguous. The Commissioner's as 
well as the district court's interpretation of § 156(g) is as reasonable as the 
Federal Circuit's interpret@on. The legislative history suggested that Congress 
wished to provide different periods of extension depending on: (1) when the 
patent was issued; (2) whether the patent owner applied for an exemption 
before enactment of the Act; and (3) whether the FDA approved the patent for 
commercial marketing and use before enactment of the Act. If, after 
considering these three limitations, a patent falls outside the limitations, one 
could rea$onably conclude, as did the Commissioner and district court, that 
Congress did not contemplate a term extension for these types of patents. 
The point that I want to make with respect to the Hoechst case is not so 
much t:Jiat the Federal Circuit's conclusion was wrong; rather, both the 
Conu!llssioner's and the Federal Circuit's Lnterpretations were r6ll~~nable, a..nd 
given these alternative reasonable interpretations and ambiguous statutory 
language, the court should have deferred to the PT0.321 After citing the 
Chevron doctrine and stating that the statutory language was ambiguous, the 
period and the related patent is eligible for a term extension and how that extension should 
be limited are two completely different issues." ld. 
320 For example, the court, towards the end of the opinion, stated: "[W]e conclude 
that the district court's assignment of a zero term extension to the '433 patent is erroneous 
because it is speculative and disregards express provisions of the statute which render the 
'433 patent eligible for a term extension." ld. at 528 (emphasis added). According to the 
Federal Circuit: "[W]e are convinced that the plain language of the statute and the relevant 
legislative history mandate that a term extension be given the '433 patent .... " ld. at 529 
(emphasis added). This language appears to contradict the court's assertion, earlier in the 
opinion, that "'there is sufficient ambiguity in [the statutory language] .... '" ld. at 526 
(quoting HoediSt, 724 F. Supp. at 401). 
321 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc,, 467 U.S. 
837, 843 (1984). "[I]fthe statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction 
of the statute." ld. at 843. "The court need not conclude that the agency construction was 
the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the 
reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial 
proceeding." ld. at 843 n.ll; see also Abbott Laboratories v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 988 
(D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 819 (1991) ("Even if we thought appellant's 
interpretation were reasonable we could not accept it if we perceived still other possible 
reasonable constructions. It is, after all, for the agency to make the choice between such 
alternatives."). 
1995] DEFERENCE, DEFIANCE 1495 
court could have easily deferred to the Commissioner's interpretation. Instead, 
the Federal Circuit mined the legislative history to find statutory meaning and 
reached a conclusion which, although reasonable, is no more convincing than 
the conclusion reached by the Commissioner and district court. Again, the 
court's "traditional tools of statutory construction" avoided step two of 
Chevron. 
B. Missed Opportunities 
In two statutory construction cases where the Federal Circuit did not apply 
the Chevron doctrine, a strong argument can be made that the same result 
would have been reached if the doctrine had been applied. The first case could 
have been decided at step one of Chevron, whereas the second decision 
strongly lent itself to a step two resolution. 
1. In re Donaldson 
Some background discussion of In re Donaldson322 would be helpful 
before the case itself is discussed. The PTO has traditionally interpreted claims 
of a patent as broadly as reasonably possible, while affording the patent 
applicant the opportunity to file amendments to avoid prior art references.-As 
part of this practice, the PTO has asserted that it is entitled to read a means-
pliis-furicti"ori clahn323 independent of any structure put forth in the 
specification. This practice was at odds with 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6, 
which reads: 
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step 
for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or 
acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the 
con-esponding strudure, material, of ads described in the specification and 
equivalents thereoj. 324 
The PTO's apparent disregard for § 112, paragraph 6 was criticized by the 
322 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
323 A means-plus-function claim allows the patent applicant to recite, in her claim, a 
"means" for performing some specified function as put forth in the specification of the 
patent application. For example, instead of claiming "a wooden leg nailed to a chair," the 
applicant, using means-plus-function language, could claim "a means for attaching a 
wooden leg to a chair." The means (e.g., nails, screws, glue, etc.) would be specified in the 
specification. 
324 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) (emphasis added). 
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Federal Circuit,325 but the PTO rebuffed the court's criticism as non-binding 
dicta. Thereafter, the Federal Circuit restated its contention that the PTO is 
bound by 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6.326 Again, the PTO ignored the 
court's ruling and issued a directive to its examiners stating that the PTO is not 
bound by the statute. 327 
This dispute culminated in In re Donaldson. In Donaldson, the Federal 
Circuit invoked the plain meaning rule: 
The plain and unambiguous meaning of [Section 112] paragrnph six is that one 
construing means-plus-function language in a claim must look to the 
specification and interpret that language in light of the corresponding structure, 
material or acts described therein, and equivalents thereof, to the extent that the 
specification provides such disclosure .... [The statute] does not state nor 
even suggest that the PTO is exempt from this xrumdate, and there is no 
legislative history to indicate that Congress meant that the PTO should be. 
The Commissioner argues that his interpretation is entitled to deference in 
view of what the Commissioner alleges is the PTO's sweeping and iong-
standing practice of not applying p&~gruph six dur~~g examination. We 
disagree. The fuct that the F'TO may have failed to adhere to a statutory 
m.~mdate over an extended period of time does not justify its continuing to do 
so.32H 
This case was decided correctly. What is missing from the court's analysis, 
however, is the application of the Chevron doctrine. Clearly, this case would 
not have proceeded beyond step one of Chevron in that Congress had "directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue" (i.e., A means-plus-function claim 
"shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure . . . described in the 
specification and equivalents thereof.").329 Why the court did not apply the 
Chevron framework is somewhat puzzling, given the fact that it was applied or 
at least addressed in Ethicon, Glaxo, and Hoechst. In these cases, Chevron 
deference to the PrO was circumvented by the court's textualist approach to 
statutory construction or aggressive analysis of the legislative history. In 
Dom:ddson, more than in any of three previously discussed cases, the statutory 
language was dear and lent itself to only one interpretation. 
325 See In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
326 See In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
327 See PTO L~,sues Directive to Examiners on Means-Plus-Function Equivalency, 
supra note 19, at411-12. 
328 Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1193-94. 
329 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. g37, 
842(1984). 
~.: 
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2. In re Alappat 
In re Alappafo3° provided the Federal Circuit with another opportunity to 
apply the Chevron doctrine. Alappat involved the statutory interpretation of 35 
U.S.C. § 7(b).33I Although I recited the pertinent facts in Part ll.A.l. above, it 
would be helpful if I restate them here. 
'~ Alappat,~1i·t:lifet7-member BPAI reversed an examiner's non"'statutory 
subject-matter rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The examiner requested 
reconsideration of this decision, arguing that the BPAI's ruling was contrary to 
PTO policy. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 7(b), the Commissioner designated an 
eight panel board, including the three original panel members, which not only 
granted the examiner's request for reconsideration, but reversed the original 
panel's decision. Section 7(b) states, in relevant part: "Each appeal and 
interference shall be beard by at least three members of the [BP AI], who shall 
be designated by the Commissioner. Only the [BPAI] has the authority to grant 
rehearings. "332 
Alappat argued that only the BP AI has authority to grant rehearings, not 
the Commissioner. The Federal Circuit disagreed. After citing the plain 
meaning rule, the court held: 
We ... interpret the Commissioner's express statutory authority to designate 
the members of a panel hearing an appeal as extending to designation of a 
panel to consider a request for a rehearing pursuant to section 7(b). There is no 
indication to the contrary in the statute, and we have found no legislative 
history indicating a clear Congressional intent that the Commissioner's 
authority to designate the members of a Board panel be limited to exercising its 
rehearing authority only through the panel which rendered an original 
decision. 333 
330 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
331 The case also involved the interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 101, but that is not 
directly relevant to the present discussion. 
332 35 U.S.C. § 7(b) (1988Y(em:phasis added). 
333 Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1533. To make this determination, the court had to rule that 
the BP AI is, for the most part, subservient to the Commissioner. For example, the court 
stated: 
Even though [BPAI] members seiVe an essential function, they are but examiner-
employees of the PfO, and the ultimate authority regarding the granting of patents lies 
with the Commissioner. For example, if the Board rejects an application, the 
Commissioner can control the PfO's position in any appeal through the Solicitor of the 
PfO; the Board cannot demand that the Solicitor attempt to sustain the Board's position. 
Conversely, if the Board approves an application, the Commissioner has the option of 
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Therefore, according to the Federal Circuit, "we find the Commissioner's 
interpretation of section 7 to be a reasonable one entitled to deference, given 
that neither the statute itself nor the legislative history thereof indicates 
congressional intent to the contrary. "334 
The statutory language was ambiguous, although the Federal Circuit did 
not expressly admit such. On one hand, the Com..missioner is given the 
_ authority tQ designate BPA_l panels of"at least three members. On the other 
hand, the statute states that only the BPAI can grant rehearings. The statute 
neither explicitly states, nor denies, that the ColD!uissioner has the authority to 
designate a._n expanded panel to consider a request for a rehearing. This 
ambiguity is manifested by the fact that the Federal Circuit interpreted the 
Commissioner's authority, as did the Commissioner, to designate BPAI 
members "as extending to designation of a panel to consider a request for 
rehearing ... , "335 and held the Commissioner's interpretation is "reasonable" 
and "entitled to deference. "336 In light of this ambiguity, the Federal Circuit 
recognized this case as one involving a policy deterrr.Ji1ation,337 could have 
decided t~is issue at step tv:,ro of tl}e Ch.evron doctrL'le. 
refusing to sign the patent .... The Commissioner has an obligation to refuse to grant a 
patent if he believe!! that doing so would be contrary to law. The foregoing evidences 
that the Board iB merely the highest level of the Examining Corps, and like all other 
members of the Examining Corps, the Board operates subject to the Commissioner's 
overall ultimate authority and responsibility .... 
. . . Congress clearly did not intend the [BP AI] to be independent of any and 
all oversight by the Commissioner. 
ld. at 1535-36. 
334 ld. at 1532-33. 
335 ld. at 1533 (emphasis added). 
336 ld. at 1532-33. 
337 In this vein, the Federal Circuit stated: 
[WJe acknowledge the considerable debate and concern among the patent bar and 
certain Board members regarding the Commissioner's limited ability to control 
deciBions through his authority to designate Board panels. Our responsibility, however, 
iB merely to adjudge whether the Commissioner's designation practices as they were 
applied in this particular case resulted in a valid decision over which this court may 
exerciBe subject matter jurudiction, not to assess whether they were sound from a 
public policy standpoint. We leave to the JegiBiature to determine whether any 
restrictions should be placed on the Commissioner's authority in this regard. Absent 
any Congressional intent to impose such restrictions, we decline to do so sua sponte. 
ld. at 1536. 
1995] DEFERENCE, DEFIANCE 1499 
IV. POUCY AND THE PTO 
A primary concern in administrative law focuses on whether the agency or 
the court should have the authority to interpret a particular statutory provision. 
In Part ll, I explored this question in the context of the PrO's congressional 
delegation to examine and issue patents. In this section, I step outside the 
confines of delegated authority and focus; on the comparative advantages of the 
PTO in determining patentability. 
A commentator, five years before Graham was decided, put forth a policy 
argument which purportedly supports the Graham decision. This argument 
emphasized the comparative advantages of an appellate court over a trial court 
in making a patentability detennination: 
The real question thus is whether a trial court is better able than an appellate 
court to determine the presence or absence of invention. . . . A trial judge is 
likely to be neither more able nor more expert than an appellate judge in this 
respect. He is, therefore, in no better position to decide whether a given set of 
facts falls within the legislative standard. 
An ambiguous standard like the 'ordinary artisan' cannot be clarified by 
general principles since the factual situation upon which those principles would 
depend is not likely to recur. If appellate courts are to perform their function of 
clarifying legislative terms at all, they must do so in such cases through 
application of the standard. The cardinal point therefore is that invention is 
largely a question of policy, and if it is to be decided by the court at all, as it 
must under the general standard of the Patent Act, the opinion of the trial judge 
should not be fina1.338 
Based on its current judicial review standards, the Federal Circuit could 
adopt this same policy argument with respect to the PTO in that the court 
applies the same standards of review to the PTO as it does to a trial court. 
Implicit in the Federal Circuit's de novo and clearly erroneous standards of 
review is that the court is "better able," or at least in as good a position, to 
make patentability determinations than the PTO. This implication, however, 
ignores the trenchant policy arguments in support of deference, including the 
inherent institutional attributes that the PTO contributes to its patentability 
detenninations and statutory interpretations. There are four predominate policy 
rationales which ulaf' . ifest 1Ji.is comparative adva."ltage and suggest t.'IJ.at the 
balance of interpretive power should lie with the PTO. 
338 Comment, Appellate Review of DetermiiUJJions of Patentable Inventions, 29 U. 
Cm. L. REv. 185, 195-97 (1961). 
::·.;· 
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A. The Economics of PaJentability Detennination.s 
Technology is transient and iS persistently changing in unforeseeable ways. 
Yesterday there was the light bulb; today there are the human genome and 
DNA sequences. Patentability determinations must take into consideration the 
ephemeral nature of technology and its effect on society. Furthermore, a 
. T<patentability""'determination should go beyond the" technology"han<L become 
familiar with industry practices which beget technological innovation, that is, 
the research and development decision making processes as they relate to 
patentability. The economic literature on patents suggests that the research and 
development decisions of certain industries are influenced by the prospect of 
patentability and patentability standards. 339 As Professor Merges has stated: 
"Indeed, because the [patentability] standard will influence [R & D] decisions, 
courts charged with interpreting the nonobviousness standard ought to be 
cognizant of its impact on the behavior of firms, and ought to modify it where 
necessary to carry out the underlying goals of the patent system. "340 
Although the courts should have an understanding of the impact of 
patentability standards, instead of speaking in terms of the "courts charged with 
interpreting" these standards, it makes more sense, from an administrative law c~ 
perspective, to refer to the PTO as "charged with interpreting" patentability 
requirements. The fact that the Federal Circuit, not unlike all Article m courts, 
is institutionally removed from the day to day operations of the private 
Lndustrial sector a.nd deal with legal problems episodically, highlights one of 
the major advantages of the PTO as an agency. 
For example, the PTO has the institutional capability to conduct public 
339 See supra note 13. 
340 See Merges, supra note 14, at 12. Professor Merges further stated: 
The standard of patentability is assumed to have behavioral effects and thus merits 
careful review. Firms will say, "Look, Finn A got a patent for doing that risky 
research; let's do some risky research ourselves." There are several reasons to believe 
the patent standard has such effects. Detailed case studies show that almost every finn 
at least tries to evaluate the cost effectiveness of proposed research and development 
projects. R&D managers also consider "patentability" or "patent strength" prior to 
investing in R&D projects. Thus the prospect of getting a patent may enter into the 
initial project investment or selection choice. If so, the standard of patentability enters at 
this stage. Even for firms whose research proceeds further before making a detailed 
cost/benefit analysis, patentability might enter in the very rough (and sometimes 
implicit) economic feasibility decisions made by the R&D department at the outset of 
the research project. 
Jd. at 10-12. 
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bearings specifically targeted to particular industries.341 This mechanism allows 
the PTO to familiarize itself with the nature of the technology as well as how 
the iildustry perceives the patentability requirements and the effect of those 
standards on the industry's R&D decision making process and overall 
competitiveness in the international market. 342 This point cannot be 
. ~4l':Forexample; the:PTO held public hearings on October 17, 1994 and Jan\lal';};,~,. 
27, 1994 with the biotechnology and computer software industries, respectively. See Patent 
and Trademark Office: Biotech Industry Blasts PTO at San Diego Hearing, 48 Pat. 
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 677 (Oct. 20, 1994); Patent and Trademark Office: PTO 
Hears from Silicon Valley on Patent Protection for Software, 47 Pat. Trademark & 
Copyright J. (BNA) 3(17 (Feb. 3, 1994). On July 20, 1994, the PTO held hearings on the 
nonobviousness standard as applied by PTO examiners. See Patent and Trademark Office: 
Biotech Industry Blasts PTO at San Diego Hearing, supra, at 677. At the public hearings 
relating to the biotechnology industry, the PTO sought to get feedback from the industry 
concerning a number of unsettled issues. Specifically, (1) the legal standards relating to 
§ 101 utility; (2) the enablement and operability requirements under § 112; and (3) the 
level of ordinary skill in the art under § 103. Over fifty witnesses testified and most offered 
constructive criticism of the PTO's application of the patentability requirements and offered 
several suggestions for improving the examination of biotech patent applications. See Patent 
and Trademark Office: Biotech Industry Blasts PTO at San Diego Hearing, supra, at 677. 
The computer software hearings were held to elicit public comment on several issues, 
"including the possible need for new standards of patentability and/or a new form of 
protection for software-related inventions, and th~ adequacy of the current examination 
process for software applications." In short, the hearings were designed to ascertain "just 
how much patent protection is enough, and whether the current system stifles rather than 
encourages development for the nation's software producers." See Patent and Trademark 
Office: PTO Hears from Silicon Valley on Patent Protection for Software, supra, at 307. 
With respect to the nonobviousness hearings, the PTO invited public comment on whether 
the United States patent policy is being effectively served by the current standard of 
nonobviousness. A vast array of suggestions were made both supporting and criticizing the 
current nonobviousness standard and the application of such. Indeed, these hearings are 
extremely informative and enable the PTO to better understand how each patentability 
requirement affects the behavior of various industries. 
342 See Interview with Lehman, supra note 20. According to the Commissioner: 
Under my regime, we have instituted this policy of public hearings and, on a policy 
basis, we can reach out to the world in a way that is entirely impossible for the Federal 
Circuit. All the Federal Circuit can do is all that it is ethically permitted to do. That is to 
read the briefs and listen to the oral arguments of the parties. This is not remotely clo~e 
to the fact, infonnation, and policy gathering apparatus that we have here, where not 
only can we rely on our internal staff of literally thousands of technical people, 
examiners and lawyers, but also our capacity to reach out and have public hearings; to 
meet and talk with people in the bar, all of these various groups that deal with this 
office. So by failing to give deference to us, the Federal Circuit is just shutting 
1502 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:1415 
overemphasized. The pharmaceutical, biotechnology, computer software, and 
chemical industries, to name but a few, annually spend billions of dollars on 
R&D. Each of these industries is unique, and each has a different perception of 
how the patentability requirements affect their R&D decisions. As such, the 
PTO is uniquely positioned to engage these industries and has the institutional 
flexibility to "modify [the patentability requirements] where necessary to carry 
out the underlying goal~ ofthepatent:system. "3~~ _, ..... 
1. The Problem of "Capture" 
Capture has been defined as when an agency "favors the concerns of the 
industry it regulates, which is well-represented by its trade groups and lawyers, 
over the interests of the general public, which is often unrepresented. "344 
There is a potential problem with agency capture with respect to patentability 
determinations. During these public hearings held by the PTO, the testimonials 
are usually, if not always, from large corporations from various industries, 
including the pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and computer software industries. 
It is a rare occasion when societal concerns are heard. The public is simply left 
out of the decision making process and becomes detached, thus perhaps 
endangering the credibility of the patent examination process. Yet just how this 
one sided approach has affected PTO rulemaking or adjudication is unclear. 
ld. 
themselves off from the benefit of this internal mechanism. I think they are being very 
reckless, frankly, with one of the most critical areas of United States law. 
343 See Merges, supra note 14, at 12; see also Scalia, supra note 5, at 517 ("[O]ne of 
the major advantages [of Olevron] •.• is to permit needed flexibility, and appropriate 
political participation in the pOlitical process. One of the major disadvantages of having the 
courts resolve ambiguities is that they resolve them forever and ever; only statutory 
amendment can produce a change."); Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 5, at 
2088 asserts: 
Sometimes regulation is made more difficult because of the pervasive problem of 
changed circumstances. New developments involving technological capacity, 
economics, the international situation, or even law may affect regulatory perfo!!!'J!nc.e. 
Congress is unable to amend every statute to account for these changes, a situation that 
creates a genuine problem for those who must apply the statute. Here as well, 
administrators are in a far better position than courts to interpret ambiguous statutes in a 
way that takes account of new conditions. 
344 RicHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET. AL., ADMINISTRATNE LAw AND PROCESS§ 1.7.2 (2d 
ed. 1992). 
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Furthermore, some have argued that the Federal Circuit, and not just the PTO, 
may be susCeptible to capture. 345 With both the court and the PTO potentially 
subject to capture, one can argue that the overall policy considerations tip the 
scale in favor of deference to the PTO with respect to patentability 
determinations. 
B. Security in Property Rights '"'·' . 
We as a society, protective of our public domain, are concerned that 
patents not issue to applicants who fail to satisfy the requisite patentability 
requirements. Patents that never should have issued because of unknown prior 
art at the time of examination should be invalidated and removed from the 
protectorate of our patent laws. On the other hand, with an eye towards 
encouraging innovation, 346 we should be sensitive to the notion of security in 
property rights. A patentee should have a certain degree of security in the 
validity of her patent and a reasonable expectation that she will be able to 
recoup her research and development expenditures without living in fear of 
constant invalidity challenges.347 As Judge Plager has stated: 
345 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Qrczdt: A Case Study in Spedalized 
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 68 (1989) ("Of course, specialization poses the risk of bias, 
and without public confidence in the court's neutrality, its ability to expolit the benefits of 
specilization will be compromiSed."); Thomas K. Landry, Certainty and Discretion in 
Patent Law: The On Sale Bar, The Doctrine of Equivalents, and Judidal Power in the 
Federal Orcuit, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1151, 1206 (1994) ("[S]pecializ.ation widens the gap 
between the public and the decisionmaker. Authoritatively as well as geographically, the 
public loses sight as bureaucratization removes to expert control. The interested public is 
redefined to include only those who are part of the same specialized subculture as the 
decisionmaker. "); cf. Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the 1 udidary, 92 YALE L.J. 
1442, 1466 (1983)("Establishing specialized courts also raises questions about the value of a 
general, non-specialized perspective on legal issues .... [The judgments of a non-specialist 
have] less chance of capture by a special interest group. I would [therefore] ... confine this 
strategy [of creating specialized courts] to areas where there is less value to the generalist's 
insight and less danger of capture.") 
346 See supra note 13 for economic justifications for a patent system; see also Patlex 
Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("The encouragement of 
investment-based risk is the fundamental purpose of the patent grant .... "). 
347 The Federal Circuit has recognized this expectation aspect of a patentee's property 
interest. See Patlex, 758 F.2d at 599. 
[W]e would not belabor the point that patent property rights, necessarily including 
the right 'to license and exploit patents,' fall squarely within both classical and judicial 
definitions of protecbble property. Suffice to cite the scholarship of Jeremy Bentham, 
who defined property as "the collection of rules which are presently accepted as 
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I can't imagine an administrative law arrangement where you get a license, a 
permit, a grant, which people can challenge time and time again . . . . It not 
only surprises me, it amazes me. Why would you possibly imve a system that 
gives you a government grant which is little more than a right to litigate? 
That's what it really is-a federal right to litigate. Well, when I make a great 
invention I don't want a fedeml right to litigate-! want a protected property 
interest in that invention. 341! 
-',, -
By second guessing the PrO's patentability determinations in the form of 
de novo and the clearly erroneous review, the Federal Circuit infuses a degree 
of insecurity in a patentee's property interest which may adversely affect 
innovation and frustrate the patentee's proprietary expectations. As discussed 
above, this does not mean that the Federal Circuit should give Chevron 
deference to the PrO if unexamined prior art is discovered. But if the PTO did 
consider the prior art reference which is reasserted by an alleged infringer, the 
court should apply the Chevron doctrine when reviewing the validity of the 
challenged patent. Furthermore, the court's standards of review encourage 
unnecessary litigation in that potential patent infringers, lrnowing they will be 
able to subject a patent to de novo review, are more likely to challenge a 
patent's validity than if the review were more deferential to the PrO. 
Lastly, although the PTO's affirmance rate is approximately 89%,349 a.n 
argument can be made that this affirmance rate does not foster the requisite 
degree of security in property rights that is necessary for sustained and 
innovative research and development Wnat if one out of every ten real 
property deeds resulted in a conveyance of false title? Indeed, the Federal 
Circuit has held that patents are property just as much as land: 
It is beyond reasonable debate that patents are property. In Consolidated 
Fruit Jar Co. v. Wright, . .. the Supreme Court stated: "A patent for an 
invention is as much property as a patent for land. The right rests on the same 
foundation and is surrounded and protected by the same sanctions. . . . 
[P]atents are property and therefore subject to the principles of eminent 
domain. "350 
governing the exploitation and enjoyment of resources. So regarded, property becomes 
a basis of expectations founded on existing rules . . . . It is supposed that men will not 
labor diligently or invest fuxly li!lJe..ss they know they ea.!'! dep-~d on rules which assure 
them that they will indeed be permitted to enjoy a substantilll share of the product as the 
price of their labor or their risk of savings." 
/d. (emphasis added). 
348 See Interview with Judge Plager, supra note 1, at 6. 
349 See supra note 106. 
350 See Pat/ex, 758 F.2d at 599. 
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C. PTO Expertise and Scientific Complexity 
Agency expertise has long been a justification for according deference. 351 
It is axiomatic that patentability detenninations are highly technical and 
complex and r~ire a great deal of technical expertise. The subject matter of a 
claimed'- inventren~·''ean ~'tange·~lfe>m' bioteclmology and pharmaceuticals to 
computer software and semiconductor chips. A firm grasp of the technology 
and how it relates to the patentability requirements are essential in making a 
351 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resouces Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
865 (1984). ("In these cases, the Administrator's interpretation represents a reasonable 
accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference: the regulatory 
scheme is technical and complex."); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 
633, 651-52 (1990) ("[A]gency expertise is one of the principal justifications behind 
O!evron deference."); see also Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util. 
Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 389-90 (1984), stating that: 
We have often noted that the inte1pretation of an agency charged with the 
administration of a statute is entitled to substantial deference. . . . To uphold [the 
agency's intelpretation] we need not find that its construction is the only reasonable 
one, or even that it is the result we would have reached had the question arisen in the 
first instance in judicial proceedings . . . . We need only conclude that it is a reasonable 
intelpretation of the relevant provision . . . . These principles of deference have 
particular force in the context of this case. The subject under regulation is technical and 
complex. 
/d. (emphasis added); Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). In 
Federal Power Comm'n v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 463 (1972), the 
Court stated: 
A court must be reluctant to reverse results supported by such a weight of considered 
and carefully articulated expert opinion. Particularly when we consider a purely factual 
question within the area ·of competence of an administrative agency created by 
Congress, and when resolution of that question depends on 'engineering and scientific' 
considerations, we recognize the relevant agency's technical expertise and experience 
and tkjer to its analysis unless it is without substantial basis in fact. 
/d. (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit has also recognized that expertise is a factor in 
the area of international trade. See Consumer Products Div., SCM Co1p. v. Silver Reed 
American, Inc., 753 F.2d 1033, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("In determining whether a 
regulation is reasonable, we must give considerable deference to the expertise of the agency 
[ITA], i.e., the 'master of the subject.'"); Avesta AB v. United States, 914 F.2d 233, 237 
(Fed. Cir. 1990), cerl. denied, 499 U.S. 920 (1991) (referring to expertise ofiTC). 
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patentability determination. 
The Federal Circuit's current standards of judicial review discount, if not 
completely ignore, the considerable scientific expertise of the PTO and its 
u..nJque w.stitutio!l:~l capability to engage in patentability determinations.352 
Every patent examiner possesses a technical undergraduate degree and many 
have doctorates in their respective disciplines. The examiners must also 
graduate from the Patent Academy;35l and"the judges~sitting on the BP AI are, 
as required by statute, not only technically proficient, but have law degrees as 
weii.354 
In one sense, the Federal Circuit's high affirmance rate of issued patents 
and BPAI non-section 103 determinations reflects the expertise of the PTQ.355 
Of course, the high affirmance rate is a double-edged sword. That is, if the 
Federal Circuit affirms the PTO in a vast majority of cases, what difference 
would it make if greater deference were accorded to the PTO? There are three 
answers to this question. First, the affirmance rate of § 103 appeals arising 
from the BPA1 is relatively low. Second, an 89% a.%·111ance rate of issued 
patents mea...n.s that roughly one out of every 10 patents is invalidated. As I 
!d. 
352 See Interview with Lehman, supra note 20. 
I think that a nonobvious determination is so cieariy a technicai determination ... 
. I mean we have 2000 patent examiners and in the area of biotechnology, we have 
over 150 Ph.Ds. How a judge for the CAFC, even if they are a patent lawyer, can 
presume to know more about whether something meets that nonobviousness test than a 
highly trained, skilled patent examiner, often times with a Ph.D, is beyond me. 
Furthermore, one of the strongest motivating factors behind the enactment of the 
reexamination statute is that it permitted an issued patent to be "tested in the Patent Office 
where the most expert opinions exist .... " See H.R. 1307(1), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6463; see also Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 
F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1960)(Hand, J.) ("To judge on our own that this or that new 
assemblage of old factors was or was not 'obvious' is to substitute our ignorance for the 
acquaintance with the subject of those who were familiar with it."). 
353 The Patent Academy is a school within the PTO designed to train examiners in the 
laws and regulations associated with the patent examination process. The examiner/student 
must satisry 114 hours of course work on 36 topics, including 12 hours on the doctrine of 
nonobviouness; 5 hours on categories of invention and claim construction; 5.5 hours on 
novelty/anticipation; and 4.5 hours on appeals to the BPAI. 
354 See 35 U.S.C. § 7(a) (1988) ("The examiners-in-chief shall be persons of 
competent legal knowledge and scientific ability . . . • The Commissioner, the Deputy 
Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioners, and the examiners-in-chief shall constitute the 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences." 
355 See supra note 106. 
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discussed above, the invalidation of one out of every 10 patents does not 
necessaruy lend itself to an optimal level of security in one's property interest. 
Lastly, and most importantly, even if the current affirmance rate has a positive 
effect on research and development and fosters a sense of security in property 
rights, such does not necessarily mean that the Federal Circuit, with its de novo 
and clearly erroneous standards of review, is promoting an efficient judicial 
-review mechanism. '''''"''" ~--- · ...,,"" .. : 
1. The Problem of "Reverse Capture" 
My appraisal of PTO expertise is not to say that I don't share many of the 
concerns of the private bar with respect to the technological competency of the 
PTO. Indeed, this is a serious concern, one that can be viewed as a kind of 
"reverse capture." That is, the problem is not so much the danger of the PTO 
being beholden to private industry, as it is the PTO's inability to competently 
understand and apply the ever transient technologies which examiners 
encounter daily. Nevertheless, the question remains: Is the Federal Circuit the 
most optimal forum to decide patentability? I think the answer is clearly no. 
First, there are other cogent policy considerations which outweigh any 
technological deficiencies within the PTO. Second, the internal operatioriS of 
agencies are executive and congressional concerns. It is not incumbent upon the 
judiciary to remedy what it perceives to be agency incompetence. Lastly, every 
patent, of course, is not litigated and it is difficult to ascertain the percentage of 
patents which should have never been issued. My feeling is that the percentage 
is not very high. Then again, many firms decide not to challenge the validity of 
a patent, not so much because they believe that the patent is valid, but because 
of the costly nature of patent litigation. This leads me once again tO a proposal 
I made earlier. That is, one of the best ways to remedy any shortcomings the 
PTO may have with respect to technological competency is to introduce a 
European-style opposition proceeding into the examination process. But again, 
that is a topic for a later time. 
D. Judicial Efficiency 
A patent application on appeal before the Federal Circuit, before reaching 
the court, has been reviewed by not only a patent examiner adept in the 
relevant technology, but the BP AI, whose members are technically and legally 
proficient.356 Given the technical and legal expertise of the PTO, the Federal 
Circuit's de novo and clearly erroneous standards of review foster judicial 
356 See 35 U.S.C. § 7(a) (1988). 
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inefficiency and call into question the very existence of the PTO. 
In In re Vaeck,357 a case in which the panel majority reversed the BPAI's 
§ 103 nonobviousness rejection, Judge Mayer, in his dissent, commented on 
this inefficiency: 
An appeal is oot a second oppnrtunity to try a case or prosecute a parent 
application, and we should not allow parties to "undertake to retry_ the entire 
case on appeal." But that is precisely what the court has permitted here. The 
PrO conducted a thorough examination of the prior art surrounding this patent 
application and concluded the claims would have been obvious. The board's 
decision based on the examiner's answer which co...._..,.eheusively explains the 
rejection is persuasive and shows how the evidence supports the legal 
conclusion that the claims would have been obvious. Yet the rourt ignores all 
of this and ro1ulucts its own examination, if you will, as though the examiner 
and board did 110t exist. Even if I thought this opinion were more persuasive 
than the board's, I could 110t join it because it misperceives the role of the 
court. Tnere m!!Y be more than one way to look at the prior a.rt, but on this 
record we are bound by the PTO's interpretation of the evidence because it is 
not clearly erroneous and its conclusion is unassailable. I would affirm on that 
basis.35!l 
Judge Mayer's dissent, despite its "clearly erroneous" language, nicely 
highlights the inefficient nature of de novo review and implicitly calls attention 
to the above mentioned policy considerations. · 
V. CONCLUSION 
Throughout this Article, I have asserted that the Federal Circuit's standards 
of review and its "traditional tools of statutory construction" result in a less 
than optimal balance of interpretive power between itself and the PTO. The 
Chevron decision dictates that the Federal Circuit dispense with its de :novo 
review and apply the Chevron two-step to questions of patent validity, 
especially those iiwolving a nonobviousness determination. Furthermore, 
Overton Park, State Fann, and § 706(2)(A) of the APA strongly suggest that 
the court stop treating the PrO as if it were an Article m court, and apply the 
"arbitrary and capricious" test when reviewing the fact findings of the PrO. 
As for the Federal Circuit's review of the Commissioner's statutory 
interpretations, the court seems to engage in a searching analysis at step one of 
Chevron in an attempt to uncover any semblance of statutory clarity. This 
approach to statutory interpretation is troublesome and leads to unconvincing 
357 947 F.2d 488 (Fed, Cir. 1991). 
35!1 Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 496-97 (M:ayer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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and, at times, irrational holdings. Lastly, I have argued that there are four 
policy considerations which suggest that the Federal Circuit should be more 
deferential to the PTO. These policy concerns highlight the PrO's institutional 
comparative advantages and lend convincing support to my doctrinal assertion 
that greater deference is warranted. 
